selinux-refpolicy/targeted/macros/program/su_macros.te
2005-10-21 18:05:21 +00:00

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#
# Macros for su domains.
#
#
# Authors: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser
#
#
# su_domain(domain_prefix)
#
# Define a derived domain for the su program when executed
# by a user domain.
#
# The type declaration for the executable type for this program is
# provided separately in domains/program/su.te.
#
undefine(`su_restricted_domain')
undefine(`su_mini_domain')
undefine(`su_domain')
ifdef(`su.te', `
define(`su_restricted_domain', `
# Derived domain based on the calling user domain and the program.
type $1_su_t, domain, privlog, privrole, privuser, privowner, privfd, nscd_client_domain;
ifdef(`support_polyinstantiation', `
typeattribute $1_su_t mlsfileread;
typeattribute $1_su_t mlsfilewrite;
typeattribute $1_su_t mlsfileupgrade;
typeattribute $1_su_t mlsfiledowngrade;
typeattribute $1_su_t mlsprocsetsl;
')
# for SSP
allow $1_su_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
domain_auto_trans($1_t, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
allow $1_su_t sbin_t:dir search;
uses_shlib($1_su_t)
allow $1_su_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
read_locale($1_su_t)
read_sysctl($1_su_t)
allow $1_su_t self:unix_dgram_socket { connect create write };
allow $1_su_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_su_t proc_t:dir search;
allow $1_su_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
r_dir_file($1_su_t, self)
allow $1_su_t proc_t:file read;
allow $1_su_t self:process { setsched setrlimit };
allow $1_su_t device_t:dir search;
allow $1_su_t self:process { fork sigchld };
nsswitch_domain($1_su_t)
r_dir_file($1_su_t, selinux_config_t)
dontaudit $1_su_t shadow_t:file { getattr read };
dontaudit $1_su_t home_root_t:dir search;
dontaudit $1_su_t init_t:fd use;
allow $1_su_t var_lib_t:dir search;
allow $1_t $1_su_t:process signal;
ifdef(`crond.te', `
allow $1_su_t crond_t:fifo_file read;
')
# Use capabilities.
allow $1_su_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource audit_control audit_write };
dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
#
# Caused by su - init scripts
#
dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl };
# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
domain_auto_trans($1_su_t, shell_exec_t, $1_t)
allow $1_su_t bin_t:dir search;
allow $1_su_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
# But also allow transitions to unprivileged user domains.
domain_trans($1_su_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
can_setexec($1_su_t)
# Get security decisions
can_getsecurity($1_su_t)
r_dir_file($1_su_t, default_context_t)
allow $1_su_t privfd:fd use;
# Write to utmp.
allow $1_su_t { var_t var_run_t }:dir search;
allow $1_su_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
can_kerberos($1_su_t)
ifdef(`chkpwd.te', `
domain_auto_trans($1_su_t, chkpwd_exec_t, $2_chkpwd_t)
')
allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms };
') dnl end su_restricted_domain
define(`su_mini_domain', `
su_restricted_domain($1,$1)
if(!secure_mode)
{
# if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t
domain_trans($1_su_t, shell_exec_t, sysadm_t)
}
# Relabel ttys and ptys.
allow $1_su_t device_t:dir { getattr read search };
allow $1_su_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };
# Close and re-open ttys and ptys to get the fd into the correct domain.
allow $1_su_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file { read write };
')dnl end su_mini_domain
define(`su_domain', `
su_mini_domain($1)
# Inherit and use descriptors from gnome-pty-helper.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_su_t $1_gph_t:fd use;')
# The user role is authorized for this domain.
role $1_r types $1_su_t;
# Write to the user domain tty.
access_terminal($1_su_t, $1)
allow $1_su_t { home_root_t $1_home_dir_t }:dir search;
allow $1_su_t $1_home_t:file create_file_perms;
ifdef(`user_canbe_sysadm', `
allow $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write };
', `
dontaudit $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write };
')
allow $1_su_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
if (use_nfs_home_dirs) {
allow $1_su_t nfs_t:dir search;
}
if (use_samba_home_dirs) {
allow $1_su_t cifs_t:dir search;
}
ifdef(`support_polyinstantiation', `
# Su can polyinstantiate
polyinstantiater($1_su_t)
# Su has to unmount polyinstantiated directories (like home)
# that should not be polyinstantiated under the new user
allow $1_su_t fs_t:filesystem unmount;
# Su needs additional permission to mount over a previous mount
allow $1_su_t polymember:dir mounton;
')
# Modify .Xauthority file (via xauth program).
ifdef(`xauth.te', `
file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, staff_home_dir_t, staff_xauth_home_t, file)
file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, user_home_dir_t, user_xauth_home_t, file)
file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_xauth_home_t, file)
domain_auto_trans($1_su_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
')
ifdef(`cyrus.te', `
allow $1_su_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir search;
')
ifdef(`ssh.te', `
# Access sshd cookie files.
allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
')
allow $1_su_t var_lib_t:dir search;
dontaudit $1_su_t init_t:fd use;
')dnl end su_domain
', `
define(`su_domain',`')
')