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4be7184ebe
authorized keys/principals file for errno != ENOENT; bz2042 ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e79aa550d91ade6a80f081bda689da24c086d66b
502 lines
14 KiB
C
502 lines
14 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.3 2022/07/01 03:52:57 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "compat.h"
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "digest.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "auth-options.h"
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#include "authfile.h"
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#include "match.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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int
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auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
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int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
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const char *loc)
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{
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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char buf[64];
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/*
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* Check keys/principals file expiry time.
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* NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
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*/
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if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
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opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
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format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
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debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
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auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Consistency checks */
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if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
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debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
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auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
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/* deny access */
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return -1;
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}
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/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
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if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
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debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
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auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
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/* deny access */
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return -1;
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}
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/* Perform from= checks */
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if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
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switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
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opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
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case 1:
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/* Host name matches. */
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break;
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case -1:
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default:
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debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
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auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
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/* FALLTHROUGH */
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case 0:
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logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
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"correct key but not from a permitted "
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"host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
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loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
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opts->required_from_host_keys);
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auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
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"permitted to use this key for login.",
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loc, remote_host);
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/* deny access */
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
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if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
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switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
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opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
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case 1:
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/* accepted */
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break;
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case -1:
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default:
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/* invalid */
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error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc);
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/* FALLTHROUGH */
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case 0:
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logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
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"certificate but not from a permitted source "
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"address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
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auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
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"permitted to use this certificate for login.",
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loc, remote_ip);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/*
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*
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* XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
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* that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
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* tests.
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*/
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auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
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return 0;
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}
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static int
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match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
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{
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char *result;
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u_int i;
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/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
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for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
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if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
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principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
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debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
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result);
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free(result);
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
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* authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
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* log preamble for file/line information.
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*/
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int
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auth_check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
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const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
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{
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u_int i, found = 0;
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char *ep, *line_opts;
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const char *reason = NULL;
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struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
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if (authoptsp != NULL)
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*authoptsp = NULL;
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/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
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ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
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while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
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*ep-- = '\0';
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/*
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* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
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* key options.
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*/
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line_opts = NULL;
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if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
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(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
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for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
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;
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line_opts = cp;
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cp = ep;
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}
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if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
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debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
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auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
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for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
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if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
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continue;
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debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
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loc, cert->principals[i]);
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found = 1;
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}
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if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
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*authoptsp = opts;
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opts = NULL;
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}
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sshauthopt_free(opts);
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return found ? 0 : -1;
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}
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int
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auth_process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file,
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const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
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{
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char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
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size_t linesize = 0;
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u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
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u_int found_principal = 0;
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if (authoptsp != NULL)
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*authoptsp = NULL;
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while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
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linenum++;
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/* Always consume entire input */
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if (found_principal)
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continue;
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/* Skip leading whitespace. */
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for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
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;
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/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
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if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
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*ep = '\0';
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if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
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continue;
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nonblank++;
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snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
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if (auth_check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
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found_principal = 1;
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}
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debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
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free(line);
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return found_principal;
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}
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/*
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* Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
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* matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
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* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
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*/
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int
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auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
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char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc,
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struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
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{
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int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
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struct sshkey *found = NULL;
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struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
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char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
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const char *reason = NULL;
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int ret = -1;
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if (authoptsp != NULL)
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*authoptsp = NULL;
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if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
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debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype);
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goto out;
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}
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/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
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if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
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/* no key? check for options */
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debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
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key_options = cp;
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if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
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reason = "invalid key option string";
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goto fail_reason;
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}
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skip_space(&cp);
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if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
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/* still no key? advance to next line*/
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debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
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if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
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debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
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auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
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goto out;
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}
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/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
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if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
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/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
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if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
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!keyopts->cert_authority)
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goto out;
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} else {
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/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
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if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
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goto out;
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}
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/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
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if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
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SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
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fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
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debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
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sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
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if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts,
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sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
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reason = "Refused by key options";
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goto fail_reason;
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}
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/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
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if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
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verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
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sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
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finalopts = keyopts;
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keyopts = NULL;
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goto success;
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}
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/*
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* Additional authorisation for certificates.
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*/
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/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
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if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
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reason = "Invalid certificate options";
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goto fail_reason;
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}
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if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0,
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remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
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reason = "Refused by certificate options";
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goto fail_reason;
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}
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if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
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goto fail_reason;
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/*
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* If the user has specified a list of principals as
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* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
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* their username in the certificate principals list.
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*/
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if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
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!match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
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reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
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goto fail_reason;
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}
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if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0,
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keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
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&reason) != 0)
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goto fail_reason;
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verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
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"signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
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key->cert->key_id,
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(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
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sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
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success:
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if (finalopts == NULL)
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fatal_f("internal error: missing options");
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if (authoptsp != NULL) {
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*authoptsp = finalopts;
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finalopts = NULL;
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}
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/* success */
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ret = 0;
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goto out;
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fail_reason:
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error("%s", reason);
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auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
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out:
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free(fp);
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sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
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sshauthopt_free(certopts);
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sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
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sshkey_free(found);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
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* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
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*/
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int
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auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file,
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struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip,
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const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
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{
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char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
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size_t linesize = 0;
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int found_key = 0;
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u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
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if (authoptsp != NULL)
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*authoptsp = NULL;
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while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
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linenum++;
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/* Always consume entire file */
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if (found_key)
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continue;
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/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
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cp = line;
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skip_space(&cp);
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if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
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continue;
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nonblank++;
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snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
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if (auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp,
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remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
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found_key = 1;
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}
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free(line);
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debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
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return found_key;
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}
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static FILE *
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auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
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int log_missing, char *file_type)
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{
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char line[1024];
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struct stat st;
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int fd;
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FILE *f;
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if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
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if (errno != ENOENT) {
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logit("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
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pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
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} else if (log_missing) {
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debug("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
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pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
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close(fd);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
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logit("User '%s' %s '%s' is not a regular file",
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pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
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close(fd);
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return NULL;
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}
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unset_nonblock(fd);
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if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
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close(fd);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (strict_modes &&
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safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
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fclose(f);
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logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
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auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
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return NULL;
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}
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return f;
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}
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FILE *
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auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
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{
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return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
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}
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FILE *
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auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
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{
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return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
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"authorized principals");
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}
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