I think these may have been adopted from the old Red Hat targeted policy (that model only had unconfined users)
Some aspect to note:
1. The ssh_sysadm_login boolean now applies to unconfined_t as well
2. remotelogin only allows unpriv logins
The rshd module also calls unconfined_shell_domtrans() but I ignored that one because that policy currently does not have support for manual transitions with pam_selinux.
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
WireGuard is a fast, modern, secure VPN tunnel, according to
https://www.wireguard.com/. In order to install it, the mostly
documented way consists in building and installing an out-of-tree kernel
module and using userland tools to configure this module (wg and
wg-quick).
* WireGuard is like "ip": the userland tool communicates with the kernel
module through a netlink socket.
* WireGuard is like "iptables": there is no daemon, but some
distributions ship systemd units that restores a WireGuard
configuration when started.
* WireGuard is like other services: its configuration files are in /etc,
and it can use /run and /tmp.
Create a new policy module which handles all of this.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Some recent modifications added patterns in .fc files for programs in
/usr/sbin without adding the patterns for /usr/bin. On Arch Linux, where
/usr/sbin is a symlink to /usr/bin, such patterns are never matched.
Add the missing patterns.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
The pattern /opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)? matches the content of
directories such as /opt/brother/Printersinf/, which seems buggy. On
several systems, /opt/brother/Printers/ is a directory that contains
directories named as printer models.
Add a "/" before "(.*/)?" in order to make sure subdirectories of
/opt/brother/Printers named "inf" are matched by the pattern.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
On Debian, haveged fails to start with "haveged: Couldn't open random
device: Permission denied". strace shows:
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/random", O_RDWR) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
audit.log has:
type=AVC msg=audit(1566048720.132:1338): avc: denied { search }
for pid=20235 comm="haveged" name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=76666
scontext=system_u:system_r:entropyd_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=0
With systemd, /dev is a temporary filesystem (tmpfs_t), so haveged needs
the search permission to it in order to open /dev/random. Use the
newly-added interface to allow this access.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Debian's PAM configuration uses a patched pam_motd module that runs
files in /etc/update-motd.d/ in order to generate a dynamic Message Of
The Day (MOTD). By default, there is only one script:
$ cat /etc/update-motd.d/10-uname
#!/bin/sh
uname -snrvm
According to https://wiki.debian.org/motd, the script is executed
through run-parts:
if (!system("/usr/bin/env -i
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d >
/run/motd.dynamic.new"))
rename("/run/motd.dynamic.new", "/run/motd.dynamic");
This requires allowing pam_motd users to execute bin_t commands
(/usr/bin/env) and shells (/bin/sh), and to manage /run/motd.dynamic*
files.
Allow relevant accesses for Debian-based systems.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
The pattern "(.*)?" means "match anything including the nothing, or
nothing": the question mark is redundant. This is likely to be a
mispelling for "(/.*)?", which means "match a slash and anthing, or
nothing", or for ".*", or for other patterns.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
In a pattern, a dot can match any character, including slash. It makes
sense when it is combined with ?, + or *, but makes little sense when
left alone.
Most of the time, the label was for file containing dots, where the dot
was not escaped. A few times, the dot was really intended to match any
character. In such case, [^/] better suits the intent.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
There are two patterns that define file contexts for /run/rpc.statd.pid:
* in policy/modules/services/rpcbind.fc:
/run/rpc.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0)
* in policy/modules/services/rpc.dc:
/run/rpc\.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_var_run_t,s0)
They coexist even though their labels differ because the first one uses
a unescaped dot. As it does not seem to exist other files matching the
first pattern, remove it in order to only keep the second one.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
This seems to be a misspelling, and there is no reason which would
explain why monit's init script would be labeled with a different
sensitivity while the main binary uses s0.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
haveged listens to commands using a Unix socket
(at path "\0/sys/entropy/haveged" according to
https://github.com/jirka-h/haveged/blob/1.9.4/src/havegecmd.h#L34).
The implementation of this server is available on
https://github.com/jirka-h/haveged/blob/1.9.4/src/havegecmd.c .
This fixes the following denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(1551002989.396:27): avc: denied { listen } for
pid=262 comm="haveged"
path=002F7379732F656E74726F70792F68617665676564
scontext=system_u:system_r:entropyd_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:entropyd_t tclass=unix_stream_socket
permissive=1
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
When ulogd is run by systemd on Debian, it logs messages to the journal,
it used a PID file in /run/ulog/ulogd.pid, and logs packets to
/var/log/ulog/syslogemu.log. This last ones triggers a dac_read_search
capability check because the directory is configured as:
drwxrwx---. ulog adm /var/log/ulog
(root does not have an access to the directory without bypassing the DAC.)
Add a comment describing how to avoid allowing dac_read_search to ulogd_t.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>