I found that building on OpenWrt/musl failed with:
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper.c:152:16: error: 'PATH_MAX' undeclared ...
Musl is less "generous" than glibc in recursively including header
files, and I suspect this is the reason for this error. Explicitly
including limits.h fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: W. Michael Petullo <mike@flyn.org>
On a SELinux disabled system the python call
`selinux.security_policyvers()` will fail.
Move the logic to find a binary policy from the python script
`sepolgen-ifgen` to the C-helper `sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper`.
Change the helper command line interface to accept an optional policy
path as second argument. If not given try the current loaded policy
(`selinux_current_policy_path`) and if running on a SELinux disabled
system iterate over the default store path appending policy versions
starting at the maximum supported policy version
(`sepol_policy_kern_vers_max`).
This changes the helper command line interface from:
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper policy_file out_file
to
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper out_file [policy_file]
and adds a linkage to libselinux.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Use codespell (https://github.com/codespell-project/codespell) in order
to find many common misspellings that are present in English texts.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
- Python 2.7 is planned to be the last of the 2.x releases
- It's generally advised to use Python 3
- Majority of python/ scripts are already switched python3
- Users with python 2 only can still use:
$ make PYTHON=/usr/bin/python ....
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
setools 4.2.0 dropped support for Python 2. On systems where
/usr/bin/python is Python 2, several tools are now broken because of
this. Update the shebang of these tools to /usr/bin/python3.
For future reference, as semanage/seobject.py, sepolicy and sepolgen
import setools, every program that uses one of these modules need to be
run with Python 3. The following programs do not use any of these
modules so their shebangs have not been modified:
dbus/selinux_server.py
libsemanage/utils/semanage_migrate_store
mcstrans/share/util/mlscolor-test
mcstrans/share/util/mlstrans-test
sandbox/start
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Introduce option --attr-helper to sepolgen-ifgen to make it possible to
override /usr/bin/sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper and use it in the testuite
in order to test the helper which has been compiled from the project
instead of the one installed on the system.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
audit2allow testsuite requires a system which uses SELinux with a MLS
policy. This is a lot to ask for a continuous integretation system.
Thankfully this can be worked around by using option -p to run the tools
with a specific configuration. Doing this, the testsuite can even be run
on a system without SELinux.
This approach requires building a custom policy for parsing test.log.
Add a minimal policy written in CIL for this need.
While at it:
* Do not invoke "sudo sepolgen-ifgen" but produce a file in a writable
directory (instead of /var/lib/sepolgen/interface_info)
* Use sys.executable instead of 'python', in order to really test
python3 and python2 when calling the test script with one of these
interpreters.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Importing sepolicy as non-root on a system with SELinux causes the
following exception to be raised:
ValueError: No SELinux Policy installed
Ignore this when using audit2why, which allows using it with option
--policy as a non-root user.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Add support for extended permissions to audit2allow. Extend AuditParser
to parse the 'ioctlcmd' field in AVC message. Extend PolicyGenerator to
generate allowxperm rules. Add the '-x'/'--xperms' option to audit2allow
to turn on generating of extended permission AV rules.
AVCMessage parses the ioctlcmd field in AVC messages. AuditParser
converts the ioctlcmd values into generic representation of extended
permissions that is stored in access vectors.
Extended permissions are represented by operations (currently only
'ioctl') and values associated to the operations. Values (for example
'~{ 0x42 1234 23-34 }') are stored in the XpermSet class.
PolicyGenerator contains new method to turn on generating of xperms.
When turned on, for each access vector, standard AV rule and possibly
several xperm AV rules are generated. Xperm AV rules are represented by
the AVExtRule class.
With xperm generating turned off, PolicyGenerator provides comments
about extended permissions in certain situations. When the AVC message
contains the ioctlcmd field and the access would be allowed according to
the policy, PolicyGenerator warns about xperm rules being the possible
cause of the denial.
Signed-off-by: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@redhat.com>
The toolchain automatically handles them and they break cross compiling.
LDFLAGS should also come before object files, some flags (eg,
-Wl,as-needed) can break things if they are in the wrong place)
Gentoo-Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/500674
Signed-off-by: Jason Zaman <jason@perfinion.com>
After libsepol is modified (for example while developing new features or
fixing bugs), running "make install" in the top-level directory does not
update the programs which use libsepol.a. Add this static library to the
target dependencies in order to force their updates. This makes "make"
use libsepol.a in the linking command without using LDLIBS.
While at it, copy what commit 14d7064348 ("libselinux: Allow
overriding libsepol.a location during build") introduced in libselinux
Makefile by using a new LIBSEPOLA variable in all Makefiles.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Teach audit2why to recognize type bounds failures. This required
updating libsepol sepol_compute_av_reason() to identify bounds
failures, and updating libsepol context_struct_compute_av() to
include the type bounds logic from the kernel.
This could potentially be further augmented to provide more detailed
reporting via the reason buffer to include information similar to
what security_dump_masked_av() reports in the kernel. However, it
is unclear if this is needed. It is already possible to get type
bounds checking at policy build time by enabling expand-check=1
in /etc/selinux/semanage.conf (or by default when compiling
monolithic policy).
Before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1480451925.038:3225): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=7118 comm="chmod" path="/home/sds/selinux-testsuite/tests/bounds/bounds_file_blue" dev="dm-2" ino=23337697 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_bounds_child_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_bounds_file_blue_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Was caused by:
Unknown - would be allowed by active policy
Possible mismatch between this policy and the one under which the audit message was generated.
Possible mismatch between current in-memory boolean settings vs. permanent ones.
After:
type=AVC msg=audit(1480451925.038:3225): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=7118 comm="chmod" path="/home/sds/selinux-testsuite/tests/bounds/bounds_file_blue" dev="dm-2" ino=23337697 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_bounds_child_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_bounds_file_blue_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Was caused by:
Typebounds violation.
Add an allow rule for the parent type.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
