The content-length header parser has its dedicated function, in order
to take extreme care about invalid, unparsable, or conflicting values.
But there's a corner case in it, by which it stops comparing values
when reaching the end of the header. This has for a side effect that
an empty value or a value that ends with a comma does not deserve
further analysis, and it acts as if the header was absent.
While this is not necessarily a problem for the value ending with a
comma as it will be cause a header folding and will disappear, it is a
problem for the first isolated empty header because this one will not
be recontructed when next ones are seen, and will be passed as-is to the
backend server. A vulnerable HTTP/1 server hosted behind haproxy that
would just use this first value as "0" and ignore the valid one would
then not be protected by haproxy and could be attacked this way, taking
the payload for an extra request.
In field the risk depends on the server. Most commonly used servers
already have safe content-length parsers, but users relying on haproxy
to protect a known-vulnerable server might be at risk (and the risk of
a bug even in a reputable server should never be dismissed).
A configuration-based work-around consists in adding the following rule
in the frontend, to explicitly reject requests featuring an empty
content-length header that would have not be folded into an existing
one:
http-request deny if { hdr_len(content-length) 0 }
The real fix consists in adjusting the parser so that it always expects a
value at the beginning of the header or after a comma. It will now reject
requests and responses having empty values anywhere in the C-L header.
This needs to be backported to all supported versions. Note that the
modification was made to functions h1_parse_cont_len_header() and
http_parse_cont_len_header(). Prior to 2.8 the latter was in
h2_parse_cont_len_header(). One day the two should be refused but the
former is also used by Lua.
The HTTP messaging reg-tests were completed to test these cases.
Thanks to Ben Kallus of Dartmouth College and Narf Industries for
reporting this! (this is in GH #2237).
With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some
spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false
positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this
could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers
to wait for the tests to complete.
This commit adds support for the new environment variable
HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect,
client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which
should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values
that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger
values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout
action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a
fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs
to be known to compare the old and new values.
Some regtests involve multiple requests from multiple clients, which can
be dispatched as multiple requests to a server. It turns out that the
idle connection sharing works so well that very quickly few connections
are used, and regularly some of the remaining idle server connections
time out at the moment they were going to be reused, causing those random
"HTTP header incomplete" traces in the logs that make them fail often. In
the end this is only an artefact of the test environment.
And indeed, some tests like normalize-uri which perform a lot of reuse
fail very often, about 20-30% of the times in the CI, and 100% of the
time in local when running 1000 tests in a row. Others like ubase64,
sample_fetches or vary_* fail less often but still a lot in tests.
This patch addresses this by adding "tune.idle-pool.shared off" to all
tests which have at least twice as many requests as clients. It proves
very effective as no single error happens on normalize-uri anymore after
10000 tests. Also 100 full runs of all tests yield no error anymore.
One test is tricky, http_abortonclose, it used to fail ~10 times per
1000 runs and with this workaround still fails once every 1000 runs.
But the test is complex and there's a warning in it mentioning a
possible issue when run in parallel due to a port reuse.
Willy Tarreau
Tim Duesterhus
Frédéric Lécaille