mirror of
git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
synced 2025-02-16 13:56:52 +00:00
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
114 lines
3.7 KiB
C
114 lines
3.7 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
|
* All rights reserved
|
|
* Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
|
|
* authentication.
|
|
*
|
|
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
|
|
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
|
|
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
|
|
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
|
|
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "includes.h"
|
|
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.17 2000/10/03 18:03:03 markus Exp $");
|
|
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
|
#include "ssh.h"
|
|
#include "xmalloc.h"
|
|
#include "uidswap.h"
|
|
#include "servconf.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
|
|
#include "key.h"
|
|
#include "hostfile.h"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
|
|
* its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, RSA *client_host_key)
|
|
{
|
|
extern ServerOptions options;
|
|
const char *canonical_hostname;
|
|
HostStatus host_status;
|
|
Key *client_key, *found;
|
|
|
|
debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", client_user);
|
|
|
|
if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
|
|
if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
|
|
|
|
debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", canonical_hostname);
|
|
|
|
/* wrap the RSA key into a 'generic' key */
|
|
client_key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
|
|
BN_copy(client_key->rsa->e, client_host_key->e);
|
|
BN_copy(client_key->rsa->n, client_host_key->n);
|
|
found = key_new(KEY_RSA);
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
|
|
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, canonical_hostname,
|
|
client_key, found);
|
|
|
|
/* Check user host file unless ignored. */
|
|
if (host_status != HOST_OK && !options.ignore_user_known_hosts) {
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
char *user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check file permissions of SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, auth_rsa()
|
|
* did already check pw->pw_dir, but there is a race XXX
|
|
*/
|
|
if (options.strict_modes &&
|
|
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
|
|
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
|
|
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
|
|
log("Rhosts RSA authentication refused for %.100s: bad owner or modes for %.200s",
|
|
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* XXX race between stat and the following open() */
|
|
temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
|
|
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, canonical_hostname,
|
|
client_key, found);
|
|
restore_uid();
|
|
}
|
|
xfree(user_hostfile);
|
|
}
|
|
key_free(client_key);
|
|
key_free(found);
|
|
|
|
if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
|
|
debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
|
|
packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
|
|
if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
|
|
log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
|
|
canonical_hostname);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
|
|
* and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
|
|
pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
|
|
packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|