[ssh.c sshd.c]
     spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov
This commit is contained in:
Ben Lindstrom 2002-06-06 19:51:58 +00:00
parent 38ed63d759
commit f666fec2d5
3 changed files with 11 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/19 20:54:52
[log.h]
extra commas in enum not 100% portable
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25
[ssh.c sshd.c]
spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov
20020604
- (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed
@ -697,4 +700,4 @@
- (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message
- (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2147 2002/06/06 19:51:06 mouring Exp $
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2148 2002/06/06 19:51:58 mouring Exp $

6
ssh.c
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.171 2002/05/16 22:09:59 stevesk Exp $");
RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.172 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int stdin_null_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
* so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
* so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
* background.
*/
int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
/* register callback for reply */
/* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
/* XXX we assume that client_loop has already been called */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
} else {

8
sshd.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.243 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
fatal_cleanup();
}
/* Read other side's version identification. */
/* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
/*
* Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
* Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
* Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
* programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
* machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
* authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
/* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
/* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();