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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
268 lines
7.0 KiB
C
268 lines
7.0 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.40 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "compat.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
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/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
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int
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ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
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const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
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{
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const EVP_MD *evp_md;
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EVP_MD_CTX md;
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u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig;
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u_int slen, dlen, len;
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int ok, nid;
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Buffer b;
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if (key == NULL ||
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(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
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key->rsa == NULL) {
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error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key");
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return -1;
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}
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nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
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if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
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error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
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return -1;
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}
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EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
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EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
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slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
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sig = xmalloc(slen);
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ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
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memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
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if (ok != 1) {
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int ecode = ERR_get_error();
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error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
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ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
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xfree(sig);
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return -1;
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}
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if (len < slen) {
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u_int diff = slen - len;
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debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
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memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
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memset(sig, 0, diff);
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} else if (len > slen) {
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error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len);
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xfree(sig);
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return -1;
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}
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/* encode signature */
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buffer_init(&b);
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buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa");
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buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen);
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len = buffer_len(&b);
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if (lenp != NULL)
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*lenp = len;
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if (sigp != NULL) {
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*sigp = xmalloc(len);
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memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
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}
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buffer_free(&b);
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memset(sig, 's', slen);
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xfree(sig);
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return 0;
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}
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int
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ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
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const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
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{
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Buffer b;
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const EVP_MD *evp_md;
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EVP_MD_CTX md;
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char *ktype;
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u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
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u_int len, dlen, modlen;
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int rlen, ret, nid;
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if (key == NULL ||
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(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
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key->rsa == NULL) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
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return -1;
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}
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if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
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BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
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return -1;
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}
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buffer_init(&b);
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buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
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ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
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if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
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buffer_free(&b);
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xfree(ktype);
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return -1;
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}
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xfree(ktype);
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sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
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rlen = buffer_len(&b);
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buffer_free(&b);
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if (rlen != 0) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
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xfree(sigblob);
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return -1;
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}
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/* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
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modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
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if (len > modlen) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen);
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xfree(sigblob);
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return -1;
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} else if (len < modlen) {
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u_int diff = modlen - len;
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debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %u > len %u",
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modlen, len);
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sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
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memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
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memset(sigblob, 0, diff);
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len = modlen;
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}
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nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
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if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
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error("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
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xfree(sigblob);
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return -1;
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}
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EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
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EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
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ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
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memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
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memset(sigblob, 's', len);
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xfree(sigblob);
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debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* See:
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* http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
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* ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
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*/
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/*
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* id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
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* oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
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*/
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static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
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0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
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0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
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0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
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0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
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0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
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0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
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};
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/*
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* id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
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* rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 }
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*/
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static const u_char id_md5[] = {
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0x30, 0x20, /* type Sequence, length 0x20 (32) */
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0x30, 0x0c, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
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0x06, 0x08, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
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0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* id-md5 */
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0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
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0x04, 0x10 /* Octet string, length 0x10 (16), followed by md5 hash */
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};
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static int
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openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
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{
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u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
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int len;
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const u_char *oid = NULL;
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u_char *decrypted = NULL;
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ret = 0;
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switch (type) {
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case NID_sha1:
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oid = id_sha1;
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oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1);
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hlen = 20;
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break;
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case NID_md5:
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oid = id_md5;
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oidlen = sizeof(id_md5);
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hlen = 16;
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break;
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default:
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goto done;
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}
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if (hashlen != hlen) {
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error("bad hashlen");
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goto done;
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}
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rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
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if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
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error("bad siglen");
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goto done;
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}
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decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize);
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if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
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RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
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error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s",
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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goto done;
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}
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if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) {
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error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
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goto done;
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}
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if (memcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
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error("oid mismatch");
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goto done;
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}
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if (memcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
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error("hash mismatch");
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goto done;
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}
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ret = 1;
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done:
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if (decrypted)
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xfree(decrypted);
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return ret;
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}
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