openssh/auth-krb4.c
Damien Miller 874d77bb13 - (djm) Big OpenBSD sync:
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/09/30 10:27:44
     [log.c]
     allow loglevel debug
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 11:59:57
     [packet.c]
     hmac->mac
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 12:03:03
     [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c]
     move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in
     debug-msg
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 12:16:48
     ssh.c
     do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:30:44
     ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c
     -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:32:34
     auth-options.c
     clear options on every call.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:51:00
     authfd.c authfd.h
     interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net>
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/10 14:20:45
     compat.c
     use rexexp for version string matching
   - provos@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/10 22:02:18
     [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h]
     First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange.  The
     client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman
     in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer
     keys.  University of Windsor provided network, T the company.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 13:59:52
     [auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
     clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:00:27
     [auth-options.h]
     clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:03:27
     [scp.1 scp.c]
     support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:11:35
     [dh.c]
     Wall
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:14:40
     [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h]
     [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h]
     add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by
     mkiernan@avantgo.com and me
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:27:24
     [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h]
     [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     new cipher framework
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:45:21
     [cipher.c]
     remove DES
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/12 03:59:20
     [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     enable DES in SSH-1 clients only
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/12 08:21:13
     [kex.h packet.c]
     remove unused
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 12:34:46
     [sshd.c]
     Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 12:59:15
     [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h  rijndael.c rijndael.h]
     rijndael/aes support
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 13:10:54
     [sshd.8]
     more info about -V
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 13:12:02
     [myproposal.h]
     prefer no compression
2000-10-14 16:23:11 +11:00

385 lines
11 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "servconf.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.19 2000/10/03 18:03:02 markus Exp $");
#ifdef KRB4
char *ticket = NULL;
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
* try krb4 authentication,
* return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
*/
int
auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
{
AUTH_DAT adata;
KTEXT_ST tkt;
struct hostent *hp;
unsigned long faddr;
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
char phost[INST_SZ];
char realm[REALM_SZ];
int r;
/*
* Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
* users and only if Kerberos is installed.
*/
if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
/* Set up our ticket file. */
if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid)) {
log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
pw->pw_name);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
}
/* Try to get TGT using our password. */
r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "",
realm, "krbtgt", realm,
DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *) password);
if (r != INTK_OK) {
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 password "
"authentication for %s failed: %s",
pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
}
/* Successful authentication. */
chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
/*
* Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
* "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
* to a bogus Kerberos server.
*/
(void) gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
(void) strlcpy(phost, (char *) krb_get_phost(localhost),
INST_SZ);
r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
if (r == KSUCCESS) {
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(localhost))) {
log("Couldn't get local host address!");
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
}
memmove((void *) &faddr, (void *) hp->h_addr,
sizeof(faddr));
/* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
faddr, &adata, "");
if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
/*
* Probably didn't have a srvtab on
* localhost. Disallow login.
*/
log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
"no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
} else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
log("Kerberos V4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
}
} else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
/*
* Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
* log the error.
*/
log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
"not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
} else {
/*
* TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
*/
packet_send_debug("WARNING: Kerberos V4 TGT "
"possibly spoofed for %s: %s",
pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto kerberos_auth_failure;
}
/* Authentication succeeded. */
return 1;
kerberos_auth_failure:
krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
return 0;
} else {
/* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
packet_send_debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
}
/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
return -1;
}
void
krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
{
debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
if (ticket) {
(void) dest_tkt();
xfree(ticket);
ticket = NULL;
}
}
int
krb4_init(uid_t uid)
{
static int cleanup_registered = 0;
const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
struct stat st;
int fd;
if (!ticket) {
/* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
ticket = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
#ifdef AFS
if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
tkt_root = "/ticket/";
#endif /* AFS */
snprintf(ticket, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d", tkt_root, uid, getpid());
(void) krb_set_tkt_string(ticket);
}
/* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
if (!cleanup_registered) {
fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
cleanup_registered = 1;
}
/* Try to create our ticket file. */
if ((fd = mkstemp(ticket)) != -1) {
close(fd);
return 1;
}
/* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
if (lstat(ticket, &st) != -1) {
if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
st.st_uid == uid)
return 1;
}
/* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving bad ticket for inspection. */
log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", ticket);
fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
cleanup_registered = 0;
xfree(ticket);
ticket = NULL;
return 0;
}
int
auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
{
AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
KTEXT_ST reply;
char instance[INST_SZ];
int r, s;
socklen_t slen;
u_int cksum;
Key_schedule schedule;
struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
s = packet_get_connection_in();
slen = sizeof(local);
memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
slen = sizeof(foreign);
memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
fatal_cleanup();
}
instance[0] = '*';
instance[1] = 0;
/* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, 0, &adat, ""))) {
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
return 0;
}
des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
*client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
(void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
*adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
/* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
if (kuserok(&adat, (char *) server_user) != KSUCCESS) {
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed!");
log("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to account %s",
*client, server_user);
xfree(*client);
return 0;
}
/* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
session key. */
cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
cksum = htonl(cksum);
/* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
empty message, admitting our failure. */
if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
reply.dat[0] = 0;
reply.length = 0;
} else
reply.length = r;
/* Clear session key. */
memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 1;
}
#endif /* KRB4 */
#ifdef AFS
int
auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *pw, const char *string)
{
CREDENTIALS creds;
if (pw == NULL)
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
}
if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
log("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm,
pw->pw_name);
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
}
if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid))
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno,
&creds.ticket_st, creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt refused: couldn't save credentials");
goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
}
/* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt accepted (%s.%s@%s, %s%s%s@%s)",
creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm, creds.pname,
creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 1;
auth_kerberos_tgt_failure:
krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 0;
}
int
auth_afs_token(struct passwd *pw, const char *token_string)
{
CREDENTIALS creds;
uid_t uid;
if (pw == NULL) {
/* XXX fake protocol error */
packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 0;
}
if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 0;
}
if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
else
uid = pw->pw_uid;
if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname, creds.realm,
pw->pw_name);
packet_send_debug("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 0;
}
packet_send_debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s, %s@%s)", creds.service,
creds.realm, creds.pname, creds.realm);
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return 1;
}
#endif /* AFS */