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mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links
If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
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From a0761a301746ec2d92d7fcb82af69c0a6a4339aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 15:09:42 +0200
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Subject: mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links
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If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had
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a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames
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in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore.
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This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can
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buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no
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longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without
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encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the
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frames are still on the TXQ.
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Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key
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having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases
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for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption.
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With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key
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configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this
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behaviour on a key being configured.
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
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---
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net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 3 ++-
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net/mac80211/key.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
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net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 1 +
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net/mac80211/tx.c | 12 +++++++++---
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4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
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+++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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* Copyright 2007 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
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* Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
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* Copyright(c) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
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- * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019 Intel Corporation
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+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2020 Intel Corporation
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*/
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static const char * const sta_flag_names
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FLAG(MPSP_OWNER),
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FLAG(MPSP_RECIPIENT),
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FLAG(PS_DELIVER),
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+ FLAG(USES_ENCRYPTION),
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#undef FLAG
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};
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--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
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+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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* Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
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* Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
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* Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
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- * Copyright 2018-2019 Intel Corporation
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+ * Copyright 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
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*/
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#include <linux/if_ether.h>
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@@ -262,22 +262,29 @@ static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_acc
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sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
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}
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-int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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+static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force)
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{
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struct sta_info *sta = key->sta;
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struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local;
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assert_key_lock(local);
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+ set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION);
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+
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sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx;
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- if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT))
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+ if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT))
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clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
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ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta);
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return 0;
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}
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+int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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+{
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+ return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false);
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+}
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+
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static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old,
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struct ieee80211_key *new)
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{
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@@ -441,11 +448,8 @@ static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct
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if (pairwise) {
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rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new);
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if (new &&
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- !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX)) {
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- sta->ptk_idx = idx;
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- clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
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- ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta);
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- }
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+ !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX))
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+ _ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true);
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} else {
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rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new);
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}
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--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
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+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
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@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ enum ieee80211_sta_info_flags {
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WLAN_STA_MPSP_OWNER,
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WLAN_STA_MPSP_RECIPIENT,
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WLAN_STA_PS_DELIVER,
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+ WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION,
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NUM_WLAN_STA_FLAGS,
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};
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--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
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+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
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@@ -590,10 +590,13 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee802
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struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb);
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)tx->skb->data;
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- if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT))
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+ if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)) {
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tx->key = NULL;
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- else if (tx->sta &&
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- (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx])))
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+ return TX_CONTINUE;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (tx->sta &&
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+ (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx])))
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tx->key = key;
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else if (ieee80211_is_group_privacy_action(tx->skb) &&
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(key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_multicast_key)))
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@@ -654,6 +657,9 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee802
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if (!skip_hw && tx->key &&
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tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)
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info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
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+ } else if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) && tx->sta &&
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+ test_sta_flag(tx->sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION)) {
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+ return TX_DROP;
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}
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return TX_CONTINUE;
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