openssh/auth.c
Ben Lindstrom 226cfa0378 Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under
Linux and works.  So that is at least a good sign. =)
20010122
 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus
     [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c]
     only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus
     [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
      auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c
      packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c
      session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h
      ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c]
     move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14
     [sshd.8]
     fix typo; from stevesk@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58
     [ssh-dss.c]
     clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from
     stevesk@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus
     [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
     pass the filename to auth_parse_options()
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001
     [readconf.c]
     fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29
     [sshconnect2.c]
     dh_new_group() does not return NULL.  ok markus@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42
     [ssh-add.c]
     do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from
     andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net
   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56
     [servconf.c]
     Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus
   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07
     [readconf.c]
     KNF; ok markus
   - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33
     [ssh-keygen.1]
     remove -R flag; ok markus@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40
     [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c
      auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
      auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c
      bufaux.c  bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c
      cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c
      deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c
      key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h
      match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c
      readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h
      session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c
      ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h
      sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h
      ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
     split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary
     #includes.  rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch]
 - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree
 - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve
   conflict when compiling for non-kerb install
 - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes
   on 1/19.
2001-01-22 05:34:40 +00:00

235 lines
6.7 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.14 2001/01/21 19:05:43 markus Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
#include <shadow.h>
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
struct stat st;
char *shell;
int i;
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
char *loginmsg;
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
!defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
struct spwd *spw;
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
if (spw != NULL) {
int days = time(NULL) / 86400;
/* Check account expiry */
if ((spw->sp_expire >= 0) && (days > spw->sp_expire))
return 0;
/* Check password expiry */
if ((spw->sp_lstchg >= 0) && (spw->sp_max >= 0) &&
(days > (spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max)))
return 0;
}
#else
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#endif
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
if (stat(shell, &st) != 0)
return 0;
if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
return 0;
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
if (match_pattern(pw->pw_name, options.deny_users[i]))
return 0;
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
if (match_pattern(pw->pw_name, options.allow_users[i]))
break;
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users)
return 0;
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0)
return 0;
/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
return 0;
}
/*
* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
* isn't listed there
*/
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
/* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
char *p;
for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '\n')
*p = ' ';
}
/* Remove trailing newline */
*--p = '\0';
log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
Authctxt *
authctxt_new(void)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
return authctxt;
}
struct passwd *
pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy));
memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy));
copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
#endif
copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
return copy;
}
void
auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
{
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
authlog = log;
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
authmsg,
method,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
authctxt->valid && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? "ROOT" : authctxt->user,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port(),
info);
}
/*
* Check if the user is logging in as root and root logins are disallowed.
* Note that root login is _allways_ allowed for forced commands.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(void)
{
if (options.permit_root_login)
return 1;
if (forced_command) {
log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
return 1;
} else {
log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_canonical_hostname());
return 0;
}
}