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git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
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9e509d4ec9
Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone. Review and one bug found by markus Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065
1299 lines
34 KiB
C
1299 lines
34 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.40 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
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#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "sshbuf.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "authfile.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "digest.h"
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#include "bitmap.h"
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#include "krl.h"
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/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
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#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
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# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
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#else
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# define KRL_DBG(x)
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#endif
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/*
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* Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
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* quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
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*/
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/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
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struct revoked_serial {
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u_int64_t lo, hi;
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RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
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};
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static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
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RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
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RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
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/* Tree of key IDs */
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struct revoked_key_id {
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char *key_id;
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RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
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};
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static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
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RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
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RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
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/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
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struct revoked_blob {
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u_char *blob;
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size_t len;
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RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
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};
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static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
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RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
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RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
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/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
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struct revoked_certs {
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struct sshkey *ca_key;
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struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
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struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
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TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
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};
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TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
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struct ssh_krl {
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u_int64_t krl_version;
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u_int64_t generated_date;
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u_int64_t flags;
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char *comment;
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struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
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struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
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struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
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};
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/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
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static int
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serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
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{
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if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
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return 0;
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return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
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}
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static int
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key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
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{
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return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
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}
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static int
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blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
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{
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int r;
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if (a->len != b->len) {
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if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
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return r;
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return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
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} else
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return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
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}
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struct ssh_krl *
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ssh_krl_init(void)
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{
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struct ssh_krl *krl;
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if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
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RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
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TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
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return krl;
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}
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static void
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revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
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{
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struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
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struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
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RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
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free(rs);
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}
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RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
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free(rki->key_id);
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free(rki);
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}
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sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
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}
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void
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ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
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{
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struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
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struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
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if (krl == NULL)
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return;
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free(krl->comment);
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RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
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free(rb->blob);
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free(rb);
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}
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RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
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free(rb->blob);
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free(rb);
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}
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TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
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TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
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revoked_certs_free(rc);
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}
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}
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void
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ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
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{
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krl->krl_version = version;
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
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{
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free(krl->comment);
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if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
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* create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
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*/
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static int
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revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
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struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
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{
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struct revoked_certs *rc;
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int r;
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*rcp = NULL;
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TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
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if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
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sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
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*rcp = rc;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!allow_create)
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return 0;
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/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
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if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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if (ca_key == NULL)
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rc->ca_key = NULL;
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else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
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free(rc);
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return r;
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}
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RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
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RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
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TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
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KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
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ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
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*rcp = rc;
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return 0;
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}
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static int
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insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
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{
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struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
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KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
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memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
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rs.lo = lo;
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rs.hi = hi;
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ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
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if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
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/* No entry matches. Just insert */
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if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
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ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
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if (ers != NULL) {
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KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
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/* Shouldn't happen */
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free(irs);
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return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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}
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ers = irs;
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} else {
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KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
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ers->lo, ers->hi));
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/*
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* The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
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* existing entry.
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*/
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if (ers->lo > lo)
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ers->lo = lo;
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if (ers->hi < hi)
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ers->hi = hi;
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}
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/*
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* The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
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* coalesce as necessary.
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*/
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/* Check predecessors */
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while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
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KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
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if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
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break;
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/* This entry overlaps. */
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if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
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ers->lo = crs->lo;
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KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
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ers->lo, ers->hi));
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}
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
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free(crs);
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}
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/* Check successors */
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while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
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KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
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if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
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break;
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/* This entry overlaps. */
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if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
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ers->hi = crs->hi;
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KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
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ers->lo, ers->hi));
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}
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RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
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free(crs);
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}
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KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
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return 0;
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
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u_int64_t serial)
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{
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return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
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const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
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{
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struct revoked_certs *rc;
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int r;
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if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
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return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
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return r;
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return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
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const char *key_id)
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{
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struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
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struct revoked_certs *rc;
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int r;
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if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
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return r;
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KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
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if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
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(rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
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free(rki);
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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}
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erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
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if (erki != NULL) {
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free(rki->key_id);
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free(rki);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
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static int
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plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
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{
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struct sshkey *kcopy;
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int r;
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if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
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return r;
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if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
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if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
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sshkey_free(kcopy);
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return r;
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}
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}
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r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
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sshkey_free(kcopy);
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return r;
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}
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/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
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static int
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revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
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{
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struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
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if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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rb->blob = blob;
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rb->len = len;
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erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
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if (erb != NULL) {
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free(rb->blob);
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free(rb);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
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{
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u_char *blob;
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size_t len;
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int r;
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debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
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if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
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return r;
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return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
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{
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u_char *blob;
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size_t len;
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int r;
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debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
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if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
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&blob, &len)) != 0)
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return r;
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return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len);
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}
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int
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ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
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{
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if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
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return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
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if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
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return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
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key->cert->signature_key,
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key->cert->key_id);
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} else {
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return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
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key->cert->signature_key,
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key->cert->serial);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
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* the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
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* numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
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* Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
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* that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
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*/
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static int
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choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
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u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
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{
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int new_state;
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u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
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/*
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* Avoid unsigned overflows.
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* The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
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*/
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contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31);
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last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
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next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
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/*
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* Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
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* NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
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* switching cost is independent of the current_state.
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*/
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cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
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cost_range = 8;
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switch (current_state) {
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case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
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cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
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break;
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case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
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cost_list = 8;
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cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
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break;
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|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
case 0:
|
|
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
|
|
cost_list = 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
|
|
cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
|
|
cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
|
|
cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
|
|
cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
|
|
|
|
/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
|
|
cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
|
|
cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
|
|
cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
|
|
cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
|
|
|
|
/* Now pick the best choice */
|
|
*force_new_section = 0;
|
|
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
|
|
cost = cost_bitmap;
|
|
if (cost_range < cost) {
|
|
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
|
|
cost = cost_range;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cost_list < cost) {
|
|
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
|
|
cost = cost_list;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
|
|
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
|
|
*force_new_section = 1;
|
|
cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
|
|
}
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
|
|
"list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
|
|
"selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
|
|
(long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
|
|
(long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
|
|
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
|
|
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
|
|
*force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
|
|
return new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
u_char *blob;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
|
|
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
|
|
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
|
|
free(blob);
|
|
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
|
|
free(blob);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
|
|
static int
|
|
revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
|
|
struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
|
|
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
|
|
int next_state, state = 0;
|
|
struct sshbuf *sect;
|
|
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
/* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
|
|
if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Store the revoked serials. */
|
|
for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
|
|
rs != NULL;
|
|
rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
|
|
(long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
|
|
state));
|
|
|
|
/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
|
|
nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
|
|
final = nrs == NULL;
|
|
gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
|
|
contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
|
|
|
|
/* Choose next state based on these */
|
|
next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
|
|
state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the current section is a range section or has a different
|
|
* type to the next section, then finish it off now.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
|
|
state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
|
|
switch (state) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
|
|
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
bitmap_free(bitmap);
|
|
bitmap = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
|
|
if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
|
|
next_state));
|
|
state = next_state;
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
switch (state) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
|
|
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
bitmap_start = rs->lo;
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
|
|
bitmap_start)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Perform section-specific processing */
|
|
switch (state) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
|
|
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
|
|
if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
|
|
error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
|
|
if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
|
|
rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
last = rs->hi;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
|
|
if (state != 0) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
|
|
__func__, state));
|
|
switch (state) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
|
|
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
bitmap_free(bitmap);
|
|
bitmap = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
|
|
|
|
/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
bitmap_free(bitmap);
|
|
sshbuf_free(sect);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
|
|
const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
|
|
{
|
|
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
struct revoked_certs *rc;
|
|
struct revoked_blob *rb;
|
|
struct sshbuf *sect;
|
|
u_char *sblob = NULL;
|
|
size_t slen, i;
|
|
|
|
if (krl->generated_date == 0)
|
|
krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
/* Store the header */
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
sshbuf_reset(sect);
|
|
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
|
|
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
|
|
sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
|
|
sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
free(sblob);
|
|
sshbuf_free(sect);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t t;
|
|
struct tm *tm;
|
|
|
|
t = timestamp;
|
|
tm = localtime(&t);
|
|
if (tm == NULL)
|
|
strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
|
|
else {
|
|
*ts = '\0';
|
|
strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
|
|
{
|
|
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
u_char type;
|
|
const u_char *blob;
|
|
size_t blen, nbits;
|
|
struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
|
|
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
|
|
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
|
|
char *key_id = NULL;
|
|
struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
/* Header: key, reserved */
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
|
|
sshbuf_free(subsect);
|
|
subsect = NULL;
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
|
|
/* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
|
|
ca_key, serial)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
|
|
ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
|
|
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
|
|
&blob, &blen)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
|
|
for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
|
|
if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
|
|
error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
|
|
ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
bitmap_free(bitmap);
|
|
bitmap = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
|
|
&key_id, NULL)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
|
|
ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
free(key_id);
|
|
key_id = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
|
|
error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
if (bitmap != NULL)
|
|
bitmap_free(bitmap);
|
|
free(key_id);
|
|
sshkey_free(ca_key);
|
|
sshbuf_free(subsect);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
|
|
int
|
|
ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
|
|
const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
|
|
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
|
|
char timestamp[64];
|
|
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
|
|
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
|
|
u_char type, *rdata = NULL;
|
|
const u_char *blob;
|
|
size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, nca_used;
|
|
u_int format_version;
|
|
|
|
nca_used = 0;
|
|
*krlp = NULL;
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
|
|
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
|
|
debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
|
|
return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
|
|
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
|
|
error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
|
|
debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
|
|
(long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
|
|
*krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
|
|
* detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
|
|
*/
|
|
sig_seen = 0;
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
|
|
if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
|
|
if (sig_seen) {
|
|
error("KRL contains non-signature section "
|
|
"after signature");
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Not interested for now. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
sig_seen = 1;
|
|
/* First string component is the signing key */
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
|
|
/* Second string component is the signature itself */
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
|
|
sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, 0)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
|
|
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
|
|
error("KRL signed more than once with "
|
|
"the same key");
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
|
|
tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1,
|
|
sizeof(*ca_used));
|
|
if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
|
|
ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
|
|
* where the section start.
|
|
*/
|
|
sshbuf_free(copy);
|
|
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
|
|
sshbuf_free(sect);
|
|
sect = NULL;
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
|
|
(r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
|
|
if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
|
|
while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect,
|
|
&rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 &&
|
|
rlen != 20) {
|
|
error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__);
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = revoke_blob(
|
|
type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ?
|
|
&krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s,
|
|
rdata, rlen)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees rdata */
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
|
|
/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
|
|
sshbuf_free(sect);
|
|
sect = NULL;
|
|
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
|
|
error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
|
|
sig_seen = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
|
|
if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
|
|
sig_seen = 1;
|
|
else {
|
|
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
|
|
ca_used[i] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
|
|
error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
|
|
if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
|
|
sig_seen = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
|
|
if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
|
|
sig_seen = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sig_seen) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
|
error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*krlp = krl;
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
if (r != 0)
|
|
ssh_krl_free(krl);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
|
|
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
|
|
free(ca_used);
|
|
free(rdata);
|
|
sshkey_free(key);
|
|
sshbuf_free(copy);
|
|
sshbuf_free(sect);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
|
|
static int
|
|
is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
|
|
struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
|
|
|
|
/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
|
|
memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
|
|
rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
|
|
erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
|
|
if (erki != NULL) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
|
|
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
|
|
* CA doesn't specify one).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (key->cert->serial == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
|
|
rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
|
|
ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
|
|
if (ers != NULL) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
|
|
key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
|
|
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
|
|
static int
|
|
is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
|
|
struct revoked_certs *rc;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
|
|
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
|
|
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
|
|
free(rb.blob);
|
|
if (erb != NULL) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
|
|
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Next, explicit keys */
|
|
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
|
|
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
|
|
free(rb.blob);
|
|
if (erb != NULL) {
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
|
|
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
|
|
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
|
|
&rc, 0)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (rc != NULL) {
|
|
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
|
|
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (rc != NULL) {
|
|
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
|
|
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
|
|
debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
|
|
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
|
|
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
|
|
int oerrno = 0, r, fd;
|
|
|
|
if (path == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
|
|
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
|
|
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
|
|
oerrno = errno;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) {
|
|
oerrno = errno;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
|
|
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (fd != -1)
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
|
|
ssh_krl_free(krl);
|
|
if (r != 0)
|
|
errno = oerrno;
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|