times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time
zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone.
YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if
suffixed with a 'Z' character.
Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw
seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This
is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call
ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow.
bz3468 ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454db1cdffa9fa346aea5211223a2ce0588dfe13
main clauses
jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those
untouched.
ok jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9520801729bebcb3c9fe43ad7f9776ab4dd05ea3
helgefjell de
removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant;
suggested by djm
ok djm dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae
stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with
common usage and FAQs; ok jmc
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c
This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
through and adding ways to require it.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6
a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
key to authorize them.
feedback deraadt, ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's
SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable,
and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options.
Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal
substitutions.
ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4
since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A.
Maierhofer, ok jmc
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7
e.g.
PermitListen 2222 8080
is equivalent to:
PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
"looks fine" markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
"expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
pointed out by jsing@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6
When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
connection was recevied on. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for
matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: dc2e11c83ae9201bbe74872a0c895ae9725536dd
As promised in last release announcement: remove
support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222
Small correction to the known_hosts section on when it is
updated. Patch from lkppo at free.fr some time ago, pointed out by smallm at
sdf.org
Upstream-ID: 1834d7af179dea1a12ad2137f84566664af225d5
When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and
an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the
certificate unless they are identical.
The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-
command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f
remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login
manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712
Catch up with the SSH1 code removal and delete all
mention of protocol 1 particularities, key files and formats, command line
options, and configuration keywords from the server documentation and
examples. ok jmc@
Upstream-ID: 850328854675b4b6a0d4a90f0b4a9dd9ca4e905f
since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1,
normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits
are v2 only);
ok/tweaks djm ok markus
Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129
Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that
includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also
add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty".
This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are
maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the
future.
Example:
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1...
Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0
Reduce instances of `` '' in manuals.
troff displays these as typographic quotes, but nroff implementations
almost always print them literally, which rarely has the intended effect
with modern fonts, even in stock xterm.
These uses of `` '' can be replaced either with more semantic alternatives
or with Dq, which prints typographic quotes in a UTF-8 locale (but will
automatically fall back to `` '' in an ASCII locale).
improvements and ok schwarze@
[servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is
executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option;
bz#2160; ok markus@
jmc@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
bentley@openbsd.org
sobrado@openbsd.org