fix te_trans conflict
This commit is contained in:
parent
dc8f17037b
commit
cac3eca0be
@ -230,6 +230,24 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_mailserver',`
|
||||
typeattribute $1 mailserver_domain;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
#######################################
|
||||
## <summary>
|
||||
## Allow the specified domain to use
|
||||
## the sendmail program as an entrypoint.
|
||||
## </summary>
|
||||
## <param name="domain">
|
||||
## Domain allowed access.
|
||||
## </param>
|
||||
#
|
||||
# cjp: added for targeted sendmail (unconfined)
|
||||
interface(`mta_sendmail_entry',`
|
||||
gen_require(`
|
||||
type sendmail_exec_t;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
domain_entry_file($1,sendmail_exec_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
#######################################
|
||||
## <summary>
|
||||
## Make a type a mailserver type used
|
||||
|
@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ files_pid_file(sendmail_var_run_t)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
|
||||
unconfined_alias_domain(sendmail_t)
|
||||
type sendmail_exec_t;
|
||||
domain_entry_file(sendmail_t,sendmail_exec_t)
|
||||
mta_sendmail_entry(sendmail_t)
|
||||
',`
|
||||
type sendmail_t;
|
||||
mta_sendmail_mailserver(sendmail_t)
|
||||
|
@ -55,368 +55,366 @@ files_tmpfs_file(xdm_tmpfs_t)
|
||||
# Local policy
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid setsched setrlimit };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
|
||||
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`',`
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid setsched setrlimit };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
files_create_lock(xdm_t,xdm_lock_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
files_create_lock(xdm_t,xdm_lock_t)
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
files_create_tmp_files(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
files_create_tmp_files(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
fs_create_tmpfs_data(xdm_t,xdm_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
||||
fs_create_tmpfs_data(xdm_t,xdm_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
files_create_var_lib(xdm_t,xdm_var_lib_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
files_create_var_lib(xdm_t,xdm_var_lib_t)
|
||||
|
||||
kernel_read_system_state(xdm_t)
|
||||
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(xdm_t)
|
||||
kernel_read_system_state(xdm_t)
|
||||
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
dev_read_rand(xdm_t)
|
||||
dev_read_urand(xdm_t)
|
||||
dev_read_rand(xdm_t)
|
||||
dev_read_urand(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
selinux_get_fs_mount(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_validate_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_access_vector(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_create_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_relabel_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_user_contexts(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_get_fs_mount(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_validate_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_access_vector(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_create_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_relabel_context(xdm_t)
|
||||
selinux_compute_user_contexts(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
files_read_etc_runtime_files(xdm_t)
|
||||
files_read_etc_runtime_files(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
|
||||
unconfined_domain_template(xdm_t)
|
||||
ifdef(`TODO',`
|
||||
# cjp: TODO: integrate strict policy:
|
||||
daemon_domain(xdm, `, privuser, privrole, auth_chkpwd, privowner, privmem, nscd_client_domain')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# for xdmctl
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file unlink;
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, fifo_file)
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, dir)
|
||||
|
||||
# NB we do NOT allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir, only access to an open
|
||||
# handle of a file inside the dir!!!
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t default_context_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_t default_context_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
can_network(xdm_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
|
||||
can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xdm_xserver_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { setattr r_dir_perms };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_t:process signal;
|
||||
# for reboot
|
||||
allow xdm_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# init script wants to check if it needs to update windowmanagerlist
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
ifdef(`distro_suse', `
|
||||
# set permissions on /tmp/.X11-unix
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Transition to user domains for user sessions.
|
||||
domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
|
||||
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
|
||||
|
||||
# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow xdm logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t
|
||||
bool xdm_sysadm_login false;
|
||||
if (xdm_sysadm_login) {
|
||||
domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, sysadm_t)
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:fd use;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Label pid and temporary files with derived types.
|
||||
rw_dir_create_file(xdm_xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Run helper programs.
|
||||
allow xdm_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
# lib_t is for running cpp
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, { shell_exec_t etc_t bin_t sbin_t lib_t })
|
||||
allow xdm_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
|
||||
ifdef(`hostname.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, hostname_exec_t)')
|
||||
ifdef(`loadkeys.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, loadkeys_exec_t)')
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process sigkill;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:file unlink;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access devices.
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:dir { read search };
|
||||
allow xdm_t console_device_t:chr_file setattr;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t framebuf_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t mouse_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t apm_bios_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t dri_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t agp_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t { xserver_misc_device_t misc_device_t }:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t v4l_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t scanner_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t tty_device_t:chr_file { ioctl read write setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
can_resmgrd_connect(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Access xdm log files.
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_log_t, xserver_log_t, file)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
# Access /var/gdm/.gdmfifo.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Remove /tmp/.X11-unix/X0.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`gpm.te', `
|
||||
# Talk to the console mouse server.
|
||||
allow xdm_t gpmctl_t:sock_file { getattr setattr write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t gpm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t sysfs_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Update utmp and wtmp.
|
||||
allow xdm_t initrc_var_run_t: file { read write lock };
|
||||
allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file append;
|
||||
|
||||
# Update lastlog.
|
||||
allow xdm_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Need to further investigate these permissions and
|
||||
# perhaps define derived types.
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_lib_t:dir { write search add_name remove_name create unlink };
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_lib_t:file { create write unlink };
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect to xfs.
|
||||
ifdef(`xfs.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:sock_file write;
|
||||
can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xfs_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
|
||||
# wdm has its own config dir /etc/X11/wdm
|
||||
# this is ugly, daemons should not create files under /etc!
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Signal any user domain.
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:process signal_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /proc for any user domain processes.
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow xdm access to the user domains
|
||||
allow xdm_t home_root_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t home_root_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t {removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t}:{ chr_file blk_file } {setattr rw_file_perms};
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t misc_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t removable_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t scsi_generic_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t devpts_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit denied probes of /proc.
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /usr/share/terminfo/l/linux and /usr/share/icons/default/index.theme...
|
||||
allow xdm_t usr_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read fonts
|
||||
read_fonts(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to write to index files under /usr
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t usr_t:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit access to /root
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
|
||||
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to check whether user root has email
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t { var_spool_t mail_spool_t }:dir search;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access sound device.
|
||||
allow xdm_t sound_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow setting of attributes on power management devices.
|
||||
allow xdm_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the X server in a derived domain.
|
||||
xserver_domain(xdm)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`rhgb.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow rhgb_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Unrestricted inheritance.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run xkbcomp.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_lib_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Insert video drivers.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t self:capability mknod;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysctl_modprobe_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_xserver_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t)
|
||||
allow insmod_t xserver_log_t:file write;
|
||||
allow insmod_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /proc/dri/.*
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t proc_t:dir { search read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /var/run.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_run_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# FIXME: After per user fonts are properly working
|
||||
# xdm_xserver_t may no longer have any reason
|
||||
# to read ROLE_home_t - examine this in more detail
|
||||
# (xauth?)
|
||||
|
||||
# Search home directories.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_nfs_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, nfs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_samba_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, cifs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# for .dmrc
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_dir_type:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`support_polyinstatiation', `
|
||||
# xdm_t can polyinstantiate
|
||||
polyinstantiater(xdm_t)
|
||||
# xdm needs access for linking .X11-unix to poly /tmp
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:dir { add_name remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:lnk_file { create unlink };
|
||||
# xdm needs access for copying .Xauthority into new home
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:file { create getattr write };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t mnt_t:dir { getattr read search };
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Wants to delete .xsession-errors file
|
||||
#
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file unlink;
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Should fix exec of pam_timestamp_check is not closing xdm file descriptor
|
||||
#
|
||||
ifdef(`pam.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow pam_t xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr ioctl write };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, pam_console_exec_t, pam_console_t)
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, pam_exec_t)
|
||||
# For pam_console
|
||||
rw_dir_create_file(xdm_t, pam_var_console_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Pamconsole/alsa
|
||||
ifdef(`alsa.te', `
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, alsa_exec_t, alsa_t)
|
||||
') dnl ifdef
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_log_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, xserver_exec_t, xdm_xserver_t)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Poweroff wants to create the /poweroff file when run from xdm
|
||||
#
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, root_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# xdm tries to bind to biff_port_t
|
||||
#
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
|
||||
# VNC v4 module in X server
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t vnc_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
ifdef(`crack.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t crack_db_t:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
')
|
||||
r_dir_file(xdm_t, selinux_config_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run telinit->init to shutdown.
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, init_exec_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow gdm to run gdm-binary
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Supress permission check on .ICE-unix
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t ice_tmp_t:dir { getattr setattr };
|
||||
') dnl end TODO
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`TODO',`
|
||||
# cjp: TODO: integrate strict policy:
|
||||
daemon_domain(xdm, `, privuser, privrole, auth_chkpwd, privowner, privmem, nscd_client_domain')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# for xdmctl
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file unlink;
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, fifo_file)
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, dir)
|
||||
|
||||
# NB we do NOT allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir, only access to an open
|
||||
# handle of a file inside the dir!!!
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t default_context_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_t default_context_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
can_network(xdm_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
|
||||
can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xdm_xserver_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { setattr r_dir_perms };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_t:process signal;
|
||||
# for reboot
|
||||
allow xdm_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# init script wants to check if it needs to update windowmanagerlist
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
ifdef(`distro_suse', `
|
||||
# set permissions on /tmp/.X11-unix
|
||||
allow initrc_t xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Transition to user domains for user sessions.
|
||||
domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
|
||||
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
|
||||
|
||||
# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow xdm logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t
|
||||
bool xdm_sysadm_login false;
|
||||
if (xdm_sysadm_login) {
|
||||
domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, sysadm_t)
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:fd use;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Label pid and temporary files with derived types.
|
||||
rw_dir_create_file(xdm_xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Run helper programs.
|
||||
allow xdm_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
# lib_t is for running cpp
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, { shell_exec_t etc_t bin_t sbin_t lib_t })
|
||||
allow xdm_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
|
||||
ifdef(`hostname.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, hostname_exec_t)')
|
||||
ifdef(`loadkeys.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, loadkeys_exec_t)')
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process sigkill;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:file unlink;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access devices.
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:dir { read search };
|
||||
allow xdm_t console_device_t:chr_file setattr;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t framebuf_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t mouse_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t apm_bios_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t dri_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t agp_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t { xserver_misc_device_t misc_device_t }:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t v4l_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t scanner_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t tty_device_t:chr_file { ioctl read write setattr getattr };
|
||||
allow xdm_t device_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
can_resmgrd_connect(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Access xdm log files.
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_log_t, xserver_log_t, file)
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir setattr;
|
||||
# Access /var/gdm/.gdmfifo.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:shm rw_shm_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Remove /tmp/.X11-unix/X0.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`gpm.te', `
|
||||
# Talk to the console mouse server.
|
||||
allow xdm_t gpmctl_t:sock_file { getattr setattr write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t gpm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t sysfs_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Update utmp and wtmp.
|
||||
allow xdm_t initrc_var_run_t: file { read write lock };
|
||||
allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file append;
|
||||
|
||||
# Update lastlog.
|
||||
allow xdm_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Need to further investigate these permissions and
|
||||
# perhaps define derived types.
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_lib_t:dir { write search add_name remove_name create unlink };
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_lib_t:file { create write unlink };
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect to xfs.
|
||||
ifdef(`xfs.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:sock_file write;
|
||||
can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xfs_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
|
||||
# wdm has its own config dir /etc/X11/wdm
|
||||
# this is ugly, daemons should not create files under /etc!
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Signal any user domain.
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:process signal_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /proc for any user domain processes.
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t userdomain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow xdm access to the user domains
|
||||
allow xdm_t home_root_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t home_root_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t {removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t}:{ chr_file blk_file } {setattr rw_file_perms};
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t misc_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t removable_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t scsi_generic_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t devpts_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit denied probes of /proc.
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /usr/share/terminfo/l/linux and /usr/share/icons/default/index.theme...
|
||||
allow xdm_t usr_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read fonts
|
||||
read_fonts(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to write to index files under /usr
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t usr_t:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit access to /root
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
|
||||
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to check whether user root has email
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t { var_spool_t mail_spool_t }:dir search;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access sound device.
|
||||
allow xdm_t sound_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow setting of attributes on power management devices.
|
||||
allow xdm_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the X server in a derived domain.
|
||||
xserver_domain(xdm)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`rhgb.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow rhgb_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Unrestricted inheritance.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run xkbcomp.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_lib_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Insert video drivers.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t self:capability mknod;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysctl_modprobe_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_xserver_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t)
|
||||
allow insmod_t xserver_log_t:file write;
|
||||
allow insmod_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /proc/dri/.*
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t proc_t:dir { search read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /var/run.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_run_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# FIXME: After per user fonts are properly working
|
||||
# xdm_xserver_t may no longer have any reason
|
||||
# to read ROLE_home_t - examine this in more detail
|
||||
# (xauth?)
|
||||
|
||||
# Search home directories.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_nfs_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, nfs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_samba_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, cifs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# for .dmrc
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_dir_type:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`support_polyinstatiation', `
|
||||
# xdm_t can polyinstantiate
|
||||
polyinstantiater(xdm_t)
|
||||
# xdm needs access for linking .X11-unix to poly /tmp
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:dir { add_name remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:lnk_file { create unlink };
|
||||
# xdm needs access for copying .Xauthority into new home
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:file { create getattr write };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t mnt_t:dir { getattr read search };
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Wants to delete .xsession-errors file
|
||||
#
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file unlink;
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Should fix exec of pam_timestamp_check is not closing xdm file descriptor
|
||||
#
|
||||
ifdef(`pam.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow pam_t xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr ioctl write };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, pam_console_exec_t, pam_console_t)
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, pam_exec_t)
|
||||
# For pam_console
|
||||
rw_dir_create_file(xdm_t, pam_var_console_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Pamconsole/alsa
|
||||
ifdef(`alsa.te', `
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, alsa_exec_t, alsa_t)
|
||||
') dnl ifdef
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_log_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, xserver_exec_t, xdm_xserver_t)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Poweroff wants to create the /poweroff file when run from xdm
|
||||
#
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, root_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# xdm tries to bind to biff_port_t
|
||||
#
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
|
||||
# VNC v4 module in X server
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t vnc_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
ifdef(`crack.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t crack_db_t:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
')
|
||||
r_dir_file(xdm_t, selinux_config_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run telinit->init to shutdown.
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, init_exec_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow gdm to run gdm-binary
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Supress permission check on .ICE-unix
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t ice_tmp_t:dir { getattr setattr };
|
||||
') dnl end TODO
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user