In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
%U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
remove the legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
ssh_free checks for and handles NULL args, remove NULL
checks from remaining callers. ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb926825c53724c069df68a93a2597f9192f7e7b
Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
revert stricter key type / signature type checking in
userauth path; too much software generates inconsistent messages, so we need
a better plan.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a44ddc991c803c4ecc8f1ad40e0ab4d22e1c519
pass negotiated signing algorithm though to
sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in
the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
add a "quiet" flag to exited_cleanly() that supresses
errors about exit status (failure due to signal is still reported)
Upstream-ID: db85c39c3aa08e6ff67fc1fb4ffa89f807a9d2f0
Move several subprocess-related functions from various
locations to misc.c. Extend subprocess() to offer a little more control over
stdio disposition.
feedback & ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 3573dd7109d13ef9bd3bed93a3deb170fbfce049
refactor authentication logging
optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials
used in a file accessible to user sessions
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 090b93036967015717b9a54fd0467875ae9d32fb
make sure we don't pass a NULL string to vfprintf
(triggered by the principals-command regress test); ok bluhm
Upstream-ID: eb49854f274ab37a0b57056a6af379a0b7111990
Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both
growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for
preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone.
Review and one bug found by markus
Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065
revise keys/principals command hang fix (bz#2655) to
consume entire output, avoiding sending SIGPIPE to subprocesses early; ok
dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 7cb04b31a61f8c78c4e48ceededcd2fd5c4ee1bc
fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of
output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com
Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe
When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and
an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the
certificate unless they are identical.
The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-
command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f
add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those
supported for AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc) and a
few more to provide access to the certificate's CA key; 'looks ok' dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 6b00fd446dbebe67f4e4e146d2e492d650ae04eb
log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the
main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288
If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will
potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a
principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has
already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the
same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to
determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on.
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d
Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar
to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct
sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller.
No functional change.
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c
add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting
authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite
useful in deployments with large userbases
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6
support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand
bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7
prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key
tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to
other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@
Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we
only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
and his own tools.
ok markus@
add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types
will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
remember which public keys have been used for
authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys.
This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require
that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys.
ok markus@
Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
[PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
[auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h]
[clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c]
[readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c]
Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port
may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
[auth-rsa.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c]
for hostbased authentication, print the client host and user on
the auth success/failure line; bz#2064, ok dtucker@
[auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c]
reconstruct the original username that was sent by the client, which may
have included a style (e.g. "root:skey") when checking public key
signatures. Fixes public key and hostbased auth when the client specified
a style; ok markus@
