osquery-defense-kit

Real-world queries for using osquery as part of your detection & response pipeline.

Organization

• detection/ - Threat detection queries tuned for alert generation.
• response/ - Data collection to assist in responding to possible threats. Tuned for periodic evidence collection.
• policy/ - Security policy queries tuned for alert generation.

Where suitable, queries are further divided up by MITRE ATT&CK tactics categories. Queries are periodically released in osquery query pack format. See Local Pack Generation for more information.

Linux Case Study: Shikitega (September 2022)

https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/shikitega-new-stealthy-malware-targeting-linux

Here is a partial list of what queries would have fired an alert based on these queries:

• Initial Dropper Execution, detected by:
  • execution/tiny-executable-events.sql
  • execution/tiny-executable.sql
• Next Stage Dropper Execution, detected by:
  • execution/tiny-executable-events.sql
  • execution/tiny-executable.sql
  • execution/unexpected-shell-parents.sql
• Escalation Prep, detected by:
  • execution/sketchy-fetchers.sql
  • execution/sketchy-fetcher-events.sql
  • c2/unexpected-talkers-linux.sql
  • c2/exotic-command-events.sql
  • c2/exotic-cmdline.sql
• Escalation Tool Execution detected by:
  • execution/unexpected-executable-permissions.sql
  • execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql
  • execution/unexpected-tmp-executables.sql
  • c2/exotic-command-events.sql
  • c2/exotic-cmdline.sql
  • initial_access/unexpected-shell-parents.sql
  • evasion/missing-from-disk-linux.sql
• Privilege Escalation detected by:
  • privesc/unexpected-setxid-process.sql
  • privesc/unexpected-privilege-escalation.sql
  • privesc/events/unexpected-privilege-escalation-events.sql
  • evasion/name_path_mismatch.sql
• Persistence detected by:
  • persistence/unexpected-cron-entries.sql
  • execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql

macOS Case Study: CloudMensis (April 2022)

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/

Here is a partial list of what stages would have been detected by particular queries:

• Initial Dropper Execution, detected by:

  • c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql

• Second Stage Execution, detected by:

  • execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql
  • persistence/unexpected-launch-daemon-macos.sql
  • execution/unexpected-mounts.sql

• TCC Bypass, detected by:

  • evasion/unexpected-env-values.sql

• Spy Agent Execution, detected by:

  • c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql
  • execution/exotic-command-events.sql
  • execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql

False Positive Policy

We endeavor to exclude real-world false positives from our detection queries.

Managing false positives is easier said than done - pull requests are welcome!

Tags Policy

Value:

• critical: queries are run 3x as often
• high: queries are run twice as often
• medium: queries are run at a regular pace (default)
• low: queries are run half as often
• very-low: queries are run 1/3rd as often

Interval Type:

• ephemeral: 60s (1 minute) base
• periodic: 1200s (20 minute) base (default)
• postmortem: 14400s (4 hour) base

Status:

• experimental: Run only half as often as normal

Local pack generation

Run make packs