don't include port number in tcpip-forward replies for
requests that don't allocate a port; bz#2509 diagnosed by Ron Frederick ok
markus
Upstream-ID: 77efad818addb61ec638b5a2362f1554e21a970a
ban ConnectionAttempts=0, it makes no sense and would cause
ssh_connect_direct() to print an uninitialised stack variable; bz#2500
reported by dvw AT phas.ubc.ca
Upstream-ID: 32b5134c608270583a90b93a07b3feb3cbd5f7d5
Allow fingerprinting from standard input "ssh-keygen -lf
-"
Support fingerprinting multiple plain keys in a file and authorized_keys
files too (bz#1319)
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 903f8b4502929d6ccf53509e4e07eae084574b77
always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether
sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and
failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383
1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for
potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size
just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@)
OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213
Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that
includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also
add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty".
This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are
maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the
future.
Example:
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1...
Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0
Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to
'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a
private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if
it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm').
Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4
Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a
global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5
support multiple certificates (one per line) and
reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: ecbadeeef3926e5be6281689b7250a32a80e88db
fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return
statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62
1. rlogin and rsh are long gone 2. protocol version isn't
of core relevance here, and v1 is going away
ok markus@, deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 8b46bc94cf1ca7c8c1a75b1c958b2bb38d7579c8
"commandline" -> "command line", since there are so few
examples of the former in the pages, so many of the latter, and in some of
these pages we had multiple spellings;
prompted by tj
Upstream-ID: 78459d59bff74223f8139d9001ccd56fc4310659
Fix typo certopt->certopts in shell variable. This would
cause the test to hang at a host key prompt if you have an A or CNAME for
"proxy" in your local domain.
Upstream-Regress-ID: 6ea03bcd39443a83c89e2c5606392ceb9585836a
log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the
main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288
Expand tildes in filenames passed to -i before checking
whether or not the identity file exists. This means that if the shell
doesn't do the expansion (eg because the option and filename were given as a
single argument) then we'll still add the key. bz#2481, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: db1757178a14ac519e9a3e1a2dbd21113cb3bfc6
