Improve the description by mentioning that if is_selinux_mls_enabled(),
it simply means that the kernel has MLS support and the policy contains
MLS features. To check whether MLS support is enabled on the running
system, use selinux_getpolicytype().
Signed-off-by: David King <dking@redhat.com>
filepath needs to be resolved first in order to be correctly found by
selabel_lookup_raw()
Fixes:
$ matchpathcon -V passwd
passwd has context system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0, should be
system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0
$ echo $?
1
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Snapper needs a way how to set a proper selinux context on btrfs
subvolumes originating in snapshot create command. Fs can't handle it on
its own so snapper will enforce .snapshots subvolume relabeling
according to a file returned by selinux_snapperd_contexts_path().
The format of the file will be similar to other contexts file:
snapperd_data = system_u:object_r:snapperd_data_t:s0
Fixes:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247530https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247532
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Bail before running off the end of the class index
Change-Id: I47c4eaac3c7d789f8d85047e34e37e3f0bb38b3a
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <brindle@quarksecurity.com>
Class and perms should come from the policy being used for analysis,
not the system policy so use sepol_ interfaces
Change-Id: Ia0590ed2514249fd98810a8d4fe87f8bf5280561
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <brindle@quarksecurity.com>
This patch is part of the Debian effort to make the build reproducible
Thank to Reiner Herrmann <reiner@reiner-h.de> for the patches
Signed-off-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@bigon.be>
It wasn't clear how to use -l option with full/standard KIND and the
example in semodule.8 man page was wrong.
Based on a patch by Laurent Bigonville <bigon@bigon.be>
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
The following test incorrectly asserts a neverallowxperm failure.
attribute test1_attr1;
attribute test1_attr2;
type test1_type1, test1_attr1, test1_attr2;
allow test1_type1 test1_attr1:socket ioctl;
allowxperm test1_type1 test1_attr2:socket ioctl { 1 };
neverallowxperm test1_attr1 test1_attr1:socket ioctl { 0 }
To handle attributes correctly, the neverallowxperm checking has been
modified. Now when the ioctl permission is granted on an avtab entry
that matches an avrule neverallowxperm entry, the assertion checking
first determines the matching source/target/class sets between the
avtab entry and the neverallowxperm entry. Only the matching sets are
enumerated over to determine if the neverallowed extended permissions
exist and if they are granted. This is similar to how
report_assertion_avtab_matches() reports neverallow failures.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Originally checkmodule stated that it wrote to the input file instead of
to the output file.
Reported-By: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
The man page's example suggested to use -g instead of -E and used --cil
and --hll options on the wrong positions.
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
- Handling of cgroups was remove in de0795a12e but
-c option was still documented in sandbox.8
- Minor formatting fix
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Compilation tools respects certain environment variables, like CC.
However, in libselinux and libsemanage, they are not respected
everywhere. This command fixes respect for those variables, falling back
to the previous hardcoded values if not specified.
Temporarily mounting /proc within selinuxfs_exists() can cause
problems since it can be called by a libselinux constructor and
therefore may be invoked by every program linked with libselinux.
Since this was only motivated originally by a situation where
selinuxfs_exists() was called from selinux_init_load_policy()
before /proc was mounted, fix it in selinux_init_load_policy() instead.
This reverts commit 5a8d8c499b
("libselinux: only mount /proc if necessary") and
commit 9df4988846
("libselinux: Mount procfs before checking /proc/filesystems").
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
When converting pp files to CIL or generating CIL using checkpolicy
or checkmodule use CIL's HLL line mark annotations to record the
original file and line numbers for neverallow rules so that CIL can
produce more informative error messages. (Unfortunately, the original
line number information is not saved in pp files, so there is no benefit
for policy modules.)
This is only done for neverallow rules currently.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Remove path field from cil_tree_node struct and all references
to it in CIL. This will reduce memory usage by 5%.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Replace all calls to cil_log() that print path information with a
call to cil_tree_log() which will also print information about any
high-level sources.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Provide more detailed log messages containing all relevant CIL and
high-level language source file information through cil_tree_log().
cil_tree_log() uses two new functions: cil_tree_get_next_path() and
cil_tree_get_cil_path().
cil_tree_get_next_path() traverses up the parse tree or AST until
it finds the next CIL or high-level language source information nodes.
It will return the path and whether or not the path is for a CIL file.
cil_tree_get_cil_path() uses cil_tree_get_next_path() to return
the CIL path.
Example cil_tree_log() message:
Problem at policy.cil:21 from foo.hll:11 from bar.hll:2
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Use some of the functionality recently added to support high-level
language line marking to track the CIL filename.
The goal is to eventually remove the path field from the tree node
struct and offset the addtion of the hll_line field.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Adds support for tracking original file and line numbers for
better error reporting when a high-level language is translated
into CIL.
This adds a field called "hll_line" to struct cil_tree_node which
increases memory usage by 5%.
Syntax:
;;* lm(s|x) LINENO FILENAME
(CIL STATEMENTS)
;;* lme
lms is used when each of the following CIL statements corresponds
to a line in the original file.
lmx is used when the following CIL statements are all expanded
from a single high-level language line.
lme ends a line mark block.
Example:
;;* lms 1 foo.hll
(CIL-1)
(CIL-2)
;;* lme
;;* lmx 10 bar.hll
(CIL-3)
(CIL-4)
;;* lms 100 baz.hll
(CIL-5)
(CIL-6)
;;* lme
(CIL-7)
;;* lme
CIL-1 is from line 1 of foo.hll
CIL-2 is from line 2 of foo.hll
CIL-3 is from line 10 of bar.hll
CIL-4 is from line 10 of bar.hll
CIL-5 is from line 100 of baz.hll
CIL-6 is from line 101 of baz.hll
CIL-7 is from line 10 of bar.hll
Based on work originally done by Yuli Khodorkovskiy of Tresys.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Change logic of bounds checking to match kernel's bound checking.
The following explanation is taken from Stephen Smalley's kernel
patch.
Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both
bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same
permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source
type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed
the same permissions to the target type.
Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic:
1. If we have:
typebounds A B;
then:
allow B self:process <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A self:process <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the
bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed:
allow A B:process <permissions>; or
allow B A:process <permissions>; or
allow A self:process <permissions>;
However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to satisfy
the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore this degenerates
to the same result (but is more efficient - we only need to perform
one compute_av call).
2. If we have:
typebounds A B;
typebounds A_exec B_exec;
then:
allow B B_exec:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A A_exec:file <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as
an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain
in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that
this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having:
allow A B_exec:file <permissions>;
in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to
enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types.
3. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded type T, then:
allow B T:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A T:file <permissions>;
is allowed in policy.
The old logic would have been identical for this example.
4. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded domain D, then:
allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic
because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can
allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having
to allow it to do the same to its parent.
The old logic would have required:
allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
to also be allowed in policy.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
As per discussion in https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/221980,
we should be using #ifdef __APPLE__ rather than our own custom-defined
DARWIN for building on MacOS X.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
