openssl: bump to 1.1.1t
Removed upstreamed patch: 010-padlock.patch
Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
(e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
no ABI change.
[Hugo Landau]
*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
be called directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
(CVE-2023-0215)
[Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
will most likely lead to a crash.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
(CVE-2022-4450)
[Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
(CVE-2022-4304)
[Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
This commit is contained in:
John Audia
Hauke Mehrtens
parent
3c0676911b
commit
4ae86b3358
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@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=openssl
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PKG_BASE:=1.1.1
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PKG_BUGFIX:=s
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PKG_BUGFIX:=t
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PKG_VERSION:=$(PKG_BASE)$(PKG_BUGFIX)
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PKG_RELEASE:=$(AUTORELEASE)
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
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PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
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ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ \
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ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/old/$(PKG_BASE)/
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PKG_HASH:=c5ac01e760ee6ff0dab61d6b2bbd30146724d063eb322180c6f18a6f74e4b6aa
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PKG_HASH:=8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b
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PKG_LICENSE:=OpenSSL
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PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE
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@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
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From 2bcf8e69bd92e33d84c48e7d108d3d46b22f8a6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: ValdikSS <iam@valdikss.org.ru>
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Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 20:14:48 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] Padlock: fix byte swapping assembly for AES-192 and 256
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Byte swapping code incorrectly uses the number of AES rounds to swap expanded
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AES key, while swapping only a single dword in a loop, resulting in swapped
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key and partially swapped expanded keys, breaking AES encryption and
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decryption on VIA Padlock hardware.
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This commit correctly sets the number of swapping loops to be done.
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Fixes #20073
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CLA: trivial
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20077)
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(cherry picked from commit 7331e7ef79fe4499d81cc92249e9c97e9ff9291a)
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---
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engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl | 2 ++
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engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl | 2 ++
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl b/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl
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index 5b097ce3ef9b..07f7000fd38a 100644
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--- a/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl
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+++ b/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86.pl
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@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
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&function_begin_B("padlock_key_bswap");
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&mov ("edx",&wparam(0));
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&mov ("ecx",&DWP(240,"edx"));
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+ &inc ("ecx");
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+ &shl ("ecx",2);
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&set_label("bswap_loop");
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&mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
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&bswap ("eax");
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diff --git a/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl b/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl
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index 09b0aaa48dfe..dfd2ae656375 100644
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--- a/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl
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+++ b/engines/asm/e_padlock-x86_64.pl
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@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@
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.align 16
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padlock_key_bswap:
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mov 240($arg1),%edx
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+ inc %edx
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+ shl \$2,%edx
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.Lbswap_loop:
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mov ($arg1),%eax
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bswap %eax
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