[monitor.c]
     only allow enabled authentication methods; ok provos@
This commit is contained in:
Ben Lindstrom 2002-06-06 20:57:17 +00:00
parent 2e14bc71e6
commit dcf6bfbfbd
2 changed files with 19 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
decriptor -> descriptor
authentciated -> authenticated
transmition -> transmission
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:42:35
[monitor.c]
only allow enabled authentication methods; ok provos@
20020604
- (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed
@ -768,4 +771,4 @@
- (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message
- (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2166 2002/06/06 20:56:07 mouring Exp $
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2167 2002/06/06 20:57:17 mouring Exp $

View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.11 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.12 2002/06/04 19:42:35 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
@ -581,7 +581,8 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
xfree(passwd);
@ -642,7 +643,8 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __FUNCTION__);
response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __FUNCTION__, response, authok);
xfree(response);
@ -688,7 +690,8 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
authok = (authctxt->valid &&
authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
authctxt->valid &&
skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
@ -760,15 +763,18 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) {
switch(type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
break;
case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
allowed = auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
break;
default:
@ -958,7 +964,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, verified);
mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
auth_method = "publickey";
auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
return (verified);
}
@ -1137,7 +1143,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
if (authctxt->valid) {
if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__);
buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);