diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7ba84a77c..5f6f0403e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
      [deattack.c misc.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
      more buffer allocation fixes; from Solar Designer; CAN-2003-0682;
      ok millert@
+   - miod@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/09/18 13:02:21
+     [authfd.c bufaux.c dh.c mac.c ssh-keygen.c]
+     A few signedness fixes for harmless situations; markus@ ok
 
 20030919
  - (djm) Bug #683: Remove reference to --with-ipv4-default from INSTALL;
@@ -1179,4 +1182,4 @@
  - Fix sshd BindAddress and -b options for systems using fake-getaddrinfo.
    Report from murple@murple.net, diagnosis from dtucker@zip.com.au
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3027 2003/09/22 11:04:23 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3028 2003/09/22 11:05:50 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index c78db6d94..5fdf1ca3d 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.61 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.62 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 static int
 ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
-	int l, len;
+	int l;
+	u_int len;
 	char buf[1024];
 
 	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
 	len = GET_32BIT(buf);
 	if (len > 256 * 1024)
-		fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+		fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
 
 	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
 	buffer_clear(reply);
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 
 	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
 	auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-	if (auth->howmany > 1024)
+	if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
 		fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
 		    auth->howmany);
 
diff --git a/bufaux.c b/bufaux.c
index 37cc27ff6..1df15b548 100644
--- a/bufaux.c
+++ b/bufaux.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.29 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.30 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 void
 buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 {
-	int bits, bytes;
+	u_int bits, bytes;
 	u_char buf[2], *bin;
 
 	/* Get the number for bits. */
@@ -103,10 +103,10 @@ buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 void
 buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 {
-	int bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1;
+	u_int bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1;
 	u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
 	int oi;
-	int hasnohigh = 0;
+	u_int hasnohigh = 0;
 
 	buf[0] = '\0';
 	/* Get the value of in binary */
diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
index 996428b7f..c924efee0 100644
--- a/dh.c
+++ b/dh.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.24 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.25 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 
 	if (dh->p == NULL)
 		fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL");
-	if (2*need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p))
+	if (need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p))
 		fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)",
 		    BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need);
 	do {
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index ab9a03d84..097f0b93b 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.5 2002/05/16 22:02:50 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.6 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 
 	if (mac->key == NULL)
 		fatal("mac_compute: no key");
-	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
+	if ((u_int)mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
 		fatal("mac_compute: mac too long");
 	HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md);
 	PUT_32BIT(b, seqno);
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index e74d3cd37..5b7bc400a 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.108 2003/08/14 16:08:58 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.109 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 static void
 buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value)
 {
-	int bits = buffer_get_int(b);
-	int bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	u_int bits = buffer_get_int(b);
+	u_int bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
 
 	if (buffer_len(b) < bytes)
 		fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: "