upstream: refactor authorized_keys/principals handling

remove "struct ssh *" from arguments - this was only used to pass the
remote host/address. These can be passed in instead and the resulting
code is less tightly coupled to ssh_api.[ch]

ok dtucker@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d4373d013edc4cc4b5c21a599e1837ac31dda0d
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2022-05-27 05:01:25 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 2c334fd36f
commit 3b0b142d2a
6 changed files with 77 additions and 57 deletions

10
auth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.155 2022/04/26 07:41:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.156 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -914,12 +914,10 @@ auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
}
int
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc)
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
const char *loc)
{
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
time_t now = time(NULL);
char buf[64];

10
auth.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.102 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.103 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ int auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *);
int hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *,
const char *, char *, struct sshkey *);
int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *);
/*
@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *);
int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *, int, const char *);
int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *, int,
const char *, const char *, const char *);
void auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int);
/* debug messages during authentication */

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.113 2022/02/27 01:33:59 naddy Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.114 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
hostbound = strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0;
@ -222,7 +225,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(pw, key, 1, remote_ip,
remote_host, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
@ -284,7 +288,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(pw, key, 0, remote_ip,
remote_host, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
@ -342,7 +347,7 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
* log preamble for file/line information.
*/
static int
check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
@ -392,7 +397,7 @@ check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
}
static int
process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file,
const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
@ -420,7 +425,7 @@ process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
nonblank++;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
if (check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_principal = 1;
}
debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
@ -431,7 +436,7 @@ process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */
static int
match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
@ -446,7 +451,7 @@ match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp);
success = process_principals(f, file, cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return success;
@ -457,7 +462,7 @@ match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
* returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
ok = process_principals(f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
@ -596,8 +601,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
*/
static int
check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
struct sshkey *found = NULL;
@ -657,8 +663,8 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by key options";
goto fail_reason;
}
@ -680,7 +686,8 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0,
remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
@ -736,8 +743,9 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file,
struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip,
const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
size_t linesize = 0;
@ -761,7 +769,8 @@ check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
nonblank++;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
if (check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp,
remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_key = 1;
}
free(line);
@ -771,7 +780,8 @@ check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
@ -803,12 +813,12 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
* against the username.
*/
if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file,
if (match_principals_file(pw, principals_file,
key->cert, &principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
}
/* Try querying command if specified */
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key,
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key,
&principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
@ -829,7 +839,8 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, cert_opts, 0,
remote_ip, remote_host, "cert") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
@ -837,8 +848,8 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
final_opts = cert_opts;
cert_opts = NULL;
} else {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0,
"principals") != 0) {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, principals_opts, 0,
remote_ip, remote_host, "principals") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
goto fail_reason;
}
@ -876,8 +887,9 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *file, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int found_key = 0;
@ -890,8 +902,8 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
debug("trying public key file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file,
key, authoptsp);
found_key = check_authkeys_file(pw, f, file,
key, remote_ip, remote_host, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
}
@ -904,8 +916,9 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
FILE *f = NULL;
@ -1005,8 +1018,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f,
options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp);
ok = check_authkeys_file(user_pw, f,
options.authorized_keys_command, key, remote_ip,
remote_host, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
@ -1036,8 +1050,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
* Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
*/
int
user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int success = 0, i;
char *file;
@ -1057,7 +1072,8 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
continue;
file = expand_authorized_keys(
options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file,
remote_ip, remote_host, &opts);
free(file);
if (!success) {
sshauthopt_free(opts);
@ -1067,12 +1083,14 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
if (success)
goto out;
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host,
&opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip,
remote_host, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.232 2022/02/25 02:09:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.233 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -1151,6 +1151,9 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
u_int type = 0;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
@ -1176,8 +1179,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
break;
allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, remote_ip, remote_host, &opts);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
auth_method = "hostbased";

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.123 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.124 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -434,8 +434,9 @@ mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.47 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.48 2022/05/27 05:01:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
int, struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, struct sshkey *);
int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,