diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index c2c13aa10..950214376 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:17:21 [sshconnect.c] pass salen to sockaddr_ntop so that we are happy on linux/solaris + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:53:06 + [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c] + display minimum RSA modulus in error(); ok markus@ 20020609 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync @@ -872,4 +875,4 @@ - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@ -$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2201 2002/06/11 15:46:34 mouring Exp $ +$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2202 2002/06/11 15:47:42 mouring Exp $ diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c index 493f14b11..92f6277f9 100644 --- a/auth-rsa.c +++ b/auth-rsa.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.55 2002/03/29 19:18:33 stevesk Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $"); #include #include @@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - error("auth_rsa_verify_response: n too small: %d bits", - BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); return (0); } diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c index 458c9c840..3e66294e9 100644 --- a/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/ssh-rsa.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.19 2002/05/31 13:20:50 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.20 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $"); #include #include @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify( return -1; } if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - error("ssh_rsa_verify: n too small: %d bits", - BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); return -1; } buffer_init(&b);