- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/23 03:33:38

[auth.c]
     make secure_filename() spam debug logs less
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller 2011-05-29 21:40:42 +10:00
parent d8478b6a9b
commit 1dd66e5f74
2 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
entierly :)
feedback and ok markus@ dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/23 03:33:38
[auth.c]
make secure_filename() spam debug logs less
20110520
- (djm) [session.c] call setexeccon() before executing passwd for pw

9
auth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.93 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.94 2011/05/23 03:33:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -456,7 +456,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
@ -466,11 +465,9 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
}
/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
break;
}
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too