As identified by Stephan Smalley, the current MLS constraint for the
contains permission of the context class should consider the current
level of a user along with the clearance level so that mls_systemlow
is no longer considered contained in mls_systemhigh.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
The attached patch adds a few database object classes, as follows:
* db_schema
------------
A schema object performs as a namespace in database; similar to
directories in filesystem.
It seems some of (but not all) database objects are stored within
a certain schema logically. We can qualify these objects using
schema name. For example, a table: "my_tbl" within a schema: "my_scm"
is identified by "my_scm.my_tbl". This table is completely different
from "your_scm.my_tbl" that it a table within a schema: "your_scm".
Its characteristics is similar to a directory in filesystem, so
it has similar permissions.
The 'search' controls to resolve object name within a schema.
The 'add_name' and 'remove_name' controls to add/remove an object
to/from a schema.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createschema.html
In the past discussion, a rubix folks concerned about no object
class definition for schema and catalog which is an upper level
namespace. Since I'm not certain whether we have a disadvantage
when 'db_schema' class is applied on catalog class, I don't add
this definition yet.
Default security context of 'db_table' and 'db_procedure' classes
get being computed using type_transition with 'db_schema' class,
instead of 'db_database' class. It reflects logical hierarchy of
database object more correctly.
* db_view
----------
A view object performs as a virtual table. We can run SELECT
statement on views, although it has no physical entities.
The definition of views are expanded in run-time, so it allows
us to describe complex queries with keeping readability.
This object class uniquely provides 'expand' permission that
controls whether user can expand this view, or not.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the view.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createview.html
* db_sequence
--------------
A sequence object is a sequential number generator.
This object class uniquely provides 'get_value', 'next_value' and
'set_value' permissions. The 'get_value' controls to reference the
sequence object. The 'next_value' controls to fetch and increment
the value of sequence object. The 'set_value' controls to set
an arbitrary value.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the sequence.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createsequence.html
* db_language
--------------
A language object is an installed engine to execute procedures.
PostgreSQL supports to define SQL procedures using regular script
languages; such as Perl, Tcl, not only SQL or binary modules.
In addition, v9.0 or later supports DO statement. It allows us to
execute a script statement on server side without defining a SQL
procedure. It requires to control whether user can execute DO
statement on this language, or not.
This object class uniquely provides 'implement' and 'execute'
permissions. The 'implement' controls whether a procedure can
be implemented with this language, or not. So, it takes security
context of the procedure as subject. The 'execute' controls to
execute code block using DO statement.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a database object, because it is not owned by a certain
schema.
In the default policy, we provide two types: 'sepgsql_lang_t' and
'sepgsql_safe_lang_t' that allows unpriv users to execute DO
statement. The default is 'sepgsql_leng_t'.
We assume newly installed language may be harm, so DBA has to relabel
it explicitly, if he want user defined procedures using the language.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createlanguage.htmlhttp://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-do.html
P.S)
I found a bug in MCS. It didn't constraint 'relabelfrom' permission
of 'db_procedure' class. IIRC, I fixed it before, but it might be
only MLS side. Sorry.
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
policy/flask/access_vectors | 29 ++++++++
policy/flask/security_classes | 6 ++
policy/mcs | 16 ++++-
policy/mls | 58 ++++++++++++++-
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 8 ++
policy/modules/services/postgresql.if | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
policy/modules/services/postgresql.te | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
- rework: Add a comment of "deprecated" for deprecated permissions.
- bugfix: MCS policy did not constrain the following permissions.
db_database:{getattr}
db_table:{getattr lock}
db_column:{getattr}
db_procedure:{drop getattr setattr}
db_blob:{getattr import export}
- rework: db_table:{lock} is moved to reader side, because it makes
impossible to refer read-only table with foreign-key constraint.
(FK checks internally acquire explicit locks.)
- bugfix: some of permissions in db_procedure class are allowed
on sepgsql_trusted_proc_t, but it is a domain, not a procedure.
It should allow them on sepgsql_trusted_proc_exec_t.
I also aliased sepgsql_proc_t as sepgsql_proc_exec_t to avoid
such kind of confusion, as Chris suggested before.
- rework: we should not allow db_procedure:{install} on the
sepgsql_trusted_proc_exec_t, because of a risk to invoke trusted
procedure implicitly.
- bugfix: MLS policy dealt db_blob:{export} as writer-side permission,
but it is required whrn the largeobject is refered.
- bugfix: MLS policy didn't constrain the db_procedure class.
Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including
the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on
the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:
* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html
The latest revision of the labeled policy patches which enable both labeled
and unlabeled policy support for NetLabel. This revision takes into account
Chris' feedback from the first version and reduces the number of interface
calls in each domain down to two at present: one for unlabeled access, one for
NetLabel access. The older, transport layer specific interfaces, are still
present for use by third-party modules but are not used in the default policy
modules.
trunk: Use netmsg initial SID for MLS-only Netlabel packets, from Paul Moore.
This patch changes the policy to use the netmsg initial SID as the "base"
SID/context for NetLabel packets which only have MLS security attributes.
Currently we use the unlabeled initial SID which makes it very difficult to
distinquish between actual unlabeled packets and those packets which have MLS
security attributes.
Specifically:
- polmatch need no longer make an exception for unlabeled_t
since a flow will now always match SPD rules with no contexts (per
the IPSec leak fix patch upstreamed a few weeks back), as
opposed to needing polmatch access to unlabeled_t.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
> We could add another 'or' on the above constraint:
>
> or ( (t2 == mlsfilewrite_in_range) and (l1 dom l2) and (h1 domby h2) )
>
> I believe that would be the constraint you were looking for. I don't
> like the name of that attribute, but I couldn't come up with a better
> one off the top of my head. :)
>
Attached is a patch which I've tested against selinux-policy-2.4.2-1
that implements this additional constraint. The name is still a bit
forced, but it works.
-matt <mra at hp dot com>
* fix userdom_search_all_users_home_content() to use search_dir_perms;
* change ssh daemon macro to use userdom_search_all_users_home_dirs() instead of _home_content()
a xfrm policy. It also defines MLS policy for association { sendto,
recvfrom, polmatch }.
NOTE: When an inbound packet is not using an IPSec SA, a check is performed
between the socket label and the unlabeled sid (SYSTEM_HIGH MLS label). For
MLS purposes however, the target of the check should be the MLS label taken
from the node sid (or secmark in the new secmark world). This would present
a severe performance overhead (to make a new sid based on the unlabeled sid
with the MLS taken from the node sid or secmark and then using this sid as
the target). Pending reconciliation of the netlabel, ipsec and iptables contexts,
I have chosen to currently make an exception for unlabeled_t SAs if TE policy
allowed it. A similar problem exists for the outbound case and it has been similarly
handled in the policy below (by making an exception for unlabeled_t).
I am submitting the below limited patch pending a comprehensive patch from
Joy Latten at IBM (latten@austin.ibm.com).
I am not sure if I needed to manually do a "make tolib" in the flask subdir
and submit the results as well. Please let me know if I needed to.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
