upstream: Strictly enforce the maximum allowed SSH2 banner size in

ssh-keyscan and prevent a one-byte buffer overflow.  Patch from Qualys, ok
djm@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ae664f9f4db6e8a0589425f74cd0bbf3aeef4e4
This commit is contained in:
dtucker@openbsd.org 2022-08-19 04:02:46 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 1b470b9036
commit ff89b1bed8

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.145 2022/01/21 00:53:40 deraadt Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.146 2022/08/19 04:02:46 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
return;
}
/*
* Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-"
* protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
* large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading
* newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
* The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
* preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
* in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
*/
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);