http_uri_rewind() returns the number of bytes to rewind before buf->p to
find the URI. It relies on http_hdr_rewind() to find the beginning and
is just here to simplify operations.
The purpose is to centralize further ->sov changes aiming at avoiding
to rely on buf->o.
http_hdr_rewind() returns the number of bytes to rewind before buf->p to
find the beginning of headers. At the moment it's not exact as it still
relies on buf->o, assuming that no other data from a past message were
pending there, but it's what was done till there.
The purpose is to centralize further ->sov changes aiming at avoiding
to rely on buf->o.
http_body_bytes() returns the number of bytes of the current message body
present in the buffer. It is compatible with being called before and after
the headers are forwarded.
This is done to centralize further ->sov changes.
We used to have msg->sov updated for every chunk that was parsed. The issue
is that we want to be able to rewind after chunks were parsed in case we need
to redispatch a request and perform a new hash on the request or insert a
different server header name.
Currently, msg->sov and msg->next make parallel progress. We reached a point
where they're always equal because msg->next is initialized from msg->sov,
and is subtracted msg->sov's value each time msg->sov bytes are forwarded.
So we can now ensure that msg->sov can always be replaced by msg->next for
every state after HTTP_MSG_BODY where it is used as a position counter.
This allows us to keep msg->sov untouched whatever the number of chunks that
are parsed, as is needed to extract data from POST request (eg: url_param).
However, we still need to know the starting position of the data relative to
the body, which differs by the chunk size length. We use msg->sol for this
since it's now always zero and unused in the body.
So with this patch, we have the following situation :
- msg->sov = msg->eoh + msg->eol = size of the headers including last CRLF
- msg->sol = length of the chunk size if any. So msg->sov + msg->sol = DATA.
- msg->next corresponds to the byte being inspected based on the current
state and is always >= msg->sov before starting to forward anything.
Since sov and next are updated in case of header rewriting, a rewind will
fix them both when needed. Of course, ->sol has no reason for changing in
such conditions, so it's fine to keep it relative to msg->sov.
In theory, even if a redispatch has to be performed, a transformation
occurring on the request would still work because the data moved would
still appear at the same place relative to bug->p.
This function is only a parser, it must start to parse at the next character
and only update the outgoing relative pointers, but not expect the buffer to
be aligned with the next byte to be parsed.
It's important to fix this otherwise we cannot use this function to parse
chunks without starting to forward data.
There are still some pending issues in the gzip compressor, and fixing
them requires a better handling of intermediate parsing states.
Another issue to deal with is the rewinding of a buffer during a redispatch
when a load balancing algorithm involves L7 data because the exact amount of
data to rewind is not clear. At the moment, this is handled by unwinding all
pending data, which cannot work in responses due to pipelining.
Last, having a first analysis which parses the body and another one which
restarts from where the parsing was left is wrong. Right now it only works
because we never both parse and transform in the same direction. But that
is wrong anyway.
In order to address the first issue, we'll have to use msg->eoh + msg->eol
to find the end of headers, and we still need to store the information about
the forwarded header length somewhere (msg->sol might be reused for this).
msg->sov may only be used for the start of data and not for subsequent chunks
if possible. This first implies that we stop sharing it with header length,
and stop using msg->sol there. In fact we don't need it already as it is
always zero when reaching the HTTP_MSG_BODY state. It was only updated to
reflect a copy of msg->sov.
So now as a first step into that direction, this patch ensure that msg->sol
is never re-assigned after being set to zero and is not used anymore when
we're dealing with HTTP processing and forwarding. We'll later reuse it
differently but for now it's secured.
The patch does nothing magic, it only removes msg->sol everywhere it was
already zero and avoids setting it. In order to keep the sov-sol difference,
it now resets sov after forwarding data. In theory there's no problem here,
but the patch is still tagged major because that code is complex.
One of the issues we face when we need to either forward headers only
before compressing, or rewind the stream during a redispatch is to know
the proper length of the request headers. msg->eoh always has the total
length up to the last CRLF, and we never know whether the request ended
with a single LF or a standard CRLF. This makes it hard to rewind the
headers without explicitly checking the bytes in the buffer.
Instead of doing so, we now use msg->eol to carry the length of the last
CRLF (either 1 or 2). Since it is not modified at all after HTTP_MSG_BODY,
and was only left in an undefined state, it is safe to use at any moment.
Thus, the complete header length to forward or to rewind now is always
msg->eoh + msg->eol.
Content-length encoded message bodies are trivial to deal with, but
chunked-encoded will require improvements, so let's separate the code
flows between the two to ease next steps. The behaviour is not changed
at all, the code is only rearranged.
This is the continuation of previous patch. Now that full buffers are
not rejected anymore, let's wait for at least the advertised chunk or
body length to be present or the buffer to be full. When either
condition is met, the message processing can go forward.
Thus we don't need to use url_param_post_limit anymore, which was passed
in the configuration as an optionnal <max_wait> parameter after the
"check_post" value. This setting was necessary when the feature was
implemented because there was no support for parsing message bodies.
The argument is now silently ignored if set in the configuration.
http_process_request_body() currently expects a request body containing
exactly an expected message body. This was done in order to support load
balancing on a unique POST parameter but the way it's done still suffers
from some limitations. One of them is that there is no guarantee that the
accepted message will contain the appropriate string if it starts with
another parameter. But at the same time it will reject a message when the
buffer is full.
So as a first step, we don't reject anymore message bodies that fill the
buffer.
Use HAProxy's exit status as the systemd wrapper's exit status instead
of always returning EXIT_SUCCESS, permitting the use of systemd's
`Restart = on-failure' logic.
Use standard error for logging messages, as it seems that this gets
messages to the systemd journal more reliably. Also use systemd's
support for specifying log levels via stderr to apply different levels
to messages.
Re-execute the systemd wrapper on SIGUSR2 and before reloading HAProxy,
making it possible to load a completely new version of HAProxy
(including a new version of the systemd wrapper) gracefully.
Since the wrapper accepts no command-line arguments of its own,
re-execution is signaled using the HAPROXY_SYSTEMD_REEXEC environment
variable.
This is primarily intended to help seamless upgrades of distribution
packages.
Since commit 4d4149c ("MEDIUM: counters: support passing the counter
number as a fetch argument"), the sample fetch sc_tracked(num) became
equivalent to sc[0-9]_tracked, by using the same smp_fetch_sc_tracked()
function.
This was theorically made possible after the series of changes starting
with commit a65536ca ("MINOR: counters: provide a generic function to
retrieve a stkctr for sc* and src."). Unfortunately, while all other
functions were changed to use the generic primitive smp_fetch_sc_stkctr(),
smp_fetch_sc_tracked() was forgotten and is not able to differentiate
between sc_tracked, src_tracked and sc[0-9]_tracked. The resulting mess is
that if sc_tracked is used, the counter number is assumed to be 47 because
that's what remains after subtracting "0" from char "_".
Fix this by simply relying on the generic function as should have been
done. The bug was introduced in 1.5-dev20. No backport is needed.
If the unique-id value is missing, the build_logline() function dump
anything. It is because the function lf_text() is bypassed. This
function is responsible to dump '-' is the value is not present, and set
the '"' around the value displayed.
This fixes the bug reported by Julient Vehent
language(<value[;value[;value[;...]]]>[,<default>])
Returns the value with the highest q-factor from a list as
extracted from the "accept-language" header using "req.fhdr".
Values with no q-factor have a q-factor of 1. Values with a
q-factor of 0 are dropped. Only values which belong to the
list of semi-colon delimited <values> will be considered. If
no value matches the given list and a default value is
provided, it is returned. Note that language names may have
a variant after a dash ('-'). If this variant is present in
the list, it will be matched, but if it is not, only the base
language is checked. The match is case-sensitive, and the
output string is always one of those provided in arguments.
The ordering of arguments is meaningless, only the ordering
of the values in the request counts, as the first value among
multiple sharing the same q-factor is used.
Example :
# this configuration switches to the backend matching a
# given language based on the request :
acl de req.fhdr(accept-language),language(de;es;fr;en) de
acl es req.fhdr(accept-language),language(de;es;fr;en) es
acl fr req.fhdr(accept-language),language(de;es;fr;en) fr
acl en req.fhdr(accept-language),language(de;es;fr;en) en
use_backend german if de
use_backend spanish if es
use_backend french if fr
use_backend english if en
default_backend choose_your_language
The function addr_to_stktable_key doesn't consider the expected
type of key. If the stick table key is based on IPv6 addresses
and the input is IPv4, the returned key is IPv4 adddress and his
length is 4 bytes, while is expected 16 bytes key.
This patch considers the expected key and try to convert IPv4 to
IPv6 and IPv6 to IPv4 according with the expected key.
This fixes the bug reported by Apollon Oikonomopoulos.
This bug was introduced somewhere in the 1.5-dev process.
Lukas reported another OpenBSD complaint about this use of sprintf() that
I missed :
src/ssl_sock.o(.text+0x2a79): In function `bind_parse_crt':
src/ssl_sock.c:3015: warning: sprintf() is often misused, please use snprintf()
This one was even easier to handle. Note that some of these calls could
be simplified by checking the snprintf output size instead of doing the
preliminary size computation.
This patch adds standardized (rfc 2409 / rfc 3526)
DH parameters with prime lengths of 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144 and
8192 bits, based on the private key size.
When compiled with USE_GETADDRINFO, make sure we use getaddrinfo(3) to
perform name lookups. On default dual-stack setups this will change the
behavior of using IPv6 first. Global configuration option
'nogetaddrinfo' can be used to revert to deprecated gethostbyname(3).
Certain implementations (for example ksh/OpenBSD) prefix the
'wc -l' output with whitespaces. This breaks the build since
689e4d733 ("BUILD: simplify the date and version retrieval in
the makefile").
Fix this by piping the wc output into tr -dc '0-9'.
Workaround is to build with IGNOREGIT=1.
HAProxy-1.4 is affected as well.
OpenBSD complains this way due to strncat() :
src/haproxy-systemd-wrapper.o(.text+0xd5): In function `spawn_haproxy':
src/haproxy-systemd-wrapper.c:33: warning: strcat() is almost always misused, please use strlcat()
In fact, the code before strncat() here is wrong, because it may
dereference a NULL if /proc/self/exe is not readable. So fix it
and get rid of strncat() at the same time.
No backport is needed.
OpenBSD complains about this use of sprintf() :
src/proto_http.o(.text+0xb0e6): In function `http_process_request':
src/proto_http.c:4127: warning: sprintf() is often misused, please use snprintf()
Here there's no risk as the strings are way shorter than the buffer size
but let's fix it anyway.
OpenBSD complains about our use of sprintf() here :
src/checks.o(.text+0x44db): In function `process_chk':
src/checks.c:766: warning: sprintf() is often misused, please use snprintf()
This case was not really clean since the introduction of global.node BTW.
Better change the API to support a size argument in the function and enforce
the limit.
A few occurrences of sprintf() were causing harmless warnings on OpenBSD :
src/cfgparse.o(.text+0x259e): In function `cfg_parse_global':
src/cfgparse.c:1044: warning: sprintf() is often misused, please use snprintf()
These ones were easy to get rid of, so better do it.
OpenBSD complains about the use of sprintf in human_time() :
src/standard.o(.text+0x1c40): In function `human_time':
src/standard.c:2067: warning: sprintf() is often misused, please use snprintf()
We can easily get around this by having a pointer to the end of the string and
using snprintf() instead.
OpenBSD complains about our use of strcpy() in standard.c. The checks
were OK and we didn't fall into the category of "almost always misused",
but it's very simple to fix it so better do it before a problem happens.
src/standard.o(.text+0x26ab): In function `str2sa_range':
src/standard.c:718: warning: strcpy() is almost always misused, please use strlcpy()
Commits 98634f0c7b, ed66c297c2 and d5f624dde7 updated the main
makefile with new objects src/hash.o, src/pattern.o and src/map.o,
but missed to update Makefile.bsd and Makefile.osx.
This will fix some of the build failures reported by Jorge Severino
under OpenBSD.
SNI is a TLS extension and requires at least TLSv1.0 or later, however
the version in the record layer may be SSLv3, not necessarily TLSv1.0.
GnuTLS for example does this.
Relax the record layer version check in smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni() to
allow fetching SNI values from clients indicating SSLv3 in the record
layer (maintaining the TLSv1.0+ check in the actual handshake version).
This was reported and analyzed by Pravin Tatti.
The TLS unique id, or unique channel binding, is a byte string that can be
pulled from a TLS connection and it is unique to that connection. It is
defined in RFC 5929 section 3. The value is used by various upper layer
protocols as part of an extra layer of security. For example XMPP
(RFC 6120) and EST (RFC 7030).
Add the ssl_fc_unique_id keyword and corresponding sample fetch method.
Value is retrieved from OpenSSL and base64 encoded as described in RFC
5929 section 3.
Constructions such as sc0_get_gpc0(foo) allow to look up the same key as
the current key but in an alternate table. A check was missing to ensure
we already have a key, resulting in a crash if this lookup is performed
before the associated track-sc rule.
This bug was reported on the mailing list by Neil@iamafreeman and
narrowed down further by Lukas Tribus and Thierry Fournier.
This bug was introduced in 1.5-dev20 by commit "0f791d4 MEDIUM: counters:
support looking up a key in an alternate table".
RFC 1945 (§4.1) defines an HTTP/0.9 request ("Simple-Request") as:
Simple-Request = "GET" SP Request-URI CRLF
HAProxy tries to automatically upgrade HTTP/0.9 requests to
to HTTP/1.0, by appending "HTTP/1.0" to the request and setting the
Request-URI to "/" if it was not present. The latter however is
RFC-incompatible, as HTTP/0.9 requests must already have a Request-URI
according to the definition above. Additionally,
http_upgrade_v09_to_v10() does not check whether the request method is
indeed GET (the mandatory method for HTTP/0.9).
As a result, any single- or double-word request line is regarded as a
valid HTTP request. We fix this by failing in http_upgrade_v09_to_v10()
if the request method is not GET or the request URI is not present.
Commit 6f7203d ("MEDIUM: pattern: add prune function") introduced an
array of functions pat_prune_fcts[] but unfortunately declared it in
pattern.h without marking it "extern", resulting in each file including
it having its own copy.
The cfgparse.c file becomes huge, and a large part of it comes from the
server keyword parser. Since the configuration is a bit more modular now,
move this parser to server.c.
This patch also moves the check of the "server" keyword earlier in the
supported keywords list, resulting in a slightly faster config parsing
for configs with large numbers of servers (about 10%).
No functional change was made, only the code was moved.
We have a use case where we look up a customer ID in an HTTP header
and direct it to the corresponding server. This can easily be done
using ACLs and use_backend rules, but the configuration becomes
painful to maintain when the number of customers grows to a few
tens or even a several hundreds.
We realized it would be nice if we could make the use_backend
resolve its name at run time instead of config parsing time, and
use a similar expression as http-request add-header to decide on
the proper backend to use. This permits the use of prefixes or
even complex names in backend expressions. If no name matches,
then the default backend is used. Doing so allowed us to get rid
of all the use_backend rules.
Since there are some config checks on the use_backend rules to see
if the referenced backend exists, we want to keep them to detect
config errors in normal config. So this patch does not modify the
default behaviour and proceeds this way :
- if the backend name in the use_backend directive parses as a log
format rule, it's used as-is and is resolved at run time ;
- otherwise it's a static name which must be valid at config time.
There was the possibility of doing this with the use-server directive
instead of use_backend, but it seems like use_backend is more suited
to this task, as it can be used for other purposes. For example, it
becomes easy to serve a customer-specific proxy.pac file based on the
customer ID by abusing the errorfile primitive :
use_backend bk_cust_%[hdr(X-Cust-Id)] if { hdr(X-Cust-Id) -m found }
default_backend bk_err_404
backend bk_cust_1
errorfile 200 /etc/haproxy/static/proxy.pac.cust1
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Jacquin <bjacquin@exosec.fr>
This patch permit to register new sections in the haproxy's
configuration file. This run like all the "keyword" registration, it is
used during the haproxy initialization, typically with the
"__attribute__((constructor))" functions.
The function url2sa() converts faster url like http://<ip>:<port> in a
struct sockaddr_storage. This patch add:
- the https support
- permit to return the length parsed
- support IPv6
- support DNS synchronous resolution only during start of haproxy.
The faster IPv4 convertion way is keeped. IPv6 is slower, because I use
the standard IPv6 parser function.
This function it is used for dynamically update all the patterns
attached to one file. This function is atomic. All parsing or indexation
failures are reported in the haproxy logs.
For outgoing connections initiated from an applet, there might not be
any listener. It's the case with peers, which resort to a hack consisting
in making the session's listener point to the peer. This listener is only
used for statistics now so it's much easier to check for its presence now.
This patch replace the word <name> by the word <file>. This word defines
the (string) returned by show "map/acl". This patch also update
documentation to explain how is composed the map or acl identifier.