From 6cb6dcffe1a2204ba9006de20f73255c268fcb6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "markus@openbsd.org" <markus@openbsd.org>
Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2016 17:47:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c24c0c32c49b91740d5a94ae914fb1898ea5f534
---
Makefile.in | 6 +-
auth-chall.c | 125 -----------
auth-rh-rsa.c | 109 ---------
auth-rhosts.c | 23 +-
auth-rsa.c | 349 -----------------------------
auth.c | 10 +-
auth.h | 17 +-
auth1.c | 444 ------------------------------------
monitor.c | 305 ++-----------------------
monitor_wrap.c | 151 +------------
monitor_wrap.h | 13 +-
serverloop.c | 596 ++-----------------------------------------------
serverloop.h | 3 +-
session.c | 212 +-----------------
session.h | 3 +-
sshd.c | 479 ++-------------------------------------
16 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 2762 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 auth-chall.c
delete mode 100644 auth-rh-rsa.c
delete mode 100644 auth-rsa.c
delete mode 100644 auth1.c
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 12991cd9f..62fdb09f6 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
-SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
- auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
- auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+ auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+ auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
diff --git a/auth-chall.c b/auth-chall.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 60c9f14ca..000000000
--- a/auth-chall.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
-
-extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
-static KbdintDevice *device;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-char *
-get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
- u_int i, numprompts;
- u_int *echo_on;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (!options.use_pam)
- remove_kbdint_device("pam");
-#endif
-
- device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
- if (device == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
- &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- return NULL;
- }
- if (numprompts < 1)
- fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
- challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
- for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
- free(prompts[i]);
- free(prompts);
- free(name);
- free(echo_on);
- free(info);
-
- return (challenge);
-}
-int
-verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
-{
- char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts;
- u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (device == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
- return 0;
- resp[0] = (char *)response;
- switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) {
- case 0: /* Success */
- authenticated = 1;
- break;
- case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */
- if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
- &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0)
- break;
- if (numprompts == 0 &&
- device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0)
- authenticated = 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
- free(prompts[i]);
- free(prompts);
- free(name);
- free(echo_on);
- free(info);
- break;
- }
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- return authenticated;
-}
-void
-abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- }
-}
diff --git a/auth-rh-rsa.c b/auth-rh-rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 057335ba4..000000000
--- a/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.45 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
- * authentication.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser,
- const char *chost, Key *client_host_key)
-{
- HostStatus host_status;
-
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
- if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
- return 0;
-
- host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
- chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
- options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
- return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
- * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
-{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- const char *chost;
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
- cuser);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
- client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- chost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
- debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
- debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
- packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
- return 0;
- }
- /* A matching host key was found and is known. */
-
- /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
- logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
- chost);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
- * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
- */
-
- verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
- pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
- packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
index 0ef344712..ecf956f06 100644
--- a/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.47 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.48 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -186,20 +186,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
* true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
* /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
*/
-
int
-auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
-{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
-
- hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
-
-static int
-auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
const char *ipaddr)
{
char buf[1024];
@@ -334,10 +322,3 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
-
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
- const char *ipaddr)
-{
- return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cbd971be1..000000000
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
- * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
- * validity of the host key.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
- * responses to a particular session.
- */
-extern u_char session_id[16];
-
-/*
- * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
- * following format:
- * options bits e n comment
- * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
- * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
- * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
- * description of the options.
- */
-
-BIGNUM *
-auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
-
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
- /* Generate a random challenge. */
- if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
- if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return challenge;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
-{
- u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- int len;
-
- /* don't allow short keys */
- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
- error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
- __func__,
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
- len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
- fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
- memset(buf, 0, 32);
- BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
-
- /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
- }
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
- * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
- * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
- u_char response[16];
- int i, success;
-
- if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-
- challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
-
- /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
- if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
- fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
-
- /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
- packet_send();
- BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for a response. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- return (success);
-}
-
-static int
-rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
- const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- int allowed = 0, bits;
- FILE *f;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- Key *key;
-
- debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
- if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
- * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
- * user really has the corresponding private key.
- */
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
- char *cp;
- char *key_options;
- int keybits;
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
- continue;
-
- /*
- * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
- * save their starting address and skip the option part
- * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
- * address to NULL.
- */
- if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
- int quoted = 0;
- key_options = cp;
- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
- cp++; /* Skip both */
- else if (*cp == '"')
- quoted = !quoted;
- }
- } else
- key_options = NULL;
-
- /* Parse the key from the line. */
- if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
- file, linenum);
- continue;
- }
- /* cp now points to the comment part. */
-
- /*
- * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
- * by its modulus).
- */
- if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
- continue;
-
- /* check the real bits */
- keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
- logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
- "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
- SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- continue;
- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /* Never accept a revoked key */
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- break;
-
- /* We have found the desired key. */
- /*
- * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
- * do not send challenge.
- */
- if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
- continue;
- if (key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
- /* break out, this key is allowed */
- allowed = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Close the file. */
- fclose(f);
-
- /* return key if allowed */
- if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
- *rkey = key;
- else
- key_free(key);
-
- return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there's user key matching client_n,
- * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- char *file;
- u_int i, allowed = 0;
-
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
- continue;
- file = expand_authorized_keys(
- options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
- allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
- free(file);
- }
-
- restore_uid();
-
- return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
- */
-int
-auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
-{
- Key *key;
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- /* no user given */
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- return 0;
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
- auth_clear_options();
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
- /* Wrong response. */
- verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
- packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
- /*
- * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
- * another challenge and break the protocol.
- */
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Correct response. The client has been successfully
- * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
- * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
- * authentication to be rejected.
- */
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
- packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
- return (1);
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 24527dd7c..b6a440213 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.115 2016/06/15 00:40:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.116 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
- authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
+ authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
authmsg,
method,
submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
@@ -306,7 +306,6 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
free(authctxt->info);
@@ -339,12 +338,11 @@ auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
- "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
+ "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
/* NOTREACHED */
}
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 55170af50..338a62da7 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.88 2016/05/04 14:04:40 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -112,20 +112,11 @@ struct KbdintDevice
void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
};
-int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
int
auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
-int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
-BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
-int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
- const char *, Key *);
int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
@@ -156,7 +147,6 @@ void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
void disable_forwarding(void);
-void do_authentication(Authctxt *);
void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
@@ -187,10 +177,6 @@ int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
-char *get_challenge(Authctxt *);
-int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
-void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
-
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
@@ -210,7 +196,6 @@ Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
-int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5073c49bb..000000000
--- a/auth1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,444 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
-
-static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
-
-struct AuthMethod1 {
- int type;
- char *name;
- int *enabled;
- int (*method)(Authctxt *);
-};
-
-const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
- &options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
- &options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
- &options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
- &options.challenge_response_authentication,
- auth1_process_tis_challenge
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
- &options.challenge_response_authentication,
- auth1_process_tis_response
- },
- { -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-static const struct AuthMethod1
-*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
- if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
- return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
-
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-static char *
-get_authname(int type)
-{
- const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
- static char buf[64];
-
- if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
- return (a->name);
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
- return (buf);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- char *password;
- u_int dlen;
-
- /*
- * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
- * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
- * not visible to an outside observer.
- */
- password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Try authentication with the password. */
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
- explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
- free(password);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- BIGNUM *n;
-
- /* RSA authentication requested. */
- if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(n);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
- BN_clear_free(n);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int keybits, authenticated = 0;
- u_int bits;
- Key *client_host_key;
- u_int ulen;
-
- /*
- * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
- * trust the client; root on the client machine can
- * claim to be any user.
- */
- client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-
- /* Get the client host key. */
- client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
- verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
- "actual %d, announced %d",
- BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
- client_host_key);
- key_free(client_host_key);
-
- auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- char *challenge;
-
- if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
- packet_put_cstring(challenge);
- free(challenge);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- char *response;
- u_int dlen;
-
- response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
- explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
- free(response);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*
- * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
- * return only if authentication is successful
- */
-static void
-do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- int prev = 0, type = 0;
- const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
-
- debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
- authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
-
- /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
- if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB5
- (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
-#endif
- PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
-#endif
- {
- auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
- NULL);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- for (;;) {
- /* default to fail */
- authenticated = 0;
-
-
- /* Get a packet from the client. */
- prev = type;
- type = packet_read();
-
- /*
- * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
- * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
- * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
- * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
- * received such a response)
- */
- if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
- type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
- abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
-
- if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
- goto skip;
- if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
- logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
- goto skip;
- }
-
- if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
- verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
- goto skip;
- }
-
- authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
- if (authenticated == -1)
- continue; /* "postponed" */
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- if (authctxt->as) {
- auth_close(authctxt->as);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
- fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
- authctxt->user);
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
- authenticated = 0;
- fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
- }
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* Special handling for root */
- if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
- authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-# endif
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
- !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
- char *msg;
- size_t len;
-
- error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
- "configuration", authctxt->user);
- len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
- msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
- /* strip trailing newlines */
- if (len > 0)
- while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
- msg[len] = '\0';
- else
- msg = "Access denied.";
- packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
- }
-#endif
-
- skip:
- /* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
-
- free(client_user);
- client_user = NULL;
-
- if (authenticated)
- return;
-
- if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
- auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
- }
-
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
- * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
- */
-void
-do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- u_int ulen;
- char *user, *style = NULL;
-
- /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-
- /* Get the user name. */
- user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- *style++ = '\0';
-
- authctxt->user = user;
- authctxt->style = style;
-
- /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
- if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
- authctxt->valid = 1;
- else {
- debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
- authctxt->pw = fakepw();
- }
-
- /* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
- if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
- "protocol 1");
-
- setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
-
- /*
- * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
- * the server.
- */
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
- authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
- packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
- * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
- */
- do_authloop(authctxt);
-
- /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index cb57bd066..59b05a98f 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.161 2016/07/22 03:39:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.162 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -169,10 +169,6 @@ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-#endif
-
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
@@ -254,52 +250,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
{0, 0, NULL}
};
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -348,17 +298,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
- }
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
@@ -369,9 +312,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
- "with SSH protocol 1");
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
@@ -455,17 +395,13 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- }
if (!no_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
@@ -845,7 +781,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
- if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
@@ -857,14 +793,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
- /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
- if (!compat20)
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
@@ -991,11 +923,8 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- if (compat20) {
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
- } else
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
@@ -1205,10 +1134,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
- (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
- fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
-
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
@@ -1242,17 +1167,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
cuser, chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
- key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
- allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
- auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
- auth_method = "rsa";
- break;
-#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
@@ -1289,9 +1203,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
- if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-
return (0);
}
@@ -1600,186 +1511,6 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *p;
- int rsafail;
-
- /* Turn off permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
- rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
- BN_clear_free(p);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
- fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *client_n;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- auth_method = "rsa";
- if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
- if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
- allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
- BN_clear_free(client_n);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed && key != NULL) {
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = blen;
- key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
- fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- if (ssh1_challenge)
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
- debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob, *response;
- u_int blen, len;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- if (len != 16)
- fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
- success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- free(response);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
- /* reset state */
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = NULL;
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
int
mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
{
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 99dc13b61..64ff92885 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.88 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
/* Imports */
-extern int compat20;
extern z_stream incoming_stream;
extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
@@ -388,18 +387,6 @@ mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0));
}
-int
-mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user,
- const char *host, Key *key)
-{
- int ret;
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
- ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
@@ -710,28 +697,6 @@ mm_terminate(void)
buffer_free(&m);
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
-{
- int rsafail;
- Buffer m;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
-
- rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (rsafail);
-}
-#endif
-
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
@@ -862,120 +827,6 @@ mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
}
#endif /* SKEY */
-void
-mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
-{
- Buffer m;
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- Buffer m;
- Key *key;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
-
- allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- /* fake forced command */
- auth_clear_options();
- have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
- forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
-
- if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
- *rkey = key;
- free(blob);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (allowed);
-}
-
-BIGNUM *
-mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
- Buffer m;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (challenge);
-}
-
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int success = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
-
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 9fd02b30c..1bc76afff 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.30 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.31 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
-enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
+enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
struct monitor;
struct mm_master;
@@ -49,12 +49,7 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, Key *, int);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, Key *);
-int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
- const char *, Key *);
int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
-BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
@@ -84,10 +79,6 @@ void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
-/* SSHv1 interfaces */
-void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
-int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-
/* Key export functions */
struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index 3563e5d42..1e211701e 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.184 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.185 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "cipher.h"
@@ -86,25 +85,6 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int use_privsep;
-static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
-static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
-static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
-static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
-static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
- May be same number as fdin. */
-static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */
-static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
-static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
-static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
-static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
-static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */
-static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
-static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
-static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */
-static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */
-static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */
-static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */
-static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */
static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
/*
@@ -185,64 +165,6 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig)
received_sigterm = sig;
}
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
- * to the client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
-{
- u_int len;
-
- /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
- while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
- if (packet_is_interactive()) {
- if (len > 512)
- len = 512;
- } else {
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
- len = packet_get_maxsize();
- }
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
- stderr_bytes += len;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
- * client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
-{
- u_int len;
-
- /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
- while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- if (packet_is_interactive()) {
- if (len > 512)
- len = 512;
- } else {
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
- len = packet_get_maxsize();
- }
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
- stdout_bytes += len;
- }
-}
-
static void
client_alive_check(void)
{
@@ -275,14 +197,14 @@ client_alive_check(void)
* for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
*/
static void
-wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out,
+ fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int ret;
time_t minwait_secs = 0;
int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
- int program_alive_scheduled = 0;
/* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
@@ -300,7 +222,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
* this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
* analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
*/
- if (compat20 && options.client_alive_interval) {
+ if (options.client_alive_interval) {
uint64_t keepalive_ms =
(uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
@@ -309,38 +231,11 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
}
- if (compat20) {
#if 0
- /* wrong: bad condition XXX */
- if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+ /* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
#endif
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- } else {
- /*
- * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
- * buffered stdin or channel data.
- */
- if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
- channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- /*
- * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
- * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
- */
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated;
- if (!fdout_eof)
- FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
- if (!fderr_eof)
- FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
- }
- /*
- * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- * to the program.
- */
- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- }
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
notify_prepare(*readsetp);
/*
@@ -374,16 +269,8 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- } else {
- if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
- client_alive_check();
- if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) {
- if (!fdout_eof)
- FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
- if (!fderr_eof)
- FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
- }
- }
+ } else if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
+ client_alive_check();
notify_done(*readsetp);
}
@@ -392,8 +279,8 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
* Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
* in buffers and processed later.
*/
-static void
-process_input(fd_set *readset)
+static int
+process_input(fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
int len;
@@ -405,10 +292,7 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
if (len == 0) {
verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- connection_closed = 1;
- if (compat20)
- return;
- cleanup_exit(255);
+ return -1;
} else if (len < 0) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
@@ -423,381 +307,26 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
}
}
- if (compat20)
- return;
-
- /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
- if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
- errno = 0;
- len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
- /* do nothing */
-#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- } else if (len <= 0) {
-#else
- } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
- (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
-#endif
- fdout_eof = 1;
- } else {
- buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
- fdout_bytes += len;
- }
- }
- /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
- if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
- errno = 0;
- len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
- /* do nothing */
-#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- } else if (len <= 0) {
-#else
- } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
- (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
-#endif
- fderr_eof = 1;
- } else {
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
- }
- }
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
*/
static void
-process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+process_output(fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
{
- struct termios tio;
- u_char *data;
- u_int dlen;
- int len;
-
- /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
- if (len < 0 &&
- (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
- /* do nothing */
- } else if (len <= 0) {
- if (fdin != fdout)
- close(fdin);
- else
- shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
- fdin = -1;
- } else {
- /* Successful write. */
- if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
- tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
- !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
- /*
- * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
- * traffic analysis
- */
- packet_send_ignore(len);
- packet_send();
- }
- /* Consume the data from the buffer. */
- buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
- /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
- stdin_bytes += len;
- }
- }
/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
packet_write_poll();
}
-/*
- * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
- * This is used when the program terminates.
- */
-static void
-drain_output(void)
-{
- /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
- if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
- packet_send();
- /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
- stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- }
- /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
- if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
- packet_send();
- /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
- stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
- }
- /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-
static void
process_buffered_input_packets(void)
{
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state);
}
-/*
- * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between
- * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
- * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
- * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
- * child program).
- */
-void
-server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
-{
- fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
- int max_fd = 0;
- u_int nalloc = 0;
- int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */
- pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */
- int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */
- u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds;
- u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
- u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
- int type;
-
- debug("Entering interactive session.");
-
- /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
- child_terminated = 0;
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
-
- if (!use_privsep) {
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- }
-
- /* Initialize our global variables. */
- fdin = fdin_arg;
- fdout = fdout_arg;
- fderr = fderr_arg;
-
- /* nonblocking IO */
- set_nonblock(fdin);
- set_nonblock(fdout);
- /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
- if (fderr != -1)
- set_nonblock(fderr);
-
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
- fdin_is_tty = 1;
-
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
-
- notify_setup();
-
- previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
-
- /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
- if (packet_is_interactive())
- buffer_high = 4096;
- else
- buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
-
-#if 0
- /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
- if (fderr != -1)
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
-#endif
-
- /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
- buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /*
- * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
- * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
- * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way
- * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere.
- */
- if (fderr == -1)
- fderr_eof = 1;
-
- server_init_dispatch();
-
- /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
- for (;;) {
-
- /* Process buffered packets from the client. */
- process_buffered_input_packets();
-
- /*
- * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- */
- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- if (fdin != fdout)
- close(fdin);
- else
- shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
- fdin = -1;
- }
- /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
- make_packets_from_stderr_data();
-
- /*
- * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
- * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
- * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
- * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
- * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
- */
- max_time_milliseconds = 0;
- stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
- stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
- /* try again after a while */
- max_time_milliseconds = 10;
- } else {
- /* Send it now. */
- make_packets_from_stdout_data();
- }
- previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-
- /* Send channel data to the client. */
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- channel_output_poll();
-
- /*
- * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
- * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
- * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
- */
- if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
- buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
- if (!channel_still_open())
- break;
- if (!waiting_termination) {
- const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
- char *cp;
- waiting_termination = 1;
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
-
- /* Display list of open channels. */
- cp = channel_open_message();
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
- free(cp);
- }
- }
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
-
- /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
- wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
- &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
-
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
- /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /* Process any channel events. */
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-
- /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
- process_input(readset);
-
- /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
- process_output(writeset);
- }
- free(readset);
- free(writeset);
-
- /* Cleanup and termination code. */
-
- /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
- drain_output();
-
- debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
- stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
-
- /* Free and clear the buffers. */
- buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /* Close the file descriptors. */
- if (fdout != -1)
- close(fdout);
- fdout = -1;
- fdout_eof = 1;
- if (fderr != -1)
- close(fderr);
- fderr = -1;
- fderr_eof = 1;
- if (fdin != -1)
- close(fdin);
- fdin = -1;
-
- channel_free_all();
-
- /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-
- while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (wait_pid != pid)
- error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
- (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
-
- /* Check if it exited normally. */
- if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
- /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */
- debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
- packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /*
- * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be
- * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
- * already died so we just ignore them. The client is
- * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
- * the exit status.
- */
- do {
- type = packet_read();
- }
- while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
-
- debug("Received exit confirmation.");
- return;
- }
- /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
- if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
- packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
- WTERMSIG(wait_status));
-
- /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
- packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
static void
collect_children(void)
{
@@ -825,7 +354,7 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
int max_fd;
- u_int nalloc = 0;
+ u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out;
u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
@@ -854,14 +383,14 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state) &&
packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
channel_output_poll();
- if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 &&
+ if (options.rekey_interval > 0 &&
!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000;
else
rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
- wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
- &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
+ wait_until_can_do_something(connection_in, connection_out,
+ &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
@@ -872,10 +401,9 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
collect_children();
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
- process_input(readset);
- if (connection_closed)
+ if (process_input(readset, connection_in) < 0)
break;
- process_output(writeset);
+ process_output(writeset, connection_out);
}
collect_children();
@@ -902,53 +430,6 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
return 0;
}
-static int
-server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *data;
- u_int data_len;
-
- /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */
- /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
- if (fdin == -1)
- return 0;
- data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
- buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
- explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
- free(data);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- /*
- * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the
- * program will be closed when all buffered data has
- * drained.
- */
- debug("EOF received for stdin.");
- packet_check_eom();
- stdin_eof = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- u_int row = packet_get_int();
- u_int col = packet_get_int();
- u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
- u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("Window change received.");
- packet_check_eom();
- if (fdin != -1)
- pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
- return 0;
-}
-
static Channel *
server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
{
@@ -1353,9 +834,9 @@ server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
static void
-server_init_dispatch_20(void)
+server_init_dispatch(void)
{
- debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
+ debug("server_init_dispatch");
dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
@@ -1375,36 +856,3 @@ server_init_dispatch_20(void)
/* rekeying */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_13(void)
-{
- debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
- dispatch_init(NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_15(void)
-{
- server_init_dispatch_13();
- debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch(void)
-{
- if (compat20)
- server_init_dispatch_20();
- else if (compat13)
- server_init_dispatch_13();
- else
- server_init_dispatch_15();
-}
diff --git a/serverloop.h b/serverloop.h
index 7311558f9..d5fbda16f 100644
--- a/serverloop.h
+++ b/serverloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.7 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H
#define SERVERLOOP_H
-void server_loop(pid_t, int, int, int);
void server_loop2(Authctxt *);
#endif
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 2235f26ac..9bad653fc 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.282 2016/03/10 11:47:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.283 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
@@ -128,7 +127,6 @@ void do_child(Session *, const char *);
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
-static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(Session *);
@@ -267,11 +265,7 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
auth_debug_send();
- if (compat20)
- do_authenticated2(authctxt);
- else
- do_authenticated1(authctxt);
-
+ do_authenticated2(authctxt);
do_cleanup(authctxt);
}
@@ -290,164 +284,6 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
- * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
- * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
- * are requested, etc.
- */
-static void
-do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Session *s;
- char *command;
- int success, type, screen_flag;
- int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
-
- s = session_new();
- if (s == NULL) {
- error("no more sessions");
- return;
- }
- s->authctxt = authctxt;
- s->pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- /*
- * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
- * or a command.
- */
- for (;;) {
- success = 0;
-
- /* Get a packet from the client. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* Process the packet. */
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
- compression_level = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
- packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.",
- compression_level);
- break;
- }
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- debug2("compression disabled");
- break;
- }
- /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
- enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
- success = session_pty_req(s);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
- s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
- s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
-
- screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
- SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
- debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
-
- if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
- if (!screen_flag)
- debug2("Buggy client: "
- "X11 screen flag missing");
- s->screen = packet_get_int();
- } else {
- s->screen = 0;
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
- xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
- else {
- success = 0;
- error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
- }
- if (!success) {
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->auth_data);
- s->auth_proto = NULL;
- s->auth_data = NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
- if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
- no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
- debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
- success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
- if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
- debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) {
- debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
- break;
- }
- debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
- if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
- &options.fwd_opts) < 0) {
- debug("Port forwarding failed.");
- break;
- }
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
- if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
- case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
- if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
- command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
- if (do_exec(s, command) != 0)
- packet_disconnect(
- "command execution failed");
- free(command);
- } else {
- if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0)
- packet_disconnect(
- "shell execution failed");
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- session_close(s);
- return;
-
- default:
- /*
- * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
- * and a failure message is returned.
- */
- logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
- }
- packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
- if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
- enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- packet_start_compression(compression_level);
- }
- }
-}
-
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
@@ -615,14 +451,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[1]);
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
- s->is_subsystem, 0);
- } else {
- /* Enter the interactive session. */
- server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
- /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
- }
+ session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
#else
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
close(inout[0]);
@@ -632,13 +462,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
* Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
- s->is_subsystem, 0);
- } else {
- server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
- /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
- }
+ session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -756,12 +581,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
- } else {
- server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
- /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
- }
+ session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
return 0;
}
@@ -2106,14 +1926,8 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
}
s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
-
- if (compat20) {
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- } else {
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- }
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
@@ -2135,9 +1949,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
}
debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
- /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
- if (!compat20)
- n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+ n_bytes = packet_remaining();
tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
if (!use_privsep)
@@ -2353,8 +2165,6 @@ void
session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr,
int is_tty)
{
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
/*
* now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
* we can activate our channel and register the fd's
@@ -2794,7 +2604,7 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+ if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index f18eaf329..98e1dafee 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.32 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.33 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ struct Session {
char *auth_data;
int single_connection;
- /* proto 2 */
int chanid;
int *x11_chanids;
int is_subsystem;
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 9fc829a91..b50ea1d99 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.471 2016/08/03 04:23:55 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.472 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
@@ -201,22 +200,12 @@ int have_agent = 0;
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
- Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
- Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
- int have_ssh1_key;
int have_ssh2_key;
- u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
} sensitive_data;
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
- * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
- */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
-
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
@@ -255,10 +244,6 @@ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-#endif
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
/*
@@ -375,43 +360,10 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
}
-/*
- * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
- * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
- * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
- * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
- * problems.
- */
-static void
-generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
-{
- verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
- sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
- options.server_key_bits);
- verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
-
- arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- errno = save_errno;
- key_do_regen = 1;
-}
-
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
u_int i;
- int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s, *newline = "\n";
@@ -511,42 +463,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
"refusing connection", remote_version);
}
- mismatch = 0;
- switch (remote_major) {
- case 1:
- if (remote_minor == 99) {
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
- enable_compat20();
- else
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (remote_minor < 3) {
- packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
- "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
- } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
- /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
- enable_compat13();
- }
- break;
- case 2:
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- enable_compat20();
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
chop(server_version_string);
debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
- if (mismatch) {
+ if (remote_major == 2 ||
+ (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ } else {
s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
close(sock_in);
@@ -565,10 +488,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
int i;
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- }
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
@@ -579,8 +498,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
@@ -590,24 +507,14 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
Key *tmp;
int i;
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
- }
-
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
-
- /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
}
static void
@@ -803,7 +710,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ if (key == NULL)
continue;
/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
@@ -952,7 +859,7 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
- key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
@@ -1038,13 +945,6 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
- * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
- * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
- * bignum n "
- * bignum d "
- * bignum iqmp "
- * bignum p "
- * bignum q "
* string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
*/
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
@@ -1052,28 +952,6 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
- sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- } else
-#endif
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif
@@ -1107,24 +985,6 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
free(cp);
- if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
- if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
- fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
- "error", __func__);
-#endif
- }
-
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
#endif
@@ -1248,7 +1108,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
- int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+ int startups = 0;
int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
@@ -1295,11 +1155,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
}
- if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
- key_used = 0;
- key_do_regen = 0;
- }
if (ret < 0)
continue;
@@ -1434,19 +1289,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
close(config_s[0]);
close(config_s[1]);
}
-
- /*
- * Mark that the key has been used (it
- * was "given" to the child).
- */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
- key_used == 0) {
- /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
- signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
- alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
- key_used = 1;
- }
-
close(*newsock);
/*
@@ -1619,8 +1461,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
- options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
- 32768, NULL);
+ /* ignored */
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
@@ -1726,9 +1567,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
drop_cray_privs();
#endif
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
/*
@@ -1852,8 +1690,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
- if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
- have_agent) {
+ if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
keytype = pubkey->type;
@@ -1868,10 +1705,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
switch (keytype) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
- break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -1884,19 +1717,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
- key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ?
- sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+ key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
free(fp);
}
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
@@ -1944,33 +1768,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
key_type(key));
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- /* Check certain values for sanity. */
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
- if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
- options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- /*
- * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
- * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
- * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
- */
- if (options.server_key_bits >
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- options.server_key_bits =
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
- debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
- options.server_key_bits);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
if (use_privsep) {
struct stat st;
@@ -2068,9 +1865,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
platform_pre_listen();
server_listen();
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
@@ -2220,11 +2014,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
-
- /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
- if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
packet_set_nonblocking();
/* allocate authentication context */
@@ -2242,7 +2031,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (use_privsep) {
if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
goto authenticated;
- } else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
+ } else if (have_agent) {
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
@@ -2251,17 +2040,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
- if (compat20) {
- do_ssh2_kex();
- do_authentication2(authctxt);
- } else {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- do_ssh1_kex();
- do_authentication(authctxt);
-#else
- fatal("ssh1 not supported");
-#endif
- }
+ do_ssh2_kex();
+ do_authentication2(authctxt);
+
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
@@ -2309,16 +2090,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (use_privsep) {
privsep_postauth(authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- if (!compat20)
- destroy_sensitive_data();
}
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
- if (compat20)
- notify_hostkeys(active_state);
+ notify_hostkeys(active_state);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
@@ -2347,229 +2125,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
exit(0);
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-/*
- * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
- * (key with larger modulus first).
- */
-int
-ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
-{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- int rsafail = 0;
-
- if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
- /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
- "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
- rsafail++;
- } else {
- /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
- "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
- rsafail++;
- }
- return (rsafail);
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-static void
-do_ssh1_kex(void)
-{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- int i, len;
- int rsafail = 0;
- BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
- u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8];
- size_t fake_key_len;
- u_char cookie[8];
- u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
-
- /*
- * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
- * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
- * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
- * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
- * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
- * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
- * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
- */
- arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
-
- /*
- * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
- * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
- * spoofing.
- */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
- /* Store our public server RSA key. */
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Store our public host RSA key. */
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Put protocol flags. */
- packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
-
- /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
- packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
-
- /* Declare supported authentication types. */
- auth_mask = 0;
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
- if (options.rsa_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
- if (options.password_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
- packet_put_int(auth_mask);
-
- /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-
- /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
-
- /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
- cipher_type = packet_get_char();
-
- if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
- packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
-
- /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
- sent earlier with the public key packet. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
- packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
- debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
-
- /* Get the encrypted integer. */
- if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(real_key_int);
-
- protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
- packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */
- if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
- fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int);
- if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes))
- fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes);
- arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len);
- if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL)
- fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed");
-
- /* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */
- rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int));
- /* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */
- if (rsafail)
- session_key_int = fake_key_int;
- else
- session_key_int = real_key_int;
-
- /*
- * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
- * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
- * key is in the highest bits.
- */
- (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
- len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
- error("%s: bad session key len from %s port %d: "
- "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", __func__,
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
- rsafail++;
- } else {
- explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
- BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
- session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
-
- derive_ssh1_session_id(
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
- cookie, session_id);
- /*
- * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
- * session id.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
- }
-
- /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
-
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-
- /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
- BN_clear_free(real_key_int);
- BN_clear_free(fake_key_int);
-
- /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
-
- /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
- explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
- debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
-
- /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-#endif
-
int
sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag)