mirror of
git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
synced 2024-12-18 16:14:34 +00:00
874d77bb13
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
492 lines
13 KiB
C
492 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
|
* All rights reserved
|
|
*
|
|
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
|
|
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
|
|
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
|
|
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
|
|
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "includes.h"
|
|
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.6 2000/10/11 20:27:23 markus Exp $");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
|
|
# include <sia.h>
|
|
# include <siad.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include "xmalloc.h"
|
|
#include "rsa.h"
|
|
#include "ssh.h"
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
|
#include "buffer.h"
|
|
#include "mpaux.h"
|
|
#include "servconf.h"
|
|
#include "compat.h"
|
|
#include "auth.h"
|
|
#include "session.h"
|
|
|
|
/* import */
|
|
extern ServerOptions options;
|
|
extern char *forced_command;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
|
|
extern char *aixloginmsg;
|
|
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
|
|
extern int saved_argc;
|
|
extern char **saved_argv;
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* convert ssh auth msg type into description
|
|
*/
|
|
char *
|
|
get_authname(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
static char buf[1024];
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
|
|
return "password";
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
|
|
return "rsa";
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
|
|
return "rhosts-rsa";
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
|
|
return "rhosts";
|
|
#ifdef KRB4
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
|
|
return "kerberos";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SKEY
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
|
|
return "s/key";
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* read packets and try to authenticate local user 'luser'.
|
|
* return if authentication is successfull. not that pw == NULL
|
|
* if the user does not exists or is not allowed to login.
|
|
* each auth method has to 'fake' authentication for nonexisting
|
|
* users.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
do_authloop(struct passwd * pw, char *luser)
|
|
{
|
|
int authenticated = 0;
|
|
int attempt = 0;
|
|
unsigned int bits;
|
|
RSA *client_host_key;
|
|
BIGNUM *n;
|
|
char *client_user, *password;
|
|
char user[1024];
|
|
unsigned int dlen;
|
|
int plen, nlen, elen;
|
|
unsigned int ulen;
|
|
int type = 0;
|
|
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
|
|
|
|
/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
client_user = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (attempt = 1;; attempt++) {
|
|
/* default to fail */
|
|
authenticated = 0;
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(user, "", sizeof user);
|
|
|
|
/* Get a packet from the client. */
|
|
type = packet_read(&plen);
|
|
|
|
/* Process the packet. */
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
#ifdef AFS
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
|
|
if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
|
|
verbose("Kerberos tgt passing disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Accept Kerberos tgt. */
|
|
char *tgt = packet_get_string(&dlen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
|
|
if (!auth_kerberos_tgt(pw, tgt))
|
|
verbose("Kerberos tgt REFUSED for %.100s", luser);
|
|
xfree(tgt);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
|
|
if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
|
|
verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Accept AFS token. */
|
|
char *token_string = packet_get_string(&dlen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
|
|
if (!auth_afs_token(pw, token_string))
|
|
verbose("AFS token REFUSED for %.100s", luser);
|
|
xfree(token_string);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
#endif /* AFS */
|
|
#ifdef KRB4
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
|
|
if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
|
|
/* packet_get_all(); */
|
|
verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Try Kerberos v4 authentication. */
|
|
KTEXT_ST auth;
|
|
char *tkt_user = NULL;
|
|
char *kdata = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &auth.length);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
|
|
|
|
if (auth.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
|
|
memcpy(auth.dat, kdata, auth.length);
|
|
xfree(kdata);
|
|
|
|
if (pw != NULL) {
|
|
authenticated = auth_krb4(pw->pw_name, &auth, &tkt_user);
|
|
if (authenticated) {
|
|
snprintf(user, sizeof user, " tktuser %s", tkt_user);
|
|
xfree(tkt_user);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* KRB4 */
|
|
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
|
|
if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
|
|
verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get client user name. Note that we just have to
|
|
* trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
|
|
* authentication is insecure. (Another is
|
|
* IP-spoofing on a local network.)
|
|
*/
|
|
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type);
|
|
|
|
/* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */
|
|
authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(user, sizeof user, " ruser %s", client_user);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
|
|
if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
|
|
verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get client user name. Note that we just have to
|
|
* trust the client; root on the client machine can
|
|
* claim to be any user.
|
|
*/
|
|
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
|
|
|
|
/* Get the client host key. */
|
|
client_host_key = RSA_new();
|
|
if (client_host_key == NULL)
|
|
fatal("RSA_new failed");
|
|
client_host_key->e = BN_new();
|
|
client_host_key->n = BN_new();
|
|
if (client_host_key->e == NULL || client_host_key->n == NULL)
|
|
fatal("BN_new failed");
|
|
bits = packet_get_int();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->e, &elen);
|
|
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->n, &nlen);
|
|
|
|
if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n))
|
|
verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
|
|
"actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n), bits);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type);
|
|
|
|
authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key);
|
|
RSA_free(client_host_key);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(user, sizeof user, " ruser %s", client_user);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
|
|
if (!options.rsa_authentication) {
|
|
verbose("RSA authentication disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* RSA authentication requested. */
|
|
n = BN_new();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(n, &nlen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, nlen, type);
|
|
authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n);
|
|
BN_clear_free(n);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
|
|
if (!options.password_authentication) {
|
|
verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
|
|
* transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
|
|
* not visible to an outside observer.
|
|
*/
|
|
password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
/* Do PAM auth with password */
|
|
authenticated = auth_pam_password(pw, password);
|
|
#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
|
|
/* Do SIA auth with password */
|
|
if (sia_validate_user(NULL, saved_argc, saved_argv,
|
|
get_canonical_hostname(), pw->pw_name, NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, password) == SIASUCCESS) {
|
|
authenticated = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
|
|
/* Try authentication with the password. */
|
|
authenticated = auth_password(pw, password);
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
|
|
xfree(password);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SKEY
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
|
|
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS");
|
|
if (options.skey_authentication == 1) {
|
|
char *skeyinfo = NULL;
|
|
if (pw != NULL)
|
|
skey_keyinfo(pw->pw_name);
|
|
if (skeyinfo == NULL) {
|
|
debug("generating fake skeyinfo for %.100s.", luser);
|
|
skeyinfo = skey_fake_keyinfo(luser);
|
|
}
|
|
if (skeyinfo != NULL) {
|
|
/* we send our s/key- in tis-challenge messages */
|
|
debug("sending challenge '%s'", skeyinfo);
|
|
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
|
|
packet_put_cstring(skeyinfo);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
|
|
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
|
|
if (options.skey_authentication == 1) {
|
|
char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
|
|
debug("skey response == '%s'", response);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
|
|
authenticated = (pw != NULL &&
|
|
skey_haskey(pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
|
|
skey_passcheck(pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
|
|
xfree(response);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#else
|
|
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
|
|
/* TIS Authentication is unsupported */
|
|
log("TIS authentication unsupported.");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
|
|
* returned) during authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (authenticated && pw == NULL)
|
|
fatal("internal error: authenticated for pw == NULL");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
|
|
if (authenticated &&
|
|
!check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,pw->pw_uid)) {
|
|
packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
|
|
(int)pw->pw_uid);
|
|
authenticated = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the user is logging in as root and root logins
|
|
* are disallowed.
|
|
* Note that root login is allowed for forced commands.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (authenticated && pw && pw->pw_uid == 0 && !options.permit_root_login) {
|
|
if (forced_command) {
|
|
log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
|
|
} else {
|
|
authenticated = 0;
|
|
log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s",
|
|
get_canonical_hostname());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Raise logging level */
|
|
if (authenticated ||
|
|
attempt == AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
|
|
type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD)
|
|
authlog = log;
|
|
|
|
authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
|
|
authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed",
|
|
get_authname(type),
|
|
pw ? "" : "illegal user ",
|
|
pw && pw->pw_uid == 0 ? "ROOT" : luser,
|
|
get_remote_ipaddr(),
|
|
get_remote_port(),
|
|
user);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
if (authenticated && !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user))
|
|
authenticated = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (client_user != NULL) {
|
|
xfree(client_user);
|
|
client_user = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (authenticated)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (attempt > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
|
|
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
|
|
loginfailed(user,get_canonical_hostname(),"ssh");
|
|
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
|
|
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, luser);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Send a message indicating that the authentication attempt failed. */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
|
|
* been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
do_authentication()
|
|
{
|
|
struct passwd *pw, pwcopy;
|
|
int plen;
|
|
unsigned int ulen;
|
|
char *user;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
|
|
packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER);
|
|
|
|
/* Get the user name. */
|
|
user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER);
|
|
|
|
setproctitle("%s", user);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef AFS
|
|
/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
|
|
if (k_hasafs()) {
|
|
k_setpag();
|
|
k_unlog();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* AFS */
|
|
|
|
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
|
|
pw = getpwnam(user);
|
|
if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) {
|
|
/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
|
|
memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
|
|
pwcopy.pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
|
|
pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
|
|
pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
|
|
pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
|
|
pwcopy.pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
|
|
#endif
|
|
pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
|
|
pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
|
|
pw = &pwcopy;
|
|
} else {
|
|
pw = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
if (pw)
|
|
start_pam(pw);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
|
|
* the server. (Unless you are running Windows)
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
|
|
if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
|
|
packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.", pw ? "" : "illegal user ", user);
|
|
|
|
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
|
|
if (options.password_authentication &&
|
|
#ifdef KRB4
|
|
(!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
|
|
#endif /* KRB4 */
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
auth_pam_password(pw, "")) {
|
|
#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
|
|
(sia_validate_user(NULL, saved_argc, saved_argv,
|
|
get_canonical_hostname(), pw->pw_name, NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, "") == SIASUCCESS)) {
|
|
#else /* !HAVE_OSF_SIA && !USE_PAM */
|
|
auth_password(pw, "")) {
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
/* Authentication with empty password succeeded. */
|
|
log("Login for user %s from %.100s, accepted without authentication.",
|
|
user, get_remote_ipaddr());
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Loop until the user has been authenticated or the
|
|
connection is closed, do_authloop() returns only if
|
|
authentication is successfull */
|
|
do_authloop(pw, user);
|
|
}
|
|
if (pw == NULL)
|
|
fatal("internal error, authentication successfull for user '%.100s'", user);
|
|
|
|
/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
|
|
/* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */
|
|
if (loginsuccess(user,get_canonical_hostname(),"ssh",&aixloginmsg) < 0)
|
|
aixloginmsg = NULL;
|
|
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
|
|
|
|
/* Perform session preparation. */
|
|
do_authenticated(pw);
|
|
}
|