osquery-defense-kit/README.md

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# osquery-defense-kit
Real-world queries for using osquery as part of your detection & response pipeline.
![osquery-defense-kit](images/logo-small.png?raw=true "osquery-defense-kit logo")
## Organization
* `detection/` - Threat detection queries suitable for alerting.
* `response/` - Data collection to assist in responding to possible threats. Designed to collect data for future analysis or in response to an event.
* `policy/` - Policy issues that are suitable for alerting.
Where suitable, these are further divided up by [MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) tactics categories.
## Linux Case Study: Shikitega (September 2022)
<https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/shikitega-new-stealthy-malware-targeting-linux>
Here is a partial list of what stages would have been detected by particular queries:
* *Initial Dropper Execution*, detected by:
* `execution/tiny-executable-events.sql`
* `execution/tiny-executable.sql`
* *Next Stage Dropper Execution*, detected by:
* `execution/tiny-executable-events.sql`
* `execution/tiny-executable.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-shell-parents.sql`
* *Escalation Prep*, detected by:
* `execution/sketchy-fetchers.sql`
* `execution/sketchy-fetcher-events.sql`
* `c2/unexpected-talkers-linux.sql`
* `c2/exotic-command-events.sql`
* `c2/exotic-cmdline.sql`
* *Escalation Tool Execution* detected by:
* `execution/unexpected-executable-permissions.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-tmp-executables.sql`
* `c2/exotic-command-events.sql`
* `c2/exotic-cmdline.sql`
* `initial_access/unexpected-shell-parents.sql`
* `evasion/missing-from-disk-linux.sql`
* *Privilege Escalation* detected by:
* `privesc/unexpected-setxid-process.sql`
* `privesc/unexpected-privilege-escalation.sql`
* `privesc/events/unexpected-privilege-escalation-events.sql`
* `evasion/name_path_mismatch.sql`
* *Persistence* detected by:
* `persistence/unexpected-cron-entries.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql`
## macOS Case Study: CloudMensis (April 2022)
<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/>
Here is a partial list of what stages would have been detected by particular queries:
* *Initial Dropper Execution*, detected by:
* `c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql`
* *Second Stage Execution*, detected by:
* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql`
* `persistence/unexpected-launch-daemon-macos.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-mounts.sql`
* *TCC Bypass*, detected by:
* `evasion/unexpected-env-values.sql`
* *Spy Agent Execution*, detected by:
* `c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql`
* `execution/exotic-command-events.sql`
* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql`
## Local pack generation
Run `make packs`