112 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
112 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
# osquery-defense-kit
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Production-ready detection & response queries for osquery
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ODK (osquery-defense-kit) is unique in that the queries are designed to be used as part of a production detection & response pipeline. The detection queries are formulated to return zero rows during normal expected behavior, so that they may be configured to generate alerts when rows are returned.
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At the moment, these queries are predominantly designed for execution on POSIX platforms (Linux & macOS). Pull requests to improve support on other platforms are fully welcome.
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## Organization
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* `detection/` - Threat detection queries tuned for alert generation.
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* `policy/` - Security policy queries tuned for alert generation.
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* `response/` - Data collection to assist in responding to possible threats. Tuned for periodic evidence collection.
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The detection queries are further divided up by [MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) tactics categories.
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At release time, the queries are packed up in [osquery query pack](https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/configuration/#query-packs) format. See `Local Pack Generation` for information on how to generate your own packs at any time.
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## Detection on Linux Case Study: Shikitega (September 2022)
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<https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/shikitega-new-stealthy-malware-targeting-linux>
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Here is a partial list of what queries would have fired an alert based on these queries:
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* *Initial Dropper Execution*, detected by:
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* `execution/tiny-executable-events.sql`
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* `execution/tiny-executable.sql`
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* *Next Stage Dropper Execution*, detected by:
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* `execution/tiny-executable-events.sql`
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* `execution/tiny-executable.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-shell-parents.sql`
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* *Escalation Prep*, detected by:
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* `execution/sketchy-fetchers.sql`
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* `execution/sketchy-fetcher-events.sql`
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* `c2/unexpected-talkers-linux.sql`
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* `c2/exotic-command-events.sql`
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* `c2/exotic-cmdline.sql`
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* *Escalation Tool Execution* detected by:
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* `execution/unexpected-executable-permissions.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-tmp-executables.sql`
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* `c2/exotic-command-events.sql`
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* `c2/exotic-cmdline.sql`
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* `initial_access/unexpected-shell-parents.sql`
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* `evasion/missing-from-disk-linux.sql`
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* *Privilege Escalation* detected by:
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* `privesc/unexpected-setxid-process.sql`
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* `privesc/unexpected-privilege-escalation.sql`
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* `privesc/events/unexpected-privilege-escalation-events.sql`
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* `evasion/name_path_mismatch.sql`
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* *Persistence* detected by:
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* `persistence/unexpected-cron-entries.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql`
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## Detection on macOS Case Study: CloudMensis (April 2022)
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<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/>
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Here is a partial list of what stages would have been detected by particular queries:
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* *Initial Dropper Execution*, detected by:
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* `c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql`
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* *Second Stage Execution*, detected by:
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* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql`
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* `persistence/unexpected-launch-daemon-macos.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-mounts.sql`
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* *TCC Bypass*, detected by:
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* `evasion/unexpected-env-values.sql`
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* *Spy Agent Execution*, detected by:
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* `c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql`
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* `execution/exotic-command-events.sql`
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* `execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql`
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## Local pack generation
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Run `make packs`
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For more control, you can invoke [osqtool](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/osqtool) directly, to override default intervals or exclude checks.
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## Policies
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### Contributions
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Help is wanted! We support any new queries so long as they can be easily updated to address false positives.
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Users may submit false positive exceptions for popular well-known software packages, so long as evidence is provided for the behavior.
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### Platform Support
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While originally focused on Linux and macOS, we support the addition of queries on any platform supported by osquery.
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In particular, we've been asked about Windows support: Chainguard doesn't have any Windows machines, but if you have Windows queries that you think would be useful and match our philosophy, we're more than willing to accept them!
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### False Positives
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We endeavor to exclude real-world false positives from our `detection` queries.
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Managing false positives is easier said than done - pull requests are welcome!
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### CPU Overhead
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In aggregate, queries should not consume more than 2% of the wall clock time across a day on a deployed system.
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### Intervals
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Deployed intervals are automatically determined based on the tags supported by the [osqtool](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/osqtool), which we use for pack assembly.
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