RepoMirrors/selinux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux synced 2024-12-26 16:02:26 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Unchecked input leades to integer underflow

Browse Source 
On Mon, 2009-08-31 at 08:55 -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31 2009, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 2009-08-30 at 10:19 -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >>         This bug was discovered, and the analysis done, buy Max
> >>  Kellermann. I have never been able to replicate the problem, so I can't
> >>  help debug this error.
> >>
> >>  Strace:
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> >> brk(0x3233000)                          = 0x3233000
> >> mmap(NULL, 18446744073703178240, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)
> >> mmap(NULL, 18446744073703313408, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)
> >> mmap(NULL, 134217728, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0) = 0x7fdfda316000
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
> >>
> >> > 0xffffffffff9ec000 == 18446744073703178240 (the size of the first
> >> > large allocation).  It's also equal to -6373376.  This just looks like
> >> > an integer underflow, doesn't it?
> >>
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> >>  Breakpoint 4, 0x00007f9bc4c05400 in mmap64 () from /lib/libc.so.6
> >>  (gdb) p $rsi
> >>  $25 = -6373376
> >>  (gdb) bt
> >>  #0  0x00007f9bc4c05400 in mmap64 () from /lib/libc.so.6
> >>  #1  0x00007f9bc4baf6bb in _int_malloc () from /lib/libc.so.6
> >>  #2  0x00007f9bc4bb0a78 in malloc () from /lib/libc.so.6
> >>  #3  0x00007f9bc5301a8e in sepol_module_package_read (mod=0xb1d170, spf=0xb202e0, verbose=0) at module.c:533
> >>  #4  0x00007f9bc4ea7838 in ?? () from /lib/libsemanage.so.1
> >>
> >>  (gdb) frame 3
> >>  #3  0x00007f9bc5301a8e in sepol_module_package_read (mod=0xb1d170, spf=0xb202e0, verbose=0) at module.c:533
> >>  533     module.c: No such file or directory.
> >>          in module.c
> >>  (gdb) p len
> >>  $26 = 18446744073703176358
> >>  (gdb) p i
> >>  $27 = 3
> >>  (gdb) p nsec
> >>  $30 = 4
> >>  (gdb) p offsets[i+1]
> >>  $28 = 8192
> >>  (gdb) p offsets[i]
> >>  $29 = 6383450
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
> >>
> >> > line 456:
> >> > len = offsets[i + 1] - offsets[i];
> >>
> >> > Voila, integer underflow.  The function module_package_read_offsets()
> >> > reads the offsets from the input file, but does not verify them.
> >> >         off[nsec] = policy_file_length(file);
> >> > Here, the check is missing.
> >>
> >>         We should probably have:
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> >> 	off[nsec] = policy_file_length(file);
> >>         if (off[nsec] < off[nsec-1]) {
> >> 		ERR(file->handle, "file size smaller than previous offset (at %u, "
> >> 		    "offset %zu -> %zu", nsec, off[nsec - 1],
> >> 		    off[nsec]);
> >> 		return -1;
> >> 	}
> >> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
> >
> > Perhaps I am missing something, but module_package_read_offsets()
> > already checks that the offsets are increasing and aborts if not.
>
>         Well, almost. It does check for most of the offsets:
> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
>
> 406	for (i = 0; i < nsec; i++) {
> 407		off[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
> 408		if (i && off[i] < off[i - 1]) {
> 409			ERR(file->handle, "offsets are not increasing (at %u, "
> 410			    "offset %zu -> %zu", i, off[i - 1],
> 411			    off[i]);
> 412			return -1;
> 413		}
> 414	}
> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
>         So far, so good.
> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> 415
> 416	free(buf);
> 417	off[nsec] = policy_file_length(file);
> 418	*offsets = off;
> 419	return 0;
> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
>
>         The problem is line 417, where there is no check; and in the
>  case reported, the file length was less than the previous offset, and
>  this resulted in a negative number passed to the memory allocator,
>  which resulted in a huge allocation request.
>
>         Above, I just propose adding a check after line 417.

Check the last offset against the file size, and ensure that we free the
buffer and offset array in the error cases.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Smalley 2009-08-31 16:37:40 -04:00
parent e376f725fc
commit a0440a66c3
1 changed files with 8 additions and 2 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

10
libsepol/src/module.c
View File

@ -409,13 +409,19 @@ static int module_package_read_offsets(sepol_module_package_t * mod,
ERR(file->handle, "offsets are not increasing (at %u, "
"offset %zu -> %zu", i, off[i - 1],
off[i]);
return -1;
goto err;
}
}
free(buf);
off[nsec] = policy_file_length(file);
if (nsec && off[nsec] < off[nsec-1]) {
ERR(file->handle, "offset greater than file size (at %u, "
"offset %zu -> %zu", nsec, off[nsec - 1],
off[nsec]);
goto err;
}
*offsets = off;
free(buf);
return 0;
err: