## ## Policy for user domains ######################################## # # Base user domain template # # This is common to user and admin domain define(`base_user_domain',` attribute $1_file_type; type $1_t, userdomain; domain_make_domain($1_t) corecommands_make_shell_entrypoint($1_t) role $1_r types $1_t; allow system_r $1_r; # user pseudoterminal type $1_devpts_t; terminal_make_user_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t) # type for contents of home directory type $1_home_t, $1_file_type, home_type; files_make_file($1_home_t) # type of home directory type $1_home_dir_t, home_dir_type, home_type; files_make_file($1_home_t) type $1_tmp_t, $1_file_type; files_make_temporary_file($1_tmp_t) type $1_tmpfs_t; files_make_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t) type $1_tty_device_t; terminal_make_physical_terminal($1_t,$1_tty_device_t) ############################## # # Local policy # allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner }; dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid }; allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition }; allow $1_t self:process { ptrace setfscreate }; allow $1_t self:fd use; allow $1_t self:fifo_file { read getattr lock ioctl write append }; allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }; allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown listen accept }; allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow $1_t self:shm { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write lock unix_read unix_write }; allow $1_t self:sem { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write unix_read unix_write }; allow $1_t self:msgq { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write enqueue unix_read unix_write }; allow $1_t self:msg { send receive }; dontaudit $1_t self:socket create; # Irrelevant until we have labeled networking. #allow $1_t self:udp_socket { sendto recvfrom }; # evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }; dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; # execute files in the home directory allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { getattr read execute execute_no_trans }; # full control of the home directory allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto }; allow $1_t $1_home_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto }; allow $1_t $1_home_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir relabelfrom relabelto }; allow $1_t $1_home_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto }; allow $1_t $1_home_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto }; allow $1_t $1_home_dir_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir }; type_transition $1_t $1_home_dir_t:{ file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file } $1_home_t; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { getattr read execute execute_no_trans }; # Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp. # cjp: this is combination is not checked and should be removed allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind; allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write }; allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; fs_create_private_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) allow $1_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read write append ioctl lock }; allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use; # Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs. # These derived domains encode both information about the calling # user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation # between different instances of the program being run by different # user domains. per_userdomain_templates($1) kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t) kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t) # Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type: kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t) # Find CDROM devices: kernel_read_device_sysctl($1_t) # GNOME checks for usb and other devices: kernel_modify_usb_hardware_config_option($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_interfaces($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_interfaces($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_udp_on_all_interfaces($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_nodes($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_udp_on_all_nodes($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_ports($1_t) corenetwork_sendrecv_udp_on_all_ports($1_t) corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t) corenetwork_bind_udp_on_all_nodes($1_t) # allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise corenetwork_bind_udp_on_general_port($1_t) devices_get_input_event($1_t) devices_read_misc($1_t) devices_write_misc($1_t) devices_play_sound($1_t) devices_record_sound_input($1_t) devices_read_sound_mixer_levels($1_t) devices_write_sound_mixer_levels($1_t) devices_get_random_data($1_t) devices_get_pseudorandom_data($1_t) # open office is looking for the following devices_get_direct_rendering_interface_attributes($1_t) devices_ignore_use_direct_rendering_interface($1_t) fs_get_all_fs_quotas($1_t) fs_get_all_fs_attributes($1_t) # for eject storage_get_fixed_disk_attributes($1_t) authlogin_read_login_records($1_t) authlogin_ignore_write_login_records($1_t) authlogin_pam_transition_add_role_use_terminal($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_tty_device_t $1_devpts_t }) authlogin_utempter_transition_add_role_use_terminal($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_tty_device_t $1_devpts_t }) corecommands_execute_general_programs($1_t) corecommands_execute_system_programs($1_t) corecommands_execute_ls($1_t) domain_execute_all_entrypoint_programs($1_t) domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors($1_t) files_execute_system_config_script($1_t) files_read_system_source_code($1_t) # Caused by su - init scripts init_script_ignore_use_pseudoterminal($1_t) libraries_use_dynamic_loader($1_t) libraries_use_shared_libraries($1_t) libraries_execute_dynamic_loader($1_t) libraries_execute_library_scripts($1_t) logging_ignore_get_all_logs_attributes($1_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) miscfiles_manage_man_page_cache($1_t) selinux_newrole_transition_add_role_use_terminal($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t }) mta_modify_mail_spool($1_t) if (allow_execmem) { # Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack. allow $1_t self:process execmem; } if (use_nfs_home_dirs) { fs_manage_nfs_directories($1_t) fs_manage_nfs_files($1_t) fs_manage_nfs_symbolic_links($1_t) fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets($1_t) fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes($1_t) fs_execute_nfs_files($1_t) } if (use_samba_home_dirs) { fs_manage_windows_network_directories($1_t) fs_manage_windows_network_files($1_t) fs_manage_windows_network_symbolic_links($1_t) fs_manage_windows_network_named_sockets($1_t) fs_manage_windows_network_named_pipes($1_t) fs_execute_windows_network_files($1_t) } if (user_direct_mouse) { devices_get_mouse_input($1_t) } if (user_ttyfile_stat) { terminal_get_all_private_physical_terminal_attributes($1_t) } optional_policy(`usermanage.te',` usermanage_chfn_transition_add_role_use_terminal($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t }) usermanage_passwd_transition_add_role_use_terminal($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t }) ') ifdef(`TODO',` # When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access # denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials. dontaudit $1_t domain:dir r_dir_perms; dontaudit $1_t domain:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; dontaudit $1_t domain:process { getattr getsession }; # # Cups daemon running as user tries to write /etc/printcap # dontaudit $1_t usr_t:file setattr; # Access the power device. allow $1_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl }; # Check to see if cdrom is mounted allow $1_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search }; # # Added to allow reading of cdrom # allow $1_t rpc_pipefs_t:dir getattr; allow $1_t nfsd_fs_t:dir getattr; allow $1_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir getattr; # /initrd is left mounted, various programs try to look at it dontaudit $1_t ramfs_t:dir getattr; if (read_default_t) { allow $1_t default_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; } # # Running ifconfig as a user generates the following # dontaudit $1_t sysctl_net_t:dir search; dontaudit $1_t default_context_t:dir search; r_dir_file($1_t, usercanread) can_ypbind($1_t) if (allow_execmod) { # Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL. allow $1_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod; } allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr; # old "file_browse_domain": # Regular files/directories that are not security sensitive dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr; dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir { read search }; # /dev dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir_file_class_set getattr; dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir { read search }; # /proc dontaudit $1_t sysctl_t:dir_file_class_set getattr; dontaudit $1_t proc_fs:dir { read search }; allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr }; can_exec($1_t, { removable_t noexattrfile } ) if (user_rw_noexattrfile) { create_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile) create_dir_file($1_t, removable_t) # Write floppies allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file write; } else { r_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile) r_dir_file($1_t, removable_t) allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file r_file_perms; } allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file read; can_exec($1_t, noexattrfile) # for running TeX programs r_dir_file($1_t, tetex_data_t) can_exec($1_t, tetex_data_t) # Run programs developed by other users in the same domain. can_resmgrd_connect($1_t) can_ypbind($1_t) allow $1_t var_lock_t:dir search; # Grant permissions to access the system DBus ifdef(`dbusd.te', ` dbusd_client(system, $1) can_network_server_tcp($1_dbusd_t) allow $1_dbusd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; allow $1_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; dbusd_client($1, $1) allow $1_t $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; dbusd_domain($1) ifdef(`hald.te', ` allow $1_t hald_t:dbus send_msg; allow hald_t $1_t:dbus send_msg; ') ') # Gnome pannel binds to the following ifdef(`cups.te', ` allow $1_t { cupsd_etc_t cupsd_rw_etc_t }:file { read getattr }; ') # Connect to inetd. ifdef(`inetd.te', ` can_tcp_connect($1_t, inetd_t) can_udp_send($1_t, inetd_t) can_udp_send(inetd_t, $1_t) ') # Connect to portmap. ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)') # Inherit and use sockets from inetd ifdef(`inetd.te', ` allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use; allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; ') ifdef(`xserver.te', ` # for /tmp/.ICE-unix file_type_auto_trans($1_t, xdm_xserver_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t, sock_file) allow $1_t xserver_misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms; ') ifdef(`xdm.te', ` # Connect to the X server run by the X Display Manager. can_unix_connect($1_t, xdm_t) allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:file { getattr read }; allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search; allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; # certain apps want to read xdm.pid file r_dir_file($1_t, xdm_var_run_t) allow $1_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read }; allow xdm_t $1_home_dir_t:dir getattr; ifdef(`xauth.te', ` file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_xauth_home_t, file) ') # for shared memory allow xdm_xserver_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { read write }; ') ifdef(`rpcd.te', ` create_dir_file($1_t, nfsd_rw_t) ') ifdef(`cardmgr.te', ` # to allow monitoring of pcmcia status allow $1_t cardmgr_var_run_t:file { getattr read }; ') # # Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan # ifdef(`apmd.te', ` allow $1_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow $1_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write; ') ifdef(`automount.te', ` allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr }; ') ifdef(`pamconsole.te', ` allow $1_t pam_var_console_t:dir search; ') ') dnl endif TODO ')dnl end base_user_domain macro ######################################## # # User domain template # define(`user_domain_template', ` ############################## # # Declarations # # Inherit rules for ordinary users. base_user_domain($1) typeattribute $1_t unpriv_userdomain; #, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain; domain_make_file_descriptors_widely_inheritable($1_t) #typeattribute $1_devpts_t userpty_type, user_tty_type; #typeattribute $1_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type; #typeattribute $1_home_t user_home_type; #typeattribute $1_tmp_t, user_tmpfile; #typeattribute $1_tty_device_t user_tty_type; ############################## # # Local policy # allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append }; terminal_create_private_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t) # Rules used to associate a homedir as a mountpoint allow $1_home_t self:filesystem associate; allow $1_file_type $1_home_t:filesystem associate; # user temporary files allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; files_create_private_tmp_data($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file }) # privileged home directory writers allow privhome $1_home_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow privhome $1_home_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename }; allow privhome $1_home_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir }; allow privhome $1_home_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow privhome $1_home_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; type_transition privhome $1_home_dir_t:{ file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file } $1_home_t; kernel_read_system_state($1_t) kernel_read_network_state($1_t) kernel_read_hardware_state($1_t) # cjp: why? bootloader_read_kernel_symbol_table($1_t) # port access is audited even if dac would not have allowed it, so dontaudit it here corenetwork_ignore_bind_tcp_on_all_reserved_ports($1_t) files_read_general_system_config($1_t) files_list_home_directories($1_t) files_read_general_application_resources($1_t) init_script_read_runtime_data($1_t) # The library functions always try to open read-write first, # then fall back to read-only if it fails. init_script_ignore_write_runtime_data($1_t) # Stop warnings about access to /dev/console init_ignore_use_file_descriptors($1_t) init_script_ignore_use_file_descriptors($1_t) miscfiles_read_man_pages($1_t) selinux_read_config($1_t) # Allow users to execute checkpolicy without a domain transition # so it can be used without privilege to write real binary policy file selinux_checkpolicy_execute($1_t) if (user_dmesg) { kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t) } else { kernel_ignore_read_ring_buffer($1_t) } # Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from # the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode # and may change other protocols if (user_tcp_server) { corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_general_port($1_t) } # for running depmod as part of the kernel packaging process optional_policy(`modutils.te',` modutils_read_kernel_module_loading_config($1_t) ') optional_policy(`selinux.te',` # for when the network connection is killed selinux_newrole_ignore_signal($1_t) ') # Need the following rule to allow users to run vpnc optional_policy(`xserver.te', ` corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_xserver_port($1_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` dontaudit $1_t boot_t:lnk_file read; dontaudit $1_t boot_t:file read; can_kerberos($1_t) # do not audit read on disk devices dontaudit $1_t { removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t }:blk_file read; ifdef(`xdm.te', ` allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read; allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search; # # Changing this to dontaudit should cause the .xsession-errors file to be written to /tmp # dontaudit xdm_t $1_home_t:file rw_file_perms; ') ifdef(`ftpd.te', ` if (ftp_home_dir) { file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t) } ') if (read_default_t) { allow $1 default_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1 default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; } can_exec($1_t, usr_t) # Read directories and files with the readable_t type. # This type is a general type for "world"-readable files. allow $1_t readable_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t readable_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; # Stat lost+found. allow $1_t lost_found_t:dir getattr; # Read /var, /var/spool, /var/run. allow $1_t var_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t var_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; allow $1_t var_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t var_spool_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms; allow $1_t var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t var_run_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms; allow $1_t var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_t var_lib_t:file { getattr read }; # Allow users to rw usb devices if (user_rw_usb) { rw_dir_create_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t) } else { r_dir_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t) } # Do not audit write denials to /etc/ld.so.cache. dontaudit $1_t ld_so_cache_t:file write; dontaudit $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { read append }; ifdef(`syslogd.te', ` # Some programs that are left in $1_t will try to connect # to syslogd, but we do not want to let them generate log messages. # Do not audit. dontaudit $1_t devlog_t:sock_file { read write }; dontaudit $1_t syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; ') allow $1_t initrc_t:fifo_file write; ifdef(`user_can_mount', ` # # Allow users to mount file systems like floppies and cdrom # mount_domain($1, $1_mount, `, fs_domain') r_dir_file($1_t, mnt_t) allow $1_mount_t device_t:lnk_file read; allow $1_mount_t removable_device_t:blk_file read; allow $1_mount_t iso9660_t:filesystem relabelfrom; allow $1_mount_t removable_t:filesystem { mount relabelto }; allow $1_mount_t removable_t:dir mounton; ifdef(`xdm.te', ` allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fd use; allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fifo_file { read write }; ') ') ') dnl end TODO ') ######################################## # # Admin domain template # define(`admin_domain_template',` ############################## # # Declarations # # Inherit rules for ordinary users. base_user_domain($1) typeattribute $1_t privhome; #, admin, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain; kernel_make_object_identity_change_constraint_exception($1_t) role system_r types $1_t; #ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `, priv_system_role') #; dnl end of sysadm_t type declaration typeattribute $1_devpts_t admin_terminal; typeattribute $1_tty_device_t admin_terminal; ############################## # # $1_t local policy # allow $1_t self:capability ~sys_module; allow $1_t self:process { setexec setfscreate }; # Set password information for other users. allow $1_t self:passwd { passwd chfn chsh }; # Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified. allow $1_t self:passwd rootok; # Manipulate other users crontab. allow $1_t self:passwd crontab; # for the administrator to run TCP servers directly allow $1_t self:tcp_socket { acceptfrom connectto recvfrom }; allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append }; terminal_create_private_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t) allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; files_create_private_tmp_data($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) kernel_read_system_state($1_t) kernel_read_network_state($1_t) kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t) kernel_get_core_interface_attributes($1_t) kernel_get_message_interface_attributes($1_t) kernel_change_ring_buffer_level($1_t) kernel_clear_ring_buffer($1_t) kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t) kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t) kernel_modify_all_sysctl($1_t) kernel_set_selinux_enforcement_mode($1_t) kernel_set_selinux_boolean($1_t) kernel_set_selinux_security_parameters($1_t) # Get security policy decisions: kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t) kernel_validate_selinux_context($1_t) kernel_compute_selinux_access_vector($1_t) kernel_compute_selinux_create_context($1_t) kernel_compute_selinux_relabel_context($1_t) kernel_compute_selinux_reachable_user_contexts($1_t) # signal unlabeled processes: kernel_kill_unlabeled_process($1_t) kernel_signal_unlabeled_process($1_t) kernel_sigstop_unlabeled_process($1_t) kernel_signull_unlabeled_process($1_t) kernel_sigchld_unlabeled_process($1_t) corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_general_port($1_t) devices_get_generic_block_device_attributes($1_t) devices_get_generic_character_device_attributes($1_t) devices_get_all_block_device_attributes($1_t) devices_get_all_character_device_attributes($1_t) fs_get_all_fs_attributes($1_t) fs_set_all_fs_quotas($1_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_t) terminal_use_console($1_t) terminal_use_general_physical_terminal($1_t) terminal_use_all_private_pseudoterminals($1_t) terminal_use_all_private_physical_terminals($1_t) # Manage almost all files authlogin_manage_all_files_except_shadow($1_t) # Relabel almost all files authlogin_relabel_all_files_except_shadow($1_t) domain_set_all_domains_priorities($1_t) domain_read_all_domains_process_state($1_t) # signal all domains: domain_kill_all_domains($1_t) domain_signal_all_domains($1_t) domain_signull_all_domains($1_t) domain_sigstop_all_domains($1_t) domain_sigstop_all_domains($1_t) domain_sigchld_all_domains($1_t) files_execute_system_source_code_scripts($1_t) init_use_control_channel($1_t) logging_send_system_log_message($1_t) modutils_insmod_transition($1_t) selinux_read_config($1_t) # The following rule is temporary until such time that a complete # policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator # cannot directly manipulate policy files with arbitrary programs. selinux_manage_source_policy($1_t) # Violates the goal of limiting write access to checkpolicy. # But presently necessary for installing the file_contexts file. selinux_manage_binary_policy($1_t) optional_policy(`cron.te',` cron_admin_template($1) ') ifdef(`TODO',` # Let admin stat the shadow file. allow $1_t shadow_t:file getattr; # for lsof allow $1_t mtrr_device_t:file getattr; allow $1_t serial_device:chr_file setattr; # allow setting up tunnels allow $1_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr; # Run programs from staff home directories. # Not ideal, but typical if users want to login as both sysadm_t or staff_t. can_exec($1_t, staff_home_t) # Run admin programs that require different permissions in their own domain. # These rules were moved into the appropriate program domain file. ifdef(`startx.te', ` ifdef(`xserver.te', ` # Create files in /tmp/.X11-unix with our X servers derived # tmp type rather than user_xserver_tmp_t. file_type_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xserver_tmpfile, $1_xserver_tmp_t, sock_file) ') ') ifdef(`xdm.te', ` ifdef(`xauth.te', ` if (xdm_sysadm_login) { allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read; allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search; } allow $1_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; ') ') # # A user who is authorized for sysadm_t may nonetheless have # a home directory labeled with user_home_t if the user is expected # to login in either user_t or sysadm_t. Hence, the derived domains # for programs need to be able to access user_home_t. # # Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors. ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', ` allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms; ') # for the administrator to run TCP servers directly allow $1_t kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom; # Connect data port to ftpd. ifdef(`ftpd.te', `can_tcp_connect(ftpd_t, $1_t)') # Connect second port to rshd. ifdef(`rshd.te', `can_tcp_connect(rshd_t, $1_t)') # Allow MAKEDEV to work allow $1_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_t device_type:{ blk_file chr_file } { create unlink rename }; allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { create read }; # for lsof allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr; allow $1_t eventpollfs_t:file getattr; ') dnl endif TODO ') ######################################## ## ## ## Execute a shell in all user domains. This ## is an explicit transition, requiring the ## caller to use setexeccon(). ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_all_users_explicit_transition',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) corecommands_shell_explicit_transition($1,userdomain) ') define(`userdomain_all_users_explicit_transition_depend',` type sysadm_t; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Execute a shell in the sysadm domain. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_sysadm_shell_transition',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) corecommands_shell_transition($1,sysadm_t) ') define(`userdomain_sysadm_shell_transition_depend',` type sysadm_t; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Read and write administrative users ## physical and pseudo terminals. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_use_admin_terminals',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) devices_list_device_nodes($1) terminal_list_pseudoterminals($1) allow $1 admin_terminal:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl }; ') define(`userdomain_use_admin_terminals_depend',` attribute admin_terminal; class chr_file { getattr read write ioctl }; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Do not audit attempts to use admin ttys and ptys. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_dontaudit_use_admin_terminals',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) dontaudit $1 admin_terminal:chr_file { read write }; ') define(`userdomain_dontaudit_use_admin_terminals_depend',` attribute admin_terminal; class chr_file { read write }; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Search all users home directories. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_search_all_users_home_dirs',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) files_list_home_directories($1) allow $1 { home_dir_type home_type }:dir search; ') define(`userdomain_search_all_users_home_dirs_depend',` attribute home_dir_type, home_type; class dir search; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Read all files in all users home directories. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_read_all_users_data',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) files_list_home_directories($1) allow $1 home_type:dir { getattr search read }; allow $1 home_type:file { getattr read }; ') define(`userdomain_read_all_users_data_depend',` attribute home_type; class dir { getattr search read }; class file { getattr read }; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) allow $1 userdomain:fd use; ') define(`userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors_depend',` attribute userdomain; class fd use; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Send general signals to all user domains. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_signal_all_userdomains',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) allow $1 userdomain:process signal; ') define(`userdomain_signal_all_userdomains_depend',` attribute userdomain; class process signal; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_use_all_unprivileged_users_file_descriptors',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use; ') define(`userdomain_use_all_unprivileged_users_file_descriptors_depend',` attribute unpriv_userdomain; class fd use; ') ######################################## ## ## ## Do not audit attempts to inherit the ## file descriptors from all user domains. ## ## ## The type of the process performing this action. ## ## # define(`userdomain_ignore_use_all_unprivileged_users_file_descriptors',` requires_block_template(`$0'_depend) dontaudit $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use; ') define(`userdomain_ignore_use_all_unprivileged_users_file_descriptors_depend',` attribute unpriv_userdomain; class fd use; ') ##