If this is a fresh pacific cluster, let's assume that there won't be
legacy clients connecting. (And if there are, let's put the burden on
the user to enable them to do so insecurely.)
This is in contrast to upgrades, where our focus is on not breaking
anything.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Two new alerts:
- AUTH_INSECURE_GLOBAL_ID_RENEWAL_ALLOWED if we are allowing clients to reclaim
global_ids in an insecure manner (for backwards compatibility until
clients are upgraded)
- AUTH_INSECURE_GLBOAL_ID_RENEWAL if there are currently clients connected that
do not know how to securely renew their global_id, as exposed by
auth_expose_insecure_global_id_reclaim=true. The client auth names and IPs
are listed the alert details (up to a limit, at least).
The docs recommend operators mute these alerts instead of silencing, but
we still include option that allow the alerts to be disabled entirely.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
When handling CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY requests from nautilus+
clients, ignore CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH in CephXAuthenticate::other_keys.
Similarly, when handling CEPHX_GET_PRINCIPAL_SESSION_KEY requests,
ignore CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH in CephXServiceTicketRequest::keys.
These fields are intended for requesting service tickets, the auth
ticket (which is really a ticket granting ticket) must not be shared
this way.
Otherwise we end up sharing an auth ticket that a) isn't encrypted
with the old session key even if needed (should_enc_ticket == true)
and b) has the wrong validity, namely auth_service_ticket_ttl instead
of auth_mon_ticket_ttl. In the CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY case, this
undue ticket immediately supersedes the actual auth ticket already
encoded in the same reply (the reply frame ends up containing two auth
tickets).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
If unauthorized global_id (re)use is disallowed, a client that has
been disconnected from the network long enough for keys to rotate
and its auth ticket to expire (i.e. become invalid/unverifiable)
would not be able to reconnect.
The default TTL is 12 hours, resulting in a 12-24 hour reconnect
window (the previous key is kept around, so the actual window can be
up to double the TTL). The setting has stayed the same since 2009,
but it also hasn't been enforced. Bump it to get a 72 hour reconnect
window to cover for something breaking on Friday and not getting fixed
until Monday.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When unauthorized global_id (re)use is disallowed, we don't want to
let unpatched clients in because they wouldn't be able to reestablish
their monitor session later, resulting in subtle hangs and disrupted
user workloads.
Denying the initial connect for all legacy (CephXAuthenticate < v3)
clients is not feasible because a large subset of them never stopped
presenting their ticket on reconnects and are therefore compatible with
enforcing mode: most notably all kernel clients but also pre-luminous
userspace clients. They don't need to be patched and excluding them
would significantly hamper the adoption of enforcing mode.
Instead, force clients that we are not sure about to reconnect shortly
after they go through authentication and obtain global_id. This is
done in Monitor::dispatch_op() to capture both msgr1 and msgr2, most
likely instead of dispatching mon_subscribe.
We need to let mon_getmap through for "ceph ping" and "ceph tell" to
work. This does mean that we share the monmap, which lets the client
return from MonClient::authenticate() considering authentication to be
finished and causing the potential reconnect error to not propagate to
the user -- the client would hang waiting for remaining cluster maps.
For msgr1, this is unavoidable because the monmap is sent immediately
after the final MAuthReply. But for msgr2 this is rare: most of the
time we get to their mon_subscribe and cut the connection before they
process the monmap!
Regardless, the user doesn't get a chance to start a workload since
there is no proper higher-level session at that point.
To help with identifying clients that need patching, add global_id and
global_id_status to "sessions" output.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
global_id is a cluster-wide unique id that must remain stable for the
lifetime of the client instance. The cephx protocol has a facility to
allow clients to preserve their global_id across reconnects:
(1) the client should provide its global_id in the initial handshake
message/frame and later include its auth ticket proving previous
possession of that global_id in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY request
(2) the monitor should verify that the included auth ticket is valid
and has the same global_id and, if so, allow the reclaim
(3) if the reclaim is allowed, the new auth ticket should be
encrypted with the session key of the included auth ticket to
ensure authenticity of the client performing reclaim. (The
included auth ticket could have been snooped when the monitor
originally shared it with the client or any time the client
provided it back to the monitor as part of requesting service
tickets, but only the genuine client would have its session key
and be able to decrypt.)
Unfortunately, all (1), (2) and (3) have been broken for a while:
- (1) was broken in 2016 by commit a2eb6ae3fb ("mon/monclient:
hunt for multiple monitor in parallel") and is addressed in patch
"mon/MonClient: preserve auth state on reconnects"
- it turns out that (2) has never been enforced. When cephx was
being designed and implemented in 2009, two changes to the protocol
raced with each other pulling it in different directions: commits
0669ca21f4 ("auth: reuse global_id when requesting tickets")
and fec31964a1 ("auth: when renewing session, encrypt ticket")
added the reclaim mechanism based strictly on auth tickets, while
commit 5eeb711b6b ("auth: change server side negotiation a bit")
allowed the client to provide global_id in the initial handshake.
These changes didn't get reconciled and as a result a malicious
client can assign itself any global_id of its choosing by simply
passing something other than 0 in MAuth message or AUTH_REQUEST
frame and not even bother supplying any ticket. This includes
getting a global_id that is being used by another client.
- (3) was broken in 2019 with addition of support for msgr2, where
the new auth ticket ends up being shared unencrypted. However the
root cause is deeper and a malicious client can coerce msgr1 into
the same. This also goes back to 2009 and is addressed in patch
"auth/cephx: ignore CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH in requested keys".
Because (2) has never been enforced, no one noticed when (1) got
broken and we began to rely on this flaw for normal operation in
the face of reconnects due to network hiccups or otherwise. As of
today, only pre-luminous userspace clients and kernel clients are
not exercising it on a daily basis.
Bump CephXAuthenticate version and use a dummy v3 to distinguish
between legacy clients that don't (may not) include their auth ticket
and new clients. For new clients, unconditionally disallow claiming
global_id without a corresponding auth ticket. For legacy clients,
introduce a choice between permissive (current behavior, default for
the foreseeable future) and enforcing mode.
If the reclaim is disallowed, return EACCES. While MonClient does
have some provision for global_id changes and we could conceivably
implement enforcement by handing out a fresh global_id instead of
the provided one, those code paths have never been tested and there
are too many ways a sudden global_id change could go wrong.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
AuthServiceHandler already has global_id field, but it is unused.
Revive it and let the handler know whether global_id is newly assigned
by the monitor or provided by the client.
Lift the setting of entity_name into AuthServiceHandler.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
session_key, connection_secret and connection_secret_required_length
aren't material for start_session() across all three implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Destroying AuthClientHandler and not resetting global_id is another
way to get MonClient to send CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY requests with
CephXAuthenticate::old_ticket not populated. This is particularly
pertinent to get_monmap_and_config() which shuts down the bootstrap
MonClient between retry attempts.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Commit a2eb6ae3fb ("mon/monclient: hunt for multiple monitor in
parallel") introduced a regression where auth state (global_id and
AuthClientHandler) was no longer preserved on reconnects. The ensuing
breakage was quickly noticed and prompted a follow-on fix 8bb6193c8f
("mon/MonClient: persist global_id across re-connecting").
However, as evident from the subject, the follow-on fix only took
care of the global_id part. AuthClientHandler is still destroyed
and all cephx tickets are discarded. A new from-scratch instance
is created for each MonConnection and CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY
requests end up with CephXAuthenticate::old_ticket not populated.
The bug is in MonClient, so both msgr1 and msgr2 are affected.
This should have resulted in a similar sort of breakage but didn't
because of a much larger bug. The monitor should have denied the
attempt to reclaim global_id with no valid ticket proving previous
possession of that global_id presented. Alas, it appears that this
aspect of the cephx protocol has never been enforced. This is dealt
with in the next patch.
To fix the issue at hand, clone AuthClientHandler into each
MonConnection so that each respective CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY
request gets a copy of the current auth ticket.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Eliminate confusion by moving auth from active_con into MonClient
instead of swapping them.
The existing MonClient::auth can be destroyed right away -- I don't
see why active_con would need it or a reason to delay its destruction
(which is what stashing in active_con effectively does).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This fixes a regression introduced in commit 85157d5aae ("mon:
s/Mutex/ceph::mutex/"). Waiting for monmap and config indefinitely
is not just bad UX, it actually masks other more serious bugs.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
* refs/pull/39939/head:
cephfs: ceph-dokan - properly log the mounted root
cephfs: Update ceph-dokan "--removable" flag
cephfs: document using multiple fs on Windows
cephfs: provide additional volume details on Windows
cephfs: add ceph-dokan unmap command
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@redhat.com>
* refs/pull/40418/head:
test: unmount when finished ino_release_cb
test: wait a time for inode release
qa: move ino_release_cb to libcephfs sub-suite
qa: simplify recall triggers for bug
qa: fix name for qa task referencing tracker issue
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
* refs/pull/40460/head:
client: only check pool permissions for regular files
Reviewed-by: Sidharth Anupkrishnan <sanupkri@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@redhat.com>
* refs/pull/40465/head:
test: bump up retries for `test_mirroring_init_failure_with_recovery` test
test: fix typo
test: disable mgr/mirroring for `test_mirroring_init_failure_with_recovery` test
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@redhat.com>
* refs/pull/40468/head:
mds/metrics: add one whitespace between metric type the metainfo
Reviewed-by: Varsha Rao <varao@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rishabh Dave <ridave@redhat.com>
in the latest document generated from RtD, the section headers are now
in <section> tags instead of <div class="section">, so update the css
accordingly.
also tweak the style of the list items in unordered list to be the same
as it was.
Signed-off-by: Kefu Chai <kchai@redhat.com>
acting.size() >= pool.info.min_size is meant to check min_size against
acting set participants, but acting is a vector with placeholders.
actingset is the representation with placeholders removed.
The upshot of this bug is that the activation process will basically
ignore min_size for an ec pool allowing writes in cases where it
shouldn't. PastIntervals::check_new_interval, however, performs
the check correctly, and will therefore discount intervals in which
we really did serve writes as not writeable. This can trigger many
different problem conditions including but not limited to:
- Unfound objects due to accepting a last_update with insufficient
osds
- Lost writes
- Crashes due to peering rules being violated
This bug was originally introduced with recovery below min_size in
e5a96fd, and then preserved through refactors in 749a13d and 95bec9.
7cb818a exposed it with with expansion of recovery below min_size
to include ec pools (acting.size() is sufficient for replicated
pools).
Fixes: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/48613
Fixes: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/48417
Signed-off-by: Samuel Just <sjust@redhat.com>
