Commit Graph

26 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stephen Smalley
ef24ade029 Report source file and line information for neverallow failures.
Change-Id: I0def97a5f2f6097e2dad7bcd5395b8fa740d7073
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-24 14:58:58 -04:00
Richard Haines
e1551b91af libsepol: Add sepol_validate_transition_reason_buffer function
This will return mls/validatetrans constraint information for each
expression in a buffer. If POLICY_KERN version is >=
POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES then the policy defined types/attributes
will be returned.

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
2013-11-06 09:31:28 -05:00
Dan Walsh
4bc2cd49d4 Update version of policy file to match what was shipped since Fedora 19 2013-10-29 11:43:02 -04:00
Richard Haines
9eefe11b3a libsepol: V1 Allow constraint denials to be determined.
Adds policy source defined 'type' or 'typeattribute' names to
constraints by adding additional structures (->type_names->types) to a
binary policy.
Before this change all typeattributes were expanded to lists of types
and added to the constraint under ->names. This made it difficult for
system admins to determine from the policy source what attribute
needed to be updated. To facilitate analysis of constraint failures
a new function has also been added, see sepol_compute_av_reason_buffer.

As additional structures have been added to policy, the policy version
is also updated (POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES). There is also a
corresponding kernel patch to handle the additional structures.

sepol_compute_av_reason_buffer is an extended version of
sepol_compute_av_reason. This will return a buffer with constraint
expression information, containing the constrain type, class, perms,
keywords etc.. It will also contain which constraint expr failed plus
the final outcome. The buffer MUST be free'd with free(3).

The type information output by sepol_compute_av_reason_buffer depends on
the policy version:
If >= POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES, then the output will be
whatever was in the original policy (type or attribute names).
If < POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES, then the output will be
the types listed in the constraint (as no attribute information is
available in these versions).
For users and roles whatever policy version, only the names are listed
(as role attributes are not currently held in the constraint).

Also added are two functions that obtain the class and permissions
from a binary policy file that has been loaded for testing:
sepol_string_to_security_class
sepol_string_to_av_perm

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
2013-10-29 08:49:51 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
56258807ea Revert "Richard Haines patch that allows us discover constraint violation information"
This reverts commit 56b49ab711.

Conflicts:
	libselinux/src/audit2why.c
2013-10-25 13:53:03 -04:00
Dan Walsh
56b49ab711 Richard Haines patch that allows us discover constraint violation information
Basically we need this information to allow audit2allow/audit2why to better
describe which constraint is being broken.
2013-10-24 13:58:37 -04:00
Alice Chu
92788715dc libsepol: Fix memory leak issues found by Klocwork
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-02-05 20:14:50 -05:00
Eric Paris
693f5241fd checkpolicy: libsepol: implement default type policy syntax
We currently have a mechanism in which the default user, role, and range
can be picked up from the source or the target object.  This implements
the same thing for types.  The kernel will override this with type
transition rules and similar.  This is just the default if nothing
specific is given.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2013-02-05 20:14:46 -05:00
Chris PeBenito
01723ac2ce libsepol: Add always_check_network policy capability
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables.  Similarly, the
peer class is not checked if there is no NetLabel or labeled IPSEC.  Some
systems prefer that these classes are always checked, for example, to
protect the system should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the
nefilter rules were maliciously flushed.

Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
these mechanisms as enabled, even if there are no labeling rules.

Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 14:30:24 -04:00
Eric Paris
7a1e3e1fef libsepol: reserve policycapability for redhat testing of ptrace child
Red Hat is testing ptrace_child in the wild.  reserve this policy
capability so we don't have conflicts.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-06-28 11:21:15 -04:00
Eric Paris
09c783c9a3 libsepol: checkpolicy: implement new default labeling behaviors
We would like to be able to say that the user, role, or range of a newly
created object should be based on the user, role, or range of either the
source or the target of the creation operation.  aka, for a new file
this could be the user of the creating process or the user or the parent
directory.  This patch implements the new language and the policydb
support to give this information to the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2012-03-27 16:49:31 -04:00
Steve Lawrence
2f68def633 libsepol: Move ebitmap_* functions from mcstrans to libsepol
This patches moves some ebitmap functions (and, xor, not, etc.) from
mcstrans into libsepol, where they really belong and could be used by
other applications (e.g. CIL)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2011-11-02 15:37:11 -04:00
Guido Trentalancia
eb695e5a56 whole tree: default make target to all not install
Change the default "make" target for the libraries from "install" to
"all" in the makefiles.

Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2011-09-16 11:54:04 -04:00
Harry Ciao
e4bc1b223d libsepol: libsemanage: policycoreutils: Create a new preserve_tunables flag in sepol_handle_t.
By default only the effective branch of a tunable conditional would be
expanded and written to raw policy, while all needless unused branches
would be discarded.

Add a new option '-P' or "--preserve_tunables" to the semodule program.
By default it is 0, if set to 1 then the above preserve_tunables flag
in the sepol_handle_t would be set to 1 accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2011-09-16 11:54:02 -04:00
Harry Ciao
f87ae53825 libsepol: Indicate when boolean is indeed a tunable.
Add flags to cond_bool_datum_t and cond_node_t structures to differentiate
the tunables' identifiers and conditionals from those of booleans.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2011-09-16 11:54:01 -04:00
Harry Ciao
3592ebea1a Add role attribute support when expanding role_set_t.
When the rolemap and pointer to the base module are available, if
a non-zero bit in role_set_t.roles is a role attribute, expand it
before remap.

Note, during module compile the rolemap may not be available, the
potential duplicates of a regular role and the role attribute that
the regular role belongs to could be properly handled by
copy_role_allow() and copy_role_trans() during module expansion.

Take advantage of the role_val_to_struct[] of the base module, since
when role_set_expand() is invoked, the role_val_to_struct[] of the
out module may have not been established yet.

Also cleanup the error handling of role_set_expand().

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
2011-07-25 10:09:43 -04:00
Harry Ciao
8072dba146 Add role attribute support when generating pp files.
Add support to read/write the flavor flag and roles ebitmap in the
role_datum_t structure from/to policy module, if its version is no less
than MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLEATTRIB.

Since the role ebitmap would be expanded and won't be written into
policy.X, neither is the flavor flag, kernel SELinux security server
needs no change, the maximum version number for policy.X needs no bump.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
2011-07-25 10:09:34 -04:00
Harry Ciao
16675b7f96 Add role attribute support when compiling modules.
1. Add a uint32_t "flavor" field and an ebitmap "roles" to the
role_datum_t structure;

2. Add a new "attribute_role" statement and its handler to declare
a role attribute;

3. Modify declare_role() to setup role_datum_t.flavor according
to the isattr argument;

4. Add a new "roleattribute" rule and its handler, which will record
the regular role's (policy value - 1) into the role attribute's
role_datum_t.roles ebitmap;

5. Modify the syntax for the role-types rule only to define the
role-type associations;

6. Add a new role-attr rule to support the declaration of a single
role, and optionally the role attribute that the role belongs to;

7. Check if the new_role used in role-transition rule is a regular role;

8. Support to require a role attribute;

9. Modify symtab_insert() to allow multiple declarations only for
the regular role, while a role attribute can't be declared more than once
and can't share a same name with another regular role.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
2011-07-25 10:09:27 -04:00
Eric Paris
6eeb71538e libsepol: add support for filenametrans rule
This patch adds libsepol support for filename_trans rules.  These rules
allow one to make labeling decisions for new objects based partially on
the last path component.  They are stored in a list.  If we find that
the number of rules grows to an significant size I will likely choose to
store these in a hash, both in libsepol and in the kernel.  But as long
as the number of such rules stays small, this should be good.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
2011-04-13 15:20:46 -04:00
Harry Ciao
45b2e6ec23 Userspace: add class to role_trans & role_trans_rule
Introduce the class support to role_trans and role_trans_rule
structures, which could be the subject class("process") or the
class that the newly created object belongs to.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
2011-04-07 12:12:58 -04:00
Paul Nuzzi
505c75aad7 libsepol: Add support for multiple target OSes
On Wed, 2009-09-16 at 09:58 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> I'd rather have separate ocontext structs for each system. That way it
> is very easy to understand which ones apply to which system and you
> don't get a crazy out of context ocontext struct.
>

I looked into having separate ocontext structs but that would involve
changing a lot of files making the patch much larger and more intrusive.

> >   	} u;
> >   	union {
> >   		uint32_t sclass;	/* security class for genfs */
> > @@ -313,6 +323,17 @@ typedef struct genfs {
> >   #define OCON_NODE6 6		/* IPv6 nodes */
> >   #define OCON_NUM   7
> >
> > +/* object context array indices for Xen */
> > +#define OCON_ISID    0    /* initial SIDs */
> > +#define OCON_PIRQ    1    /* physical irqs */
> > +#define OCON_IOPORT  2    /* io ports */
> > +#define OCON_IOMEM   3    /* io memory */
> > +#define OCON_DEVICE  4    /* pci devices */
> > +#define OCON_DUMMY1  5    /* reserved */
> > +#define OCON_DUMMY2  6    /* reserved */
> > +#define OCON_NUM     7
> > +
> > +
> >
> Should these be namespaced? What if <random other system> has io port
> objects? You'd have to align them with each other and you have a mess of
> keeping the numbers the same (you already do this with OCON_ISID)

Variables have been namespaced and there is no more overlap with
OCON_ISID.

> Also we are relying on having the same number of OCON's which isn't good
> I don't think. As much as I hate the policydb_compat_info (read: alot)
> why aren't we using that to say how many ocons a xen policy really has?

OCON_NUM is now dynamically read through policydb_compat_info.

> This is messy, why not an ocontext_selinux_free() and
> ocontext_xen_free() (note: I realize the xen_free() one won't do
> anything except freep the ocontext_t)
>

done.

> >
> >   	len = buf[1];
> > -	if (len != strlen(target_str)&&
> > -	    (!alt_target_str || len != strlen(alt_target_str))) {
> > -		ERR(fp->handle, "policydb string length %zu does not match "
> > -		    "expected length %zu", len, strlen(target_str));
> > +	if (len>  32) {
> >
>
> magic number 32?

#defined.

Thanks for your input.  Below is the updated patch for libsepol.

----

 libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/policydb.h |   28 ++
 libsepol/src/expand.c                      |   85 +++++++-
 libsepol/src/policydb.c                    |  295
+++++++++++++++++++++++------
 libsepol/src/policydb_internal.h           |    1
 libsepol/src/private.h                     |    4
 libsepol/src/write.c                       |   93 ++++++++-
 6 files changed, 443 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
2009-10-14 15:45:46 -04:00
Christopher Pardy
86a2f899cb libsepol: method to check disable dontaudit flag.
This patch adds the ability to check on the value of the disable_dontaudit flag in the sepol handle. In the past the only way to know the value of this was to directly read the values from the handle. The get function provides a setter-getter symmetry similar to other functions found in libsepol.

Signed-off-by: Christopher Pardy <cpardy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-07-07 14:19:57 -04:00
Caleb Case
f7917ea9cf aliases for the boundry format
The boundry format mapped the primary field to a boolean in the
properties bitmap. This is appropriate for the kernel policy, but in
modular policy the primary field may be an integer that indicates the
primary type that is being aliased. In this case, the primary value cannot
be assumed to be boolean.

This patch creates a new module format that writes out the primary value
as was done before the boundry format.

Signed-off-by: Caleb Case <ccase@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
2009-02-16 11:52:03 -05:00
Joshua Brindle
f470207454 Author: KaiGai Kohei
Email: kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com
Subject: Thread/Child-Domain Assignment (rev.6)
Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2008 15:39:45 +0900

>> Hmm....
>> It seems to me what you pointed out is a bug of my patch. It prevents to deliver
>> actual number of type/attribute symbols to policy file, but it is unclear why does
>> it makes libsepol ignore the policyvers.
>> (I guess it may be a separated matter.)
>>
>>> Rather than trying to calculate the length without attributes I just removed
>>> the attribute check. This causes attributes to be written for all versions,
>>> but this should not cause any problems at all.
>> The reason why I injected such an ad-hoc code is that we cannot decide the policy
>> version written when type_attr_remove() is invoked.
>> Is it impossible to move it to policydb_write()?
>> It is invoked after the policyvers is fixed by caller.
>
> It isn't impossible. You are going to have to make it walk to type
> symbol table to calculate the length without attributes, then write
> that length instead of the total symtab length.

The attached patch enables to fixup the number of type/attribute entries
to be written. The type_attr_uncount() decrements the number of attribute
entries skipped at type_write().

At first, I had a plan to invoke type_attr_remove() with
hashtab_map_remove_on_error(), but it means the given policydb structure
is modified at policydb_write() and implicit changes to external interface.

Differences from the previous version are here:

Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
2008-10-08 06:58:40 -04:00
Vesa-Matti J Kari
0915aeaaac selinux: conditional expression type validation was off-by-one
This is the same off-by-one bug that was already fixed in the kernel.
(According to my understanding neither of these bugs has security
implications)

Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
2008-08-19 16:34:59 -04:00
Joshua Brindle
13cd4c8960 initial import from svn trunk revision 2950 2008-08-19 15:30:36 -04:00