- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27

[auth-rsa.c]
     move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed)
     bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@
This commit is contained in:
Darren Tucker 2010-12-05 09:01:47 +11:00
parent 7336b904ff
commit adab6f1299
2 changed files with 9 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
check that g^x^q === 1 mod p; recommended by JPAKE author Feng Hao
(this code is still disabled, but apprently people are treating it as
a reference implementation)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27
[auth-rsa.c]
move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed)
bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@
20101204
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c] Use arc4random_uniform(range)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.79 2010/12/03 23:55:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
MD5_CTX md;
int len;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
@ -249,6 +246,10 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
"actual %d vs. announced %d.",
file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
/* Never accept a revoked key */
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
break;
/* We have found the desired key. */
/*
* If our options do not allow this key to be used,