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Prevent excessively long username going to PAM.

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This is a mitigation for a buffer overflow in Solaris' PAM username
handling (CVE-2020-14871), and is only enabled for Sun-derived PAM
implementations.  This is not a problem in sshd itself, it only
prevents sshd from being used as a vector to attack Solaris' PAM.
It does not prevent the bug in PAM from being exploited via some other
PAM application.

Based on github PR#212 from Mike Scott but implemented slightly
differently.  ok tim@ djm@
This commit is contained in:
Darren Tucker 2020-11-11 12:30:46 +11:00
parent 10dce8ff68
commit fcf429a4c6
1 changed files with 6 additions and 0 deletions
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6
auth-pam.c
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@ -689,6 +689,12 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
#if defined(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) && defined(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
/* Protect buggy PAM implementations from excessively long usernames */
if (strlen(user) >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
fatal("Username too long from %s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#endif
if (sshpam_handle == NULL) {
if (ssh == NULL) {
fatal("%s: called initially with no "