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On Mon, 2009-08-24 at 23:37 +1000, Russell Coker wrote: > On Mon, 24 Aug 2009, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> wrote: > > >>> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=503252 > > >> > > >> audit2allow -l is looking for the load_policy message which does not go > > >> to the dmesg, /var/log/messages. Therefore the tool has no idea when > > >> policy was last loaded. > > > > > > That would be a kernel bug then. > > > > Well I believe the messages that are intercepted by the audit.log do not go > > into dmesg, by design. Although Steve, James or Eric could probably say for > > sure. > > When auditd is not running on a Debian system with CentOS kernel > 2.6.18-92.1.13.el5xen or Debian/Lenny kernel 2.6.26-2-xen-686 then nothing > goes to the kernel message log which is interpreted by audit2allow as a > candidate for the "-l" functionality. > > It's OK if all the AVC messages go to the audit log and "dmesg|audit2allow -l" > gives no output. But if all AVC messages other than the load_policy message > go to the kernel message log then it's a bug. Originally audit2allow used the avc: allowed message generated by auditallow statement for load_policy to identify policy reloads. Later it was switched to use the MAC_POLICY_LOAD events generated by the audit framework. Those events should still get logged via printk if auditd is not running, but it appears that the code (audit_printk_skb) will then log the type= field as an integer rather than a string, and audit2allow/sepolgen only looks for the string MAC_POLICY_LOAD. So I suspect that this would be resolved by modifying sepolgen/audit.py to also match on type=1403 for load messages. Try this: Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> |
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