08bfe6f1c1
Extract mtproto key generation code.
2019-11-15 16:16:32 +03:00
246c45ce0e
Use lib_ui from submodule.
2019-10-19 12:27:28 +04:00
3b0bf7cb1e
Move some more widgets and effects.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
849deb57e2
Move many widget classes to lib_ui.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
c057f28425
Move standard buttons to lib_ui.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
c5845f17ae
Remove twidget header.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
e2f54eb3e9
Move some style code to lib_ui.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
0c713a930a
Remove app.h / facades.h from precompiled header.
2019-10-01 23:59:46 +03:00
b631d09a40
Fix possible crash in event loop nesting.
2019-09-09 10:45:18 +03:00
6343221d7b
Remove many includes from stdafx.pch.
2019-09-06 19:31:07 +03:00
90fb9eccd4
Optimize InvokeQueued().
2019-07-10 19:37:00 +02:00
4bd0683e91
Guard UpdateRequest handling.
2019-07-05 16:29:02 +02:00
0e964b06dc
Hook main queue processing to update requests.
2019-07-04 16:26:13 +02:00
9c613fe2f7
Move system versions to platform/platform_info.
2019-06-04 14:23:14 +03:00
ff0ff1d99c
Fix stickers lagging on macOS.
2019-05-28 13:39:38 +02:00
a0e2a925ee
Filter command line arguments passed to Qt.
...
See https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/
qt5-based-gui-apps-susceptible-to-remote-code-execution/
This RCE exploit doesn't affect Telegram Desktop directly, because
Telegram Desktop uses statically linked Qt and does not load any
plugins from external shared libraries. But in any case it's better
to control how command line arguments can affect the app behaviour.
For now pass only the first command line part, the executable path.
2019-05-06 12:40:04 +02:00
1ab4dbe466
Fix crash in application closing.
2019-04-06 12:12:24 +04:00
a56a12a1ef
Optimized video frame pushing.
2019-03-11 12:08:18 +04:00
9a616edf2a
Add new animations engine.
2019-03-11 12:08:17 +04:00
26f1ade5ba
Optimize connecting widget.
2019-02-10 21:35:44 +03:00
a70e72f75d
Application->Sandbox, Messenger->Application.
2019-01-23 12:51:58 +04:00
John Preston