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- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32 [servconf.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c auth.c sshd_config.5] Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@.
698 lines
18 KiB
C
698 lines
18 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.96 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
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# include <paths.h>
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#endif
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#include <pwd.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
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#include <login.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
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#include <shadow.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
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#include <libgen.h>
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#endif
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "match.h"
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#include "groupaccess.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "auth-options.h"
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#include "canohost.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "loginrec.h"
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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#include "ssh-gss.h"
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#endif
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#include "authfile.h"
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#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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/* import */
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extern ServerOptions options;
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extern int use_privsep;
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extern Buffer loginmsg;
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extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
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/* Debugging messages */
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Buffer auth_debug;
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int auth_debug_init;
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/*
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* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
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* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
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* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
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* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
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* listed there, false will be returned.
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* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
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* Otherwise true is returned.
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*/
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int
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allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
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{
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struct stat st;
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const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
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u_int i;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
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struct spwd *spw = NULL;
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#endif
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/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
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if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
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return 0;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
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if (!options.use_pam)
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spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
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#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
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if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
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return 0;
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#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
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#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
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/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
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passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
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if (spw != NULL)
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#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
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passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
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#else
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passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
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#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
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#endif
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/* check for locked account */
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if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
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int locked = 0;
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#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
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if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
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locked = 1;
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#endif
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#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
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if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
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strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
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locked = 1;
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#endif
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#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
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if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
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locked = 1;
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
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free((void *) passwd);
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#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
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if (locked) {
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logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
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pw->pw_name);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
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* are chrooting.
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*/
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if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
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strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
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char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
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_PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
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if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
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logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
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"does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
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xfree(shell);
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return 0;
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}
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if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
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(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
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logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
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"is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
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xfree(shell);
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return 0;
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}
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xfree(shell);
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}
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if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
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options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
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hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
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ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
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}
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/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
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if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
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for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
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if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
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options.deny_users[i])) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
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"because listed in DenyUsers",
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pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
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if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
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for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
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if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
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options.allow_users[i]))
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break;
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/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
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if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
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"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
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/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
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if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
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"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
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if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
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if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
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options.num_deny_groups)) {
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ga_free();
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
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"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
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pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
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* isn't listed there
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*/
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if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
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if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
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options.num_allow_groups)) {
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ga_free();
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
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"because none of user's groups are listed "
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"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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ga_free();
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}
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#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
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if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
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return 0;
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#endif
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/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
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return 1;
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}
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void
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auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
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{
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void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
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char *authmsg;
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if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
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return;
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/* Raise logging level */
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if (authenticated == 1 ||
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!authctxt->valid ||
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authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
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strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
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authlog = logit;
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if (authctxt->postponed)
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authmsg = "Postponed";
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else
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authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
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authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
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authmsg,
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method,
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authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
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authctxt->user,
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get_remote_ipaddr(),
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get_remote_port(),
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info);
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#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
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if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
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(strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
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strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
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strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
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record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
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get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
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# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
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if (authenticated)
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sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
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get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
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# endif
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#endif
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#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
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if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
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audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
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*/
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int
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auth_root_allowed(char *method)
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{
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switch (options.permit_root_login) {
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case PERMIT_YES:
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return 1;
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case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
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if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
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return 1;
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break;
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case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
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if (forced_command) {
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logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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}
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logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
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* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
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* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
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*
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* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
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*/
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char *
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expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
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{
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char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
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int i;
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file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
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"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
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/*
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* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
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* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
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*/
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if (*file == '/')
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return (file);
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i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
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if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
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fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
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xfree(file);
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return (xstrdup(ret));
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}
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char *
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authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
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{
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if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
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strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
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return NULL;
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return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
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}
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/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
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HostStatus
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check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
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const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
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{
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char *user_hostfile;
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struct stat st;
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HostStatus host_status;
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struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
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const struct hostkey_entry *found;
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hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
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load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
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if (userfile != NULL) {
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user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
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if (options.strict_modes &&
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(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
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((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
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logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
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"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
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pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
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auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
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user_hostfile);
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} else {
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temporarily_use_uid(pw);
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load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
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restore_uid();
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}
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xfree(user_hostfile);
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}
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host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
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if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
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error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
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found->host);
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else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
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debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
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found->host, found->file, found->line);
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else
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debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
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free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
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return host_status;
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}
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/*
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* Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
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* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
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* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
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*
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* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
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*
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* Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
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* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
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*
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* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
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*/
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static int
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secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
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char *err, size_t errlen)
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{
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uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
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char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
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char *cp;
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int comparehome = 0;
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struct stat st;
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if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
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strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
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comparehome = 1;
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/* check the open file to avoid races */
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if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
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(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
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buf);
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return -1;
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}
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/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
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for (;;) {
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if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
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return -1;
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}
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strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
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if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
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(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(err, errlen,
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"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
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return -1;
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}
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/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
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if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
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break;
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/*
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* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
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* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
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*/
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if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static FILE *
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auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
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int log_missing, char *file_type)
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{
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char line[1024];
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struct stat st;
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int fd;
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FILE *f;
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if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
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if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
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debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
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strerror(errno));
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return NULL;
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}
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if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
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close(fd);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
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logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
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pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
unset_nonblock(fd);
|
|
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (strict_modes &&
|
|
secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
|
|
fclose(f);
|
|
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
|
|
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return f;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
FILE *
|
|
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
|
|
{
|
|
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
FILE *
|
|
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
|
|
{
|
|
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
|
|
"authorized principals");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct passwd *
|
|
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
|
|
extern login_cap_t *lc;
|
|
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
|
|
auth_session_t *as;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
|
|
|
|
ci->user = user;
|
|
parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
|
|
aix_setauthdb(user);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
pw = getpwnam(user);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
|
|
aix_restoreauthdb();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
|
|
/*
|
|
* Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems
|
|
* when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
|
|
* login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
|
|
* user database.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
|
|
logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
|
|
user, pw->pw_name);
|
|
pw = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (pw == NULL) {
|
|
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
|
|
user, get_remote_ipaddr());
|
|
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
|
|
record_failed_login(user,
|
|
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
|
|
audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
|
|
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!allowed_user(pw))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
|
|
if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
|
|
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
|
|
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
|
|
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
|
|
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
|
|
pw = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (as != NULL)
|
|
auth_close(as);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (pw != NULL)
|
|
return (pwcopy(pw));
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
|
|
int
|
|
auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
char *key_fp;
|
|
|
|
if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
/* key not revoked */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case -1:
|
|
/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
|
|
error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
|
|
"authentication");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
/* Key revoked */
|
|
key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
|
|
error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
|
|
"%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
|
|
xfree(key_fp);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
|
|
if (!auth_debug_init)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
va_start(args, fmt);
|
|
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
auth_debug_send(void)
|
|
{
|
|
char *msg;
|
|
|
|
if (!auth_debug_init)
|
|
return;
|
|
while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
|
|
msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
|
|
packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
|
|
xfree(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
auth_debug_reset(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (auth_debug_init)
|
|
buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
|
|
else {
|
|
buffer_init(&auth_debug);
|
|
auth_debug_init = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct passwd *
|
|
fakepw(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static struct passwd fake;
|
|
|
|
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
|
|
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
|
|
fake.pw_passwd =
|
|
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
|
|
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
|
|
fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
|
|
fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
|
|
fake.pw_class = "";
|
|
#endif
|
|
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
|
|
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
|
|
|
|
return (&fake);
|
|
}
|