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Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
115 lines
3.7 KiB
C
115 lines
3.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
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* authentication.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.21 2001/01/21 19:05:42 markus Exp $");
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "pathnames.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "tildexpand.h"
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#include "canohost.h"
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/*
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* Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
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* its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
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*/
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int
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auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, RSA *client_host_key)
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{
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extern ServerOptions options;
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const char *canonical_hostname;
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HostStatus host_status;
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Key *client_key, *found;
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debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", client_user);
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if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
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if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
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return 0;
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canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
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debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", canonical_hostname);
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/* wrap the RSA key into a 'generic' key */
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client_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
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BN_copy(client_key->rsa->e, client_host_key->e);
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BN_copy(client_key->rsa->n, client_host_key->n);
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found = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
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/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
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host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, canonical_hostname,
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client_key, found, NULL);
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/* Check user host file unless ignored. */
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if (host_status != HOST_OK && !options.ignore_user_known_hosts) {
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struct stat st;
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char *user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
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/*
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* Check file permissions of _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, auth_rsa()
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* did already check pw->pw_dir, but there is a race XXX
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*/
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if (options.strict_modes &&
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(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
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((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
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log("Rhosts RSA authentication refused for %.100s: bad owner or modes for %.200s",
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pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
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} else {
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/* XXX race between stat and the following open() */
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temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
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host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, canonical_hostname,
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client_key, found, NULL);
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restore_uid();
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}
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xfree(user_hostfile);
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}
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key_free(client_key);
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key_free(found);
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if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
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debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
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packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
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return 0;
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}
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/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
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/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
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if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
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log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
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canonical_hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
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* and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
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*/
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verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
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pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
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packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
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return 1;
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}
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