[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
[compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections
using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail
when connecting with something that implements the spec properly.
Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
versions.
reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@
repeatedly):
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03
[myproposal.h]
trimm default proposals.
This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers
(arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration
(the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available
for the config files).
ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26
[myproposal.h]
The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code
makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that
direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh.
Brought up by naddy.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27
[myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
[kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
[kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
[schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
feedback, ok markus@
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
[ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c
ssh_config.5 packet.h]
Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow
rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic.
with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
[readconf.c ssh.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c]
Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and which
were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing.
ok markus@
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c]
Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider.
This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using
IdentityFile. ok markus@
[readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c]
Remove undocumented legacy options UserKnownHostsFile2 and
GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile/GlobalKnownHostsFile
accept multiple paths per line and making their defaults include
known_hosts2; ok markus
[auth.c hostfile.c hostfile.h ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c]
automatically order the hostkeys requested by the client based on
which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids
hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys
that are preferred by default; with markus@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
[sshconnect2.c]
bz#1502: authctxt.success is declared as an int, but passed by
reference to function that accepts sig_atomic_t*. Convert it to
the latter; ok markus@ dtucker@
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
[sshconnect2.c]
show the key type that we are offering in debug(), helps distinguish
between certs and plain keys as the path to the private key is usually
the same.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[authfile.c sshconnect2.c]
Do not prompt for a passphrase if we fail to open a keyfile, and log the
reason the open failed to debug.
bz #1693, found by tj AT castaglia org, ok djm@
[sshconnect2.c channels.c sshconnect.c]
Set close-on-exec on various descriptors so they don't get leaked to
child processes. bz #1643, patch from jchadima at redhat, ok deraadt.
[sshconnect2.c]
disallow a hostile server from checking jpake auth by sending an
out-of-sequence success message. (doesn't affect code enabled by default)
[auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c]
[sshconnect2.c]
refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more
generally useful
[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h]
[readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5]
[sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c]
[Makefile.in]
Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
[sshconnect2.c]
Repair strnvis() buffersize of 4*n+1, with termination gauranteed by the
function.
spotted by des@freebsd, who commited an incorrect fix to the freebsd tree
and (as is fairly typical) did not report the problem to us. But this fix
is correct.
ok djm
[readconf.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c]
promote rekeylimit to a int64 so it can hold the maximum useful limit
of 2^32; report and patch from Jan.Pechanec AT Sun.COM, ok dtucker@
[sshconnect2.c]
fall back to gethostname() when the outgoing connection is not
on a socket, such as is the case when ProxyCommand is used.
Gives hostbased auth an opportunity to work; bz#616, report
and feedback stuart AT kaloram.com; ok markus@
