Makes libselinux safer and less likely to leak file descriptors when
used as part of a multithreaded program.
Signed-off-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
To avoid regressions such as the one reported in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1219045
add a test for /etc/selinux/config to is_selinux_enabled().
This ensures that systems that do not install selinux-policy
will continue to return 0 from is_selinux_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
SELinux can be disabled via the selinux=0 kernel parameter or via
/sys/fs/selinux/disable (triggered by setting SELINUX=disabled in
/etc/selinux/config). In either case, selinuxfs will be unmounted
and unregistered and therefore it is sufficient to check for the
selinuxfs mount. We do not need to check for no-policy-loaded and
treat that as SELinux-disabled anymore; that is a relic of Fedora Core 2
days. Drop the no-policy-loaded test, which was a bit of a hack anyway
(checking whether getcon_raw() returned "kernel" as that can only happen
if no policy is yet loaded and therefore security_sid_to_context() only
has the initial SID name available to return as the context).
May possibly fix https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1195074
by virtue of removing the call to getcon_raw() and therefore avoiding
use of tls on is_selinux_enabled() calls. Regardless, it will make
is_selinux_enabled() faster and simpler.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
In attempting to enable building various part of Android with -Wall -Werror,
we found that the const security_context_t declarations in libselinux
are incorrect; const char * was intended, but const security_context_t
translates to char * const and triggers warnings on passing
const char * from the caller. Easiest fix is to replace them all with
const char *. And while we are at it, just get rid of all usage of
security_context_t itself as it adds no value - there is no true
encapsulation of the security context strings and callers already
directly use string functions on them. typedef left to permit
building legacy users until such a time as all are updated.
This is a port of Change-Id I2f9df7bb9f575f76024c3e5f5b660345da2931a7
from Android, augmented to deal with all of the other code in upstream
libselinux and updating the man pages too.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The Fedora Distribution is looking to standardize kernel subsystem file
systems to be mounted under /sys/fs. They would like us to move /selinux
to /sys/fs/selinux. This patch changes libselinux in the following
ways:
1. load_policy will first check if /sys/fs/selinux exists and mount the
selinuxfs at this location, if it does not exists it will fall back to
mounting the file system at /selinux (if it exists).
2. The init functions of selinux will now check if /sys/fs/selinux is
mounted, if it is and has an SELinuxfs mounted on it, the code will then
check if the selinuxfs is mounted rw, if it is, libselinux will set the
mountpoint, if it is readonly, libselinux will return no mountpoint. If
/sys/fs/selinux does not exists, the same check will be done for
/selinux and finally for an entry in /proc/mounts.
NOTE: We added the check for RO, to allow tools like mock to be able to
tell a chroot that SELinux is disabled while enforcing it outside the
chroot.
$ getenforce
Enabled
$ mount --bind /selinux /var/chroot/selinux
$ mount -o remount,ro /var/chroot/selinux
$ chroot /var/chroot
$ getenforce
Disabled
3. In order to make this work, I needed to stop enabled from checking if
/proc/filesystem for entries if selinux_mnt did not exist. Now enabeled
checks if selinux_mnt has been discovered otherwise it will report
selinux disabled.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Nick Kralevich
Stephen Smalley
Daniel J Walsh
Joshua Brindle