From 0ae6e009c8c6c61e16407b906ee80714daf61037 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2001 12:21:34 +1000
Subject: [PATCH]    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15      [auth.c]
      no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir).      note that dirname(3) modifies
 its argument on some systems.

---
 ChangeLog |  9 ++++++++-
 auth.c    | 17 +++++++----------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2e3f57a3a..0f00e72e3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@
      dugsong ok
      XXX isn't it sensitive to the order of -I/usr/include/kerberosIV and
      -I/usr/include/kerberosV?
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 16:29:59
+     [ssh.c]
+     sort options string, fix -p, add -k
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15
+     [auth.c]
+     no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir).
+     note that dirname(3) modifies its argument on some systems.
 
 20010711
  - (djm) dirname(3) may modify its argument on glibc and other systems. 
@@ -6015,4 +6022,4 @@
  - Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
  - Released 1.0pre1
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1396 2001/07/14 02:20:32 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1397 2001/07/14 02:21:34 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 84e0be761..9d4f4abfe 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.26 2001/06/27 04:48:52 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.27 2001/07/11 18:26:15 markus Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
@@ -363,13 +363,10 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
     char *err, size_t errlen)
 {
 	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
-	char homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
 	char *cp;
 	struct stat st;
 
-	strlcpy(homedir, dirname(pw->pw_dir), sizeof(homedir));
-
 	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
 		    strerror(errno));
@@ -385,8 +382,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", homedir);
-
 	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
 	for (;;) {
 		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
@@ -395,10 +390,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 		}
 		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
 
-		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
-		if (strcmp(buf, homedir) == 0)
-			break;
-
 		debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
@@ -408,6 +399,12 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 			return -1;
 		}
 
+		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+		if (strcmp(pw->pw_dir, buf) == 0) {
+			debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+			    buf);
+			break;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
 		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too