From f666fec2d553955c26c999cb687877454eeca3ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Lindstrom Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2002 19:51:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25 [ssh.c sshd.c] spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov --- ChangeLog | 5 ++++- ssh.c | 6 +++--- sshd.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 9b21a8598..ff710913b 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/19 20:54:52 [log.h] extra commas in enum not 100% portable + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25 + [ssh.c sshd.c] + spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov 20020604 - (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed @@ -697,4 +700,4 @@ - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@ -$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2147 2002/06/06 19:51:06 mouring Exp $ +$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2148 2002/06/06 19:51:58 mouring Exp $ diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index f442c43af..4b82d1e7e 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.171 2002/05/16 22:09:59 stevesk Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.172 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $"); #include #include @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int stdin_null_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful - * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the + * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the * background. */ int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; @@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg) debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command)); channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1); /* register callback for reply */ - /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */ + /* XXX we assume that client_loop has already been called */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply); } else { diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index afb872665..437e0f970 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.243 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $"); #include #include @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) fatal_cleanup(); } - /* Read other side's version identification. */ + /* Read other sides version identification. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { @@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); /* * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. - * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged + * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. @@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); - /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ + /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait();