diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index def04ff41..58d21ac55 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@
      prototype pedant.  not very creative...
      - () -> (void)
      - no variable names
+   - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 16:15:25
+     [auth1.c auth.h auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c readconf.c readconf.h 
+      servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+     Kerberos v5 support for SSH1, mostly from Assar Westerlund 
+     <assar@freebsd.org> and Bjorn Gronvall <bg@sics.se>. markus@ ok
 
 20010629
  - (bal) Removed net_aton() since we don't use it any more
@@ -5881,4 +5886,4 @@
  - Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
  - Released 1.0pre1
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1357 2001/07/04 04:07:12 mouring Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1358 2001/07/04 04:21:14 mouring Exp $
diff --git a/auth-krb4.c b/auth-krb4.c
index 8bb6e3d6f..031dcd301 100644
--- a/auth-krb4.c
+++ b/auth-krb4.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.23 2001/01/22 08:15:00 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.24 2001/06/26 16:15:22 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.23 2001/01/22 08:15:00 markus Exp $");
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
 #ifdef AFS
@@ -38,70 +39,114 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.23 2001/01/22 08:15:00 markus Exp $");
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KRB4
-char *ticket = NULL;
-
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
+static int
+krb4_init(void *context)
+{
+	static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+	const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd;
+	
+	if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
+		/* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
+		authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+#ifdef AFS
+		if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
+			tkt_root = "/ticket/";
+#endif /* AFS */
+		snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d",
+		    tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, getpid());
+		krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+	}
+	/* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
+	if (!cleanup_registered) {
+		fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+		cleanup_registered = 1;
+	}
+	/* Try to create our ticket file. */
+	if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	}
+	/* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
+	if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) {
+		if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
+		    st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid)
+			return (1);
+	}
+	/* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
+	log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+	
+	fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+	cleanup_registered = 0;
+	
+	xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+	authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
+	
+	return (0);
+}
+
 /*
  * try krb4 authentication,
  * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
  */
-
 int
-auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
+auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	AUTH_DAT adata;
 	KTEXT_ST tkt;
 	struct hostent *hp;
-	u_long faddr;
-	char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-	char phost[INST_SZ];
-	char realm[REALM_SZ];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
+	u_int32_t faddr;
 	int r;
-
+	
+	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	
 	/*
 	 * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
 	 * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
 	 */
 	if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
-
 		/* Set up our ticket file. */
-		if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid)) {
+		if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
 			log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
 			    pw->pw_name);
-			goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+			goto failure;
 		}
 		/* Try to get TGT using our password. */
-		r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "",
-		    realm, "krbtgt", realm,
-		    DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *) password);
+		r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
+		    "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
 		if (r != INTK_OK) {
-			packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 password "
-			    "authentication for %s failed: %s",
-			    pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-			goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+			debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
+			    "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+			goto failure;
 		}
 		/* Successful authentication. */
 		chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
+		
 		/*
 		 * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
 		 * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
 		 * to a bogus Kerberos server.
 		 */
-		(void) gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
-		(void) strlcpy(phost, (char *) krb_get_phost(localhost),
-		    INST_SZ);
+		gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+		strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
+		    sizeof(phost));
 		r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
-
+		
 		if (r == KSUCCESS) {
-			if (!(hp = gethostbyname(localhost))) {
+			if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
 				log("Couldn't get local host address!");
-				goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+				goto failure;
 			}
-			memmove((void *) &faddr, (void *) hp->h_addr,
+			memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
 			    sizeof(faddr));
-
+			
 			/* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
 			r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
 			    faddr, &adata, "");
@@ -110,119 +155,74 @@ auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
 				 * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
 				 * localhost. Disallow login.
 				 */
-				log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+				log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
 				    "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
 				    pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-				goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+				goto failure;
 			} else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-				log("Kerberos V4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+				log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
 				    KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
-				goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+				goto failure;
 			}
 		} else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
 			/*
 			 * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
 			 * log the error.
 			 */
-			log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+			log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
 			    "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
-			krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
-			goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+			    krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+			goto failure;
 		} else {
 			/*
 			 * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
 			 */
-			packet_send_debug("WARNING: Kerberos V4 TGT "
-			    "possibly spoofed for %s: %s",
-			    pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-			goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+			debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
+			    "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+			goto failure;
 		}
-
 		/* Authentication succeeded. */
-		return 1;
-
-kerberos_auth_failure:
-		krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
-
-		if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
-			return 0;
-	} else {
+		return (1);
+	} else
 		/* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
-		packet_send_debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
-	}
+		debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+	
+ failure:
+	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+	
+	if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+		return (0);
+	
 	/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
-	return -1;
+	return (-1);
 }
 
 void
-krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context)
 {
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
 	debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
-	if (ticket) {
+	if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
 		(void) dest_tkt();
-		xfree(ticket);
-		ticket = NULL;
+		xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+		authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
 	}
 }
 
 int
-krb4_init(uid_t uid)
-{
-	static int cleanup_registered = 0;
-	const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
-	struct stat st;
-	int fd;
-
-	if (!ticket) {
-		/* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
-		ticket = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-#ifdef AFS
-		if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
-			tkt_root = "/ticket/";
-#endif /* AFS */
-		snprintf(ticket, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d", tkt_root, uid, getpid());
-		(void) krb_set_tkt_string(ticket);
-	}
-	/* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
-	if (!cleanup_registered) {
-		fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
-		cleanup_registered = 1;
-	}
-	/* Try to create our ticket file. */
-	if ((fd = mkstemp(ticket)) != -1) {
-		close(fd);
-		return 1;
-	}
-	/* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
-	if (lstat(ticket, &st) != -1) {
-		if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
-		    st.st_uid == uid)
-			return 1;
-	}
-	/* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving bad ticket for inspection. */
-	log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", ticket);
-	fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
-	cleanup_registered = 0;
-	xfree(ticket);
-	ticket = NULL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
+auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 {
 	AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
 	KTEXT_ST reply;
-	char instance[INST_SZ];
-	int r, s;
-	socklen_t slen;
-	u_int cksum;
 	Key_schedule schedule;
 	struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
-
+	char instance[INST_SZ];
+	socklen_t slen;
+	u_int cksum;
+	int r, s;
+	
 	s = packet_get_connection_in();
-
+	
 	slen = sizeof(local);
 	memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
 	if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
@@ -235,157 +235,139 @@ auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 	}
 	instance[0] = '*';
 	instance[1] = 0;
-
+	
 	/* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
-	if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, 0, &adat, ""))) {
-		packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return 0;
+	if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
+	    0, &adat, ""))) {
+		debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+		return (0);
 	}
 	des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
-
+	
 	*client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
 	(void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
 	    *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
-
+	
 	/* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
-	if (kuserok(&adat, (char *) server_user) != KSUCCESS) {
-		packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed!");
-		log("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to account %s",
-		    *client, server_user);
+	if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
+		log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
+		    "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
 		xfree(*client);
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
 	/* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
 	   session key. */
 	cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
 	cksum = htonl(cksum);
-
+	
 	/* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
 	   empty message, admitting our failure. */
 	if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
 	    schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
-		packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
+		debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
 		reply.dat[0] = 0;
 		reply.length = 0;
 	} else
 		reply.length = r;
-
+	
 	/* Clear session key. */
 	memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
-
+	
 	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
 	packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
-	return 1;
+	return (1);
 }
 #endif /* KRB4 */
 
 #ifdef AFS
 int
-auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *pw, const char *string)
+auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
 {
 	CREDENTIALS creds;
-
-	if (pw == NULL)
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	
+	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+		goto failure;
+	
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	
 	if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
-		log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
-		packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+		log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
+		goto failure;
 	}
 	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
 		strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
-
+	
 	if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
-		log("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
-		    creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm,
-		    pw->pw_name);
-		packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+		log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
 		    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
 		    creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+		goto failure;
 	}
-	if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid))
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-
+	if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
+		goto failure;
+	
 	if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-
+		goto failure;
+	
 	if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
-	    creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno,
-	    &creds.ticket_st, creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
-		packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt refused: couldn't save credentials");
-		goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+	    creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
+	    creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
+		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials");
+		goto failure;
 	}
 	/* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
 	chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
-	packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt accepted (%s.%s@%s, %s%s%s@%s)",
-	    creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm, creds.pname,
-	    creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
+	
+	debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
+	    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-	return 1;
-
-auth_kerberos_tgt_failure:
-	krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+	
+	restore_uid();
+	
+	return (1);
+	
+ failure:
+	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-	return 0;
+	restore_uid();
+	
+	return (0);
 }
 
 int
-auth_afs_token(struct passwd *pw, const char *token_string)
+auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
 {
 	CREDENTIALS creds;
+	struct passwd *pw;
 	uid_t uid;
-
-	if (pw == NULL) {
-		/* XXX fake protocol error */
-		packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-		return 0;
-	}
+	
+	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	
 	if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
 		log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-		packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
 	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
 		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
-
+	
 	if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
 		uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
 	else
 		uid = pw->pw_uid;
-
+	
 	if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
-		log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname, creds.realm,
-		    pw->pw_name);
-		packet_send_debug("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
-		    creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+		log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+		    creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
 		memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
-	packet_send_debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s, %s@%s)", creds.service,
-	    creds.realm, creds.pname, creds.realm);
+	debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-	return 1;
+	
+	return (1);
 }
 #endif /* AFS */
diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
index d53a9ea2d..988297cb4 100644
--- a/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.22 2001/03/20 18:57:04 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.23 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
 
@@ -128,14 +128,14 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 #endif
 	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
 		return 0;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	if (auth_userokay(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
-	    (char *)password) == 0)
-		return 0;
-	else
-		return 1;
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+		int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
+		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+			return ret;
+		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+	}
 #endif
-
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (is_winnt) {
 		HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
@@ -146,21 +146,24 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		return 1;
 	}
 #endif
-
 #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
 	return (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0);
 #endif
-
 #ifdef KRB4
 	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
-		int ret = auth_krb4_password(pw, password);
+		int ret = auth_krb4_password(authctxt, password);
 		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
 			return ret;
 		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
 	}
 #endif
-
-
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	if (auth_userokay(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+	    (char *)password) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	else
+		return 1;
+#endif
 	pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index a29944113..1c72dffa3 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
- * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.20 2001/06/26 06:32:47 itojun Exp $
+ * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.21 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $
  */
 #ifndef AUTH_H
 #define AUTH_H
@@ -36,23 +36,36 @@
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 #include <bsd_auth.h>
 #endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
 
 typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
 typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
 
 struct Authctxt {
-	int success;
-	int postponed;
-	int valid;
-	int attempt;
-	int failures;
-	char *user;
-	char *service;
-	struct passwd *pw;
-	char *style;
-	void *kbdintctxt;
+	int		 success;
+	int		 postponed;
+	int		 valid;
+	int		 attempt;
+	int		 failures;
+	char		*user;
+	char		*service;
+	struct passwd	*pw;
+	char		*style;
+	void		*kbdintctxt;
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	auth_session_t *as;
+	auth_session_t	*as;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB4
+	char		*krb4_ticket_file;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
+	krb5_auth_context krb5_auth_ctx;
+	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
+	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -125,21 +138,27 @@ int     auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *);
  * if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
  * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
  */
-int     auth_krb4(const char *, KTEXT, char **);
-int     krb4_init(uid_t);
+int     auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **);
+int	auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
 void    krb4_cleanup_proc(void *);
-int	auth_krb4_password(struct passwd *, const char *);
 
 #ifdef AFS
 #include <kafs.h>
 
 /* Accept passed Kerberos v4 ticket-granting ticket and AFS tokens. */
-int     auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *, const char *);
-int     auth_afs_token(struct passwd *, const char *);
+int     auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int     auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *);
 #endif				/* AFS */
 
 #endif				/* KRB4 */
 
+#ifdef KRB5
+int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client);
+int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
+void	krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
 #include "auth-pam.h"
 #include "auth2-pam.h"
 
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index d5b7fa7c8..da2c23e52 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.24 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.25 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.24 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $");
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ get_authname(int type)
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
 		return "challenge-response";
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
 		return "kerberos";
 #endif
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
 	if (options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -116,62 +117,64 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 		/* Process the packet. */
 		switch (type) {
-#ifdef AFS
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
-			if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
-				verbose("Kerberos tgt passing disabled.");
-				break;
-			} else {
-				/* Accept Kerberos tgt. */
-				char *tgt = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
-				if (!auth_kerberos_tgt(pw, tgt))
-					verbose("Kerberos tgt REFUSED for %.100s", authctxt->user);
-				xfree(tgt);
-			}
-			continue;
 
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
-			if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
-				verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
-				break;
-			} else {
-				/* Accept AFS token. */
-				char *token_string = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
-				if (!auth_afs_token(pw, token_string))
-					verbose("AFS token REFUSED for %.100s", authctxt->user);
-				xfree(token_string);
-			}
-			continue;
-#endif /* AFS */
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
 			if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
 				verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
-				break;
 			} else {
-				/* Try Kerberos v4 authentication. */
-				KTEXT_ST auth;
-				char *tkt_user = NULL;
-				char *kdata = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length);
-				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
-
-				if (authctxt->valid) {
-					if (auth.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-						memcpy(auth.dat, kdata, auth.length);
-					authenticated = auth_krb4(pw->pw_name, &auth, &tkt_user);
-					if (authenticated) {
-						snprintf(info, sizeof info,
-						    " tktuser %.100s", tkt_user);
-						xfree(tkt_user);
+				char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+				
+				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+				
+				if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
+#ifdef KRB4
+					KTEXT_ST tkt;
+					
+					tkt.length = dlen;
+					if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
+						memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
+					
+					if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
+						authenticated = 1;
+						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
+						    " tktuser %.100s",
+						    client_user);
+						xfree(client_user);
 					}
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+				} else {
+#ifdef KRB5
+					krb5_data tkt;
+					tkt.length = dlen;
+					tkt.data = kdata;
+					
+					if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
+						authenticated = 1;
+						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
+						    " tktuser %.100s",
+						    client_user);
+						xfree(client_user);
+					}
+#endif /* KRB5 */
 				}
 				xfree(kdata);
 			}
 			break;
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
+#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
+			
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+			/* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */
+		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
+			packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication.");
+			break;
+#ifdef AFS
+		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
+			packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication.");
+			break;
+#endif /* AFS */
+#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
+			
 		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
 			if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
 				verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
@@ -369,7 +372,7 @@ do_authentication()
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int plen;
 	u_int ulen;
-	char *user, *style = NULL;
+	char *p, *user, *style = NULL;
 
 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
 	packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER);
@@ -379,8 +382,12 @@ do_authentication()
 	packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER);
 
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
-		*style++ = 0;
+		*style++ = '\0';
 
+	/* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */
+	if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
+		*p = '\0';
+	
 	authctxt = authctxt_new();
 	authctxt->user = user;
 	authctxt->style = style;
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 3c4d12662..4a1094685 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.81 2001/06/23 02:34:30 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.82 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -96,11 +96,14 @@ typedef enum {
 	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts, oRhostsAuthentication,
 	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oFallBackToRsh, oUseRsh,
 	oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	oKerberosAuthentication,
-#endif /* KRB4 */
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+	oKerberosTgtPassing,
+#endif
 #ifdef AFS
-	oKerberosTgtPassing, oAFSTokenPassing,
+	oAFSTokenPassing,
 #endif
 	oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
 	oUser, oHost, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
@@ -137,11 +140,13 @@ static struct {
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	{ "kerberosauthentication", oKerberosAuthentication },
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-#ifdef AFS
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oKerberosTgtPassing },
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	{ "afstokenpassing", oAFSTokenPassing },
 #endif
 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oFallBackToRsh },
@@ -335,23 +340,21 @@ parse_flag:
 	case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	case oKerberosAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	case oKerberosTgtPassing:
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
 		goto parse_flag;
-
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	case oAFSTokenPassing:
 		intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
 		goto parse_flag;
 #endif
-
 	case oFallBackToRsh:
 		intptr = &options->fallback_to_rsh;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -724,11 +727,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	options->afs_token_passing = -1;
 #endif
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
@@ -799,16 +804,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 0;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
 		options->kerberos_authentication = 1;
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-#ifdef AFS
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
 		options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
 		options->afs_token_passing = 1;
-#endif /* AFS */
+#endif
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index 4b3be7615..2f784e6e2 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.33 2001/06/26 06:32:58 itojun Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.34 2001/06/26 16:15:24 dugsong Exp $"); */
 
 #ifndef READCONF_H
 #define READCONF_H
@@ -41,12 +41,13 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
-#ifdef KRB4
-	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* Try Kerberos
-						 * authentication. */
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* Try Kerberos authentication. */
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* Try Kerberos TGT passing. */
 #endif
 #ifdef AFS
-	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* Try Kerberos tgt passing. */
 	int     afs_token_passing;	/* Try AFS token passing. */
 #endif
 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 55b0b0039..7dbf31834 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -10,14 +10,11 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.84 2001/06/23 15:12:19 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.85 2001/06/26 16:15:24 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #ifdef KRB4
 #include <krb.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
-#include <kafs.h>
-#endif
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -70,13 +67,15 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	options->afs_token_passing = -1;
 #endif
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
@@ -170,20 +169,22 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
 		options->kerberos_authentication = (access(KEYFILE, R_OK) == 0);
 	if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
 		options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
 	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-#ifdef AFS
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
 		options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS	
 	if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
 		options->afs_token_passing = k_hasafs();
-#endif /* AFS */
+#endif
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -224,11 +225,14 @@ typedef enum {
 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
 	sRhostsAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 #endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+	sKerberosTgtPassing,
+#endif
 #ifdef AFS
-	sKerberosTgtPassing, sAFSTokenPassing,
+	sAFSTokenPassing,
 #endif
 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress,
@@ -267,13 +271,15 @@ static struct {
 	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },
 	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },			/* alias */
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication },
 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd },
 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup },
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sKerberosTgtPassing },
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	{ "afstokenpassing", sAFSTokenPassing },
 #endif
 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
@@ -584,8 +590,7 @@ parse_flag:
 		case sPubkeyAuthentication:
 			intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
 			goto parse_flag;
-
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 		case sKerberosAuthentication:
 			intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
 			goto parse_flag;
@@ -598,12 +603,12 @@ parse_flag:
 			intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
 			goto parse_flag;
 #endif
-
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 		case sKerberosTgtPassing:
 			intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
 			goto parse_flag;
-
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 		case sAFSTokenPassing:
 			intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
 			goto parse_flag;
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index a71b7c135..1b0220283 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.45 2001/06/26 06:33:00 itojun Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.46 2001/06/26 16:15:24 dugsong Exp $"); */
 
 #ifndef SERVCONF_H
 #define SERVCONF_H
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
 	int     rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* If true, permit Kerberos
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kerberos_or_local_passwd;	/* If true, permit kerberos
@@ -84,9 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
 						 * file on logout. */
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* If true, permit Kerberos tgt
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* If true, permit Kerberos TGT
 					 * passing. */
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	int     afs_token_passing;	/* If true, permit AFS token passing. */
 #endif
 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 7d0e0723c..5a6afa7ec 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.95 2001/06/25 08:25:39 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.96 2001/06/26 16:15:24 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ typedef struct Session Session;
 struct Session {
 	int	used;
 	int	self;
-	struct	passwd *pw;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
 	pid_t	pid;
 	/* tty */
 	char	*term;
@@ -198,6 +199,14 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	/* remove agent socket */
 	if (auth_get_socket_name())
 		auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+#ifdef KRB4
+	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+		krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -216,6 +225,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen;
 
 	s = session_new();
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
 
 	/*
@@ -300,6 +310,58 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
 				success = 1;
 			break;
+			
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
+			if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
+				verbose("Kerberos TGT passing disabled.");
+			} else {
+				char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+				
+				/* XXX - 0x41, see creds_to_radix version */
+				if (kdata[0] != 0x41) {
+#ifdef KRB5
+					krb5_data tgt;
+					tgt.data = kdata;
+					tgt.length = dlen;
+					
+					if (auth_krb5_tgt(s->authctxt, &tgt))
+						success = 1;
+					else
+						verbose("Kerberos v5 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+				} else {
+#ifdef AFS
+					if (auth_krb4_tgt(s->authctxt, kdata))
+						success = 1;
+					else
+						verbose("Kerberos v4 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* AFS */
+				}
+				xfree(kdata);
+			}
+			break;
+#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
+			
+#ifdef AFS
+		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
+			if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
+				verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
+			} else {
+				/* Accept AFS token. */
+				char *token = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+				
+				if (auth_afs_token(s->authctxt, token))
+					success = 1;
+				else
+					verbose("AFS token refused for %.100s",
+					    s->authctxt->user);
+				xfree(token);
+			}
+			break;
+#endif /* AFS */
 
 		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
 		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
@@ -615,7 +677,7 @@ static int
 check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
 	char buf[256];
-	struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 	struct stat st;
 
 	/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
@@ -955,7 +1017,7 @@ void
 do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
 	const char *shell, *hostname = NULL, *cp = NULL;
-	struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 	char buf[256];
 	char cmd[1024];
 	FILE *f = NULL;
@@ -1134,10 +1196,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	/* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
 	if (k_hasafs()) {
 		char cell[64];
-
+		
 		if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
 			krb_afslog(cell, 0);
-
+		
 		krb_afslog(0, 0);
 	}
 #endif /* AFS */
@@ -1221,16 +1283,16 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
 	read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
 #endif
-
 #ifdef KRB4
-	{
-		extern char *ticket;
-
-		if (ticket)
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE", ticket);
-	}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
+	if (s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE",
+		    s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+		    s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	/* Pull in any environment variables that may have been set by PAM. */
 	do_pam_environment(&env, &envsize);
diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
index ec0a5c96c..09203d714 100644
--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.36 2001/06/23 22:37:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.37 2001/06/26 16:15:24 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.36 2001/06/23 22:37:46 markus Exp $");
 #ifdef KRB4
 #include <krb.h>
 #endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
 #ifdef AFS
 #include <kafs.h>
 #include "radix.h"
@@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.36 2001/06/23 22:37:46 markus Exp $");
 #include "readpass.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 
 /* Session id for the current session. */
 u_char session_id[16];
@@ -379,7 +383,7 @@ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
 
 #ifdef KRB4
 static int
-try_kerberos_authentication(void)
+try_krb4_authentication(void)
 {
 	KTEXT_ST auth;		/* Kerberos data */
 	char *reply;
@@ -397,20 +401,21 @@ try_kerberos_authentication(void)
 	/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
 	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
 		return 0;
-
-	strncpy(inst, (char *) krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)), INST_SZ);
-
-	realm = (char *) krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1));
+	
+	strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)),
+	    INST_SZ);
+	
+	realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1));
 	if (!realm) {
-		debug("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1));
+		debug("Kerberos v4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/* This can really be anything. */
-	checksum = (u_long) getpid();
-
+	checksum = (u_long)getpid();
+	
 	r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum);
 	if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-		debug("Kerberos V4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+		debug("Kerberos v4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */
@@ -420,26 +425,26 @@ try_kerberos_authentication(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule);
-
+	
 	/* Send authentication info to server. */
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
 	packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
-
+	
 	/* Zero the buffer. */
 	(void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN);
-
+	
 	slen = sizeof(local);
 	memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
 	if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(),
-			(struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&local, &slen) < 0)
 		debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-
+	
 	slen = sizeof(foreign);
 	memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
 	if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-			(struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &slen) < 0) {
 		debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno));
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
@@ -448,96 +453,288 @@ try_kerberos_authentication(void)
 	switch (type) {
 	case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
 		/* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
-		debug("Kerberos V4 authentication failed.");
+		debug("Kerberos v4 authentication failed.");
 		return 0;
 		break;
-
+		
 	case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
 		/* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
-		debug("Kerberos V4 authentication accepted.");
-
+		debug("Kerberos v4 authentication accepted.");
+		
 		/* Get server's response. */
 		reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length);
 		memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
 		xfree(reply);
-
+		
 		packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
-
+		
 		/*
 		 * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
 		 * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
 		 * bogus. Bail out.
 		 */
 		r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
-				&foreign, &local, &msg_data);
+		    &foreign, &local, &msg_data);
 		if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-			debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-			packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
+			debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s",
+			    krb_err_txt[r]);
+			packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
 		}
 		/* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */
-		(void) memcpy((char *) &cksum, (char *) msg_data.app_data, sizeof(cksum));
+		memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data,
+		    sizeof(cksum));
 		cksum = ntohl(cksum);
-
+		
 		/* If it matches, we're golden. */
 		if (cksum == checksum + 1) {
-			debug("Kerberos V4 challenge successful.");
+			debug("Kerberos v4 challenge successful.");
 			return 1;
 		} else
-			packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
+			packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
 		break;
-
+		
 	default:
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos V4 response: %d", type);
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v4 response: %d", type);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
 #endif /* KRB4 */
 
-#ifdef AFS
+#ifdef KRB5
 static int
-send_kerberos_tgt(void)
+try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context)
+{
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	const char *tkfile;
+	struct stat buf;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	const char *remotehost;
+	krb5_data ap;
+	int type, payload_len;
+	krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *reply = NULL;
+	int ret;
+	
+	memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap));
+	
+	problem = krb5_init_context(context);
+	if (problem) {
+		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_init_context failed");
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	tkfile = krb5_cc_default_name(*context);
+	if (strncmp(tkfile, "FILE:", 5) == 0)
+		tkfile += 5;
+	
+	if (stat(tkfile, &buf) == 0 && getuid() != buf.st_uid) {
+		debug("Kerberos v5: could not get default ccache (permission denied).");
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	problem = krb5_cc_default(*context, &ccache);
+	if (problem) {
+		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_cc_default failed: %s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+	
+	problem = krb5_mk_req(*context, auth_context, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
+	    "host", remotehost, NULL, ccache, &ap);
+	if (problem) {
+		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_mk_req failed: %s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
+	packet_put_string((char *) ap.data, ap.length);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+	
+	xfree(ap.data);
+	ap.length = 0;
+	
+	type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+	switch (type) {
+        case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+                /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
+                debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed.");
+                ret = 0;
+                break;
+		
+	case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
+                /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
+                debug("Kerberos v5 authentication accepted.");
+		
+                /* Get server's response. */
+                ap.data = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &ap.length);
+		
+                packet_integrity_check(payload_len, 4 + ap.length, type);
+                /* XXX je to dobre? */
+		
+                problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply);
+                if (problem) {
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+		
+	default:
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v5 response: %d",
+		    type);
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+		
+	}
+	
+ out:
+	if (ccache != NULL)
+		krb5_cc_close(*context, ccache);
+	if (reply != NULL)
+		krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(*context, reply);
+	if (ap.length > 0)
+		krb5_data_free(&ap);
+	
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+send_krb5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context)
+{
+	int fd, type, payload_len;
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_data outbuf;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	krb5_creds creds;
+	krb5_kdc_flags flags;
+	const char *remotehost;
+	
+	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+	memset(&outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
+	
+	fd = packet_get_connection_in();
+	
+	problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(context, auth_context, &fd);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	problem = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &creds.client);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	problem = krb5_build_principal(context, &creds.server,
+	    strlen(creds.client->realm), creds.client->realm,
+	    "krbtgt", creds.client->realm, NULL);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	creds.times.endtime = 0;
+	
+	flags.i = 0;
+	flags.b.forwarded = 1;
+	flags.b.forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool(context,  NULL,
+	    "libdefaults", "forwardable", NULL);
+	
+	remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+	
+	problem = krb5_get_forwarded_creds(context, auth_context,
+	    ccache, flags.i, remotehost, &creds, &outbuf);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
+	packet_put_string((char *)outbuf.data, outbuf.length);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+	
+	type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+	
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+		char *pname;
+		
+		krb5_unparse_name(context, creds.client, &pname);
+		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarded (%s).", pname);
+		xfree(pname);
+	} else
+		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed.");
+	
+	return;
+	
+ out:
+	if (problem)
+		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed: %s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(context, problem));
+	if (creds.client)
+		krb5_free_principal(context, creds.client);
+	if (creds.server)
+		krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
+	if (ccache)
+		krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
+	if (outbuf.data)
+		xfree(outbuf.data);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+static void
+send_krb4_tgt(void)
 {
 	CREDENTIALS *creds;
-	char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
-	int r, type, plen;
-	char buffer[8192];
 	struct stat st;
-
+	char buffer[4096], pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
+	int problem, type, len;
+	
 	/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
 	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
-		return 0;
-
+		return;
+	
 	creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds));
-
-	if ((r = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm)) != KSUCCESS) {
-		debug("Kerberos V4 tf_fullname failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if ((r = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds)) != GC_OK) {
-		debug("Kerberos V4 get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	
+	problem = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
+	problem = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+	
 	if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) {
-		debug("Kerberos V4 ticket expired: %s", TKT_FILE);
-		return 0;
+		problem = RD_AP_EXP;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof buffer);
-	xfree(creds);
-
+	creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+	
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
 	packet_put_cstring(buffer);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
-
-	type = packet_read(&plen);
-
-	if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-		debug("Kerberos TGT for realm %s rejected.", prealm);
-	else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos TGT response: %d", type);
-
-	return 1;
+	
+	type = packet_read(&len);
+	
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT forwarded (%s%s%s@%s).",
+		    creds->pname, creds->pinst[0] ? "." : "",
+		    creds->pinst, creds->realm);
+	else
+		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT rejected.");
+	
+	xfree(creds);
+	return;
+	
+ out:
+	debug("Kerberos v4 TGT passing failed: %s", krb_err_txt[problem]);
+	xfree(creds);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -546,10 +743,10 @@ send_afs_tokens(void)
 	CREDENTIALS creds;
 	struct ViceIoctl parms;
 	struct ClearToken ct;
-	int i, type, len, plen;
+	int i, type, len;
 	char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell;
 	char buffer[8192];
-
+	
 	/* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */
 	for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {	/* just in case */
 		parms.in = (char *) &i;
@@ -559,7 +756,7 @@ send_afs_tokens(void)
 		if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0)
 			break;
 		p = buf;
-
+		
 		/* Get secret token. */
 		memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(u_int));
 		if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN)
@@ -567,7 +764,7 @@ send_afs_tokens(void)
 		p += sizeof(u_int);
 		memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length);
 		p += creds.ticket_st.length;
-
+		
 		/* Get clear token. */
 		memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
 		if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken))
@@ -577,20 +774,22 @@ send_afs_tokens(void)
 		p += len;
 		p += sizeof(len);	/* primary flag */
 		server_cell = p;
-
+		
 		/* Flesh out our credentials. */
-		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
+		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof(creds.service));
 		creds.instance[0] = '\0';
 		strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ);
 		memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ);
 		creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp;
-		creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, ct.EndTimestamp);
+		creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date,
+		    ct.EndTimestamp);
 		creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle;
 		snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId);
 		creds.pinst[0] = '\0';
-
+		
 		/* Encode token, ship it off. */
-		if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *) buffer, sizeof buffer) <= 0)
+		if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *)buffer,
+		    sizeof(buffer)) <= 0)
 			break;
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN);
 		packet_put_cstring(buffer);
@@ -599,8 +798,8 @@ send_afs_tokens(void)
 
 		/* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector,
 		   Victor? */
-		type = packet_read(&plen);
-
+		type = packet_read(&len);
+		
 		if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
 			debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell);
 		else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
@@ -622,9 +821,9 @@ try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
 	u_int clen;
 	char prompt[1024];
 	char *challenge, *response;
-
+	
 	debug("Doing challenge reponse authentication.");
-
+	
 	for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
 		/* request a challenge */
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
@@ -913,9 +1112,13 @@ void
 ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
     Key **keys, int nkeys)
 {
+#ifdef KRB5
+	krb5_context context = NULL;
+	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+#endif
 	int i, type;
 	int payload_len;
-
+	
 	if (supported_authentications == 0)
 		fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods");
 
@@ -934,43 +1137,40 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 
 	/* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
 	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-		return;
+		goto success;
 	if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER",
-				  type);
-
-#ifdef AFS
-	/* Try Kerberos tgt passing if the server supports it. */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
-	    options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
-		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
-		(void) send_kerberos_tgt();
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
+	
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
+            options.kerberos_authentication) {
+		debug("Trying Kerberos v5 authentication.");
+		
+		if (try_krb5_authentication(&context, &auth_context)) {
+			type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+			if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+				goto success;
+			if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v5 auth", type);
+		}
 	}
-	/* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
-	    options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
-		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
-		send_afs_tokens();
-	}
-#endif /* AFS */
-
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+	
 #ifdef KRB4
 	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
 	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
-		debug("Trying Kerberos authentication.");
-		if (try_kerberos_authentication()) {
-			/* The server should respond with success or failure. */
+		debug("Trying Kerberos v4 authentication.");
+		
+		if (try_krb4_authentication()) {
 			type = packet_read(&payload_len);
 			if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-				return;
+				goto success;
 			if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos auth", type);
+				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v4 auth", type);
 		}
 	}
 #endif /* KRB4 */
-
+	
 	/*
 	 * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
 	 * do not wish to remain anonymous.
@@ -986,7 +1186,7 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 		/* The server should respond with success or failure. */
 		type = packet_read(&payload_len);
 		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-			return;
+			goto success;
 		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
 			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
 					  type);
@@ -1000,7 +1200,7 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
 			if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
 			    try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, keys[i]))
-				return;
+				goto success;
 		}
 	}
 	/* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
@@ -1012,20 +1212,20 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 		 * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
 		 */
 		if (try_agent_authentication())
-			return;
+			goto success;
 
 		/* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
 			if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL &&
 			    options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
 			    try_rsa_authentication(options.identity_files[i]))
-				return;
+				goto success;
 	}
 	/* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */
 	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
 	    options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
 		if (try_challenge_response_authentication())
-			return;
+			goto success;
 	}
 	/* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
 	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
@@ -1035,9 +1235,41 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
 		    server_user, host);
 		if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
-			return;
+			goto success;
 	}
 	/* All authentication methods have failed.  Exit with an error message. */
 	fatal("Permission denied.");
 	/* NOTREACHED */
+
+ success:
+#ifdef KRB5
+	/* Try Kerberos v5 TGT passing. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
+	    options.kerberos_tgt_passing && context && auth_context) {
+		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
+		send_krb5_tgt(context, auth_context);
+	}
+	if (auth_context)
+		krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
+	if (context)
+		krb5_free_context(context);
+#endif
+	
+#ifdef AFS
+	/* Try Kerberos v4 TGT passing if the server supports it. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
+	    options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
+		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
+		send_krb4_tgt();
+	}
+	/* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
+	    options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
+		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
+		send_afs_tokens();
+	}
+#endif /* AFS */
 }
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 936e861a9..dd5d7ab2c 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.201 2001/06/23 19:12:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.202 2001/06/26 16:15:25 dugsong Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -1160,13 +1160,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    "originating port not trusted.");
 		options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	}
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
 	if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
 	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
 		debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
 		options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
 	}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
+#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
 #ifdef AFS
 	/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
 	if (k_hasafs()) {
@@ -1186,13 +1186,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		do_ssh1_kex();
 		do_authentication();
 	}
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-	/* Cleanup user's ticket cache file. */
-	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
-		(void) dest_tkt();
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 	verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
 
@@ -1268,13 +1261,15 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
 	if (options.rsa_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options.kerberos_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	if (options.afs_token_passing)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
 #endif