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- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15

Browse Source 
[auth.c]
     no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir).
     note that dirname(3) modifies its argument on some systems.
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller 2001-07-14 12:21:34 +10:00
parent 1b73448d6d
commit 0ae6e009c8
2 changed files with 15 additions and 11 deletions
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9
ChangeLog
View File

@ -40,6 +40,13 @@
dugsong ok
XXX isn't it sensitive to the order of -I/usr/include/kerberosIV and
-I/usr/include/kerberosV?
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 16:29:59
[ssh.c]
sort options string, fix -p, add -k
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15
[auth.c]
no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir).
note that dirname(3) modifies its argument on some systems.
20010711
- (djm) dirname(3) may modify its argument on glibc and other systems.
@ -6015,4 +6022,4 @@
- Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
- Released 1.0pre1
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1396 2001/07/14 02:20:32 djm Exp $
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1397 2001/07/14 02:21:34 djm Exp $

17
auth.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.26 2001/06/27 04:48:52 markus Exp $");
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.27 2001/07/11 18:26:15 markus Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
@ -363,13 +363,10 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
char homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
char *cp;
struct stat st;
strlcpy(homedir, dirname(pw->pw_dir), sizeof(homedir));
if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
strerror(errno));
@ -385,8 +382,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
return -1;
}
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", homedir);
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
@ -395,10 +390,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
if (strcmp(buf, homedir) == 0)
break;
debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
@ -408,6 +399,12 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
return -1;
}
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
if (strcmp(pw->pw_dir, buf) == 0) {
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
break;
}
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too