openssh/monitor_wrap.c

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/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.70 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "dh.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
#include "zlib.h"
#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
#else
#include "zlib.h"
#endif
#include "monitor.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "schnorr.h"
#include "jpake.h"
#include "uuencode.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "roaming.h"
/* Imports */
extern int compat20;
extern z_stream incoming_stream;
extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
/*
* m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
* points to the unprivileged child.
*/
return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
}
void
mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
{
u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
u_char buf[4];
u_int msg_len;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
{
u_char rtype;
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
mm_request_receive(sock, m);
rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
if (rtype != type)
fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
rtype, type);
}
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
BIGNUM *p, *g;
int success = 0;
Buffer m;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, min);
buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
buffer_put_int(&m, max);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
success = buffer_get_char(&m);
if (success == 0)
fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m));
buffer_free(&m);
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
int
mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key));
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
*sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
buffer_free(&m);
return (0);
}
struct passwd *
mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username)
{
Buffer m;
struct passwd *pw;
u_int len;
ServerOptions *newopts;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, username);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) {
pw = NULL;
goto out;
}
pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
if (len != sizeof(struct passwd))
fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
#endif
pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
if (newopts->banner != NULL)
newopts->banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
xfree(newopts);
buffer_free(&m);
return (pw);
}
char *
mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
{
Buffer m;
char *banner;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
buffer_clear(&m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
xfree(banner);
banner = NULL;
}
return (banner);
}
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
void
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
{
Buffer m;
int authenticated = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key));
}
int
mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
Key *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key));
}
int
mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
char *host, Key *key)
{
int ret;
key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key);
key->type = KEY_RSA1;
return (ret);
}
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
u_int len;
int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
xfree(blob);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
/* fake forced command */
auth_clear_options();
have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
buffer_free(&m);
return (allowed);
}
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
u_int len;
int verified = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
xfree(blob);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return (verified);
}
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
{
Buffer b;
u_int len;
Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
Enc *enc;
Mac *mac;
Comp *comp;
debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __func__, blob, blen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
#endif
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
newkey = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkey));
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
/* Enc structure */
enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len);
enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if (len != enc->block_size)
fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %u != %u", __func__,
enc->block_size, len);
if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__,
enc->name, enc->cipher);
/* Mac structure */
mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if (len > mac->key_len)
fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len,
mac->key_len);
mac->key_len = len;
/* Comp structure */
comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
len = buffer_len(&b);
if (len != 0)
error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", len);
buffer_free(&b);
return (newkey);
}
int
mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
{
Buffer b;
int len;
Enc *enc;
Mac *mac;
Comp *comp;
Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode);
debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey);
if (newkey == NULL) {
error("%s: newkey == NULL", __func__);
return 0;
}
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
buffer_init(&b);
/* Enc structure */
buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name);
/* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
/* Mac structure */
buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
/* Comp structure */
buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name);
len = buffer_len(&b);
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (blobp != NULL) {
*blobp = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
}
memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
buffer_free(&b);
return len;
}
static void
mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
{
buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need);
buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type);
buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type);
buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer));
buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags);
buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string);
buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string);
}
void
mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
{
Buffer m, *input, *output;
u_char *blob, *p;
u_int bloblen, plen;
u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
buffer_init(&m);
if (!compat20) {
u_char iv[24];
u_char *key;
u_int ivlen, keylen;
buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags());
buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher());
debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 KEY+IV", __func__);
keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(NULL);
key = xmalloc(keylen+1); /* add 1 if keylen == 0 */
keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key);
buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
xfree(key);
ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen);
buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen);
buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
goto skip;
} else {
/* Kex for rekeying */
mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex);
}
debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
__func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
/* Keys from Kex */
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__);
skip:
/* More key context */
plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL);
p = xmalloc(plen+1);
packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p);
buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
xfree(p);
plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL);
p = xmalloc(plen+1);
packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p);
buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
xfree(p);
/* Compression state */
debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream));
buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
/* Network I/O buffers */
input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input();
output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output();
buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input));
buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output));
/* Roaming */
if (compat20) {
buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes());
buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes());
}
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
}
int
mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
Buffer m;
char *p, *msg;
int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1;
/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
if (tmp1 > 0)
close(tmp1);
if (tmp2 > 0)
close(tmp2);
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
close(tmp2);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (0);
}
p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
xfree(p);
buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
xfree(msg);
if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
/* Success */
return (1);
}
void
mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
Buffer m;
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
/* closed dup'ed master */
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
u_int
mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
Buffer m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
xfree(msg);
buffer_free(&m);
2003-11-21 12:56:47 +00:00
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
void *
mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
int success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (NULL);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (authctxt);
}
int
mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
u_int i;
int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m);
ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
*name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*num = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
(*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
(*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (ret);
}
int
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
Buffer m;
u_int i;
int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
buffer_free(&m);
return (ret);
}
void
mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Request process termination */
void
mm_terminate(void)
{
Buffer m;
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
int
mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
{
int rsafail;
Buffer m;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
buffer_free(&m);
return (rsafail);
}
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
int
mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
&m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
Buffer m;
int authok;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#ifdef SKEY
int
mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
&m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
xfree(challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
Buffer m;
int authok;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#endif /* SKEY */
void
mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
{
Buffer m;
int i;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
int
mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
{
Buffer m;
Key *key;
u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
/* fake forced command */
auth_clear_options();
have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
*rkey = key;
xfree(blob);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (allowed);
}
BIGNUM *
mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
{
Buffer m;
BIGNUM *challenge;
u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
key->type = KEY_RSA1;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
xfree(blob);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
buffer_free(&m);
return (challenge);
}
int
mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
int success = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
key->type = KEY_RSA1;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
xfree(blob);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return (success);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, event);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
void
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
*ctx = NULL;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int len;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
out->length = len;
if (flags)
*flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
&m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return(major);
}
int
mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
Buffer m;
int authenticated = 0;
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
&m);
authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef JPAKE
void
mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
*hash_scheme = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*salt = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
}
void
mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
if ((*priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(*priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
*id = buffer_get_string(&m, id_len);
/* priv1 and priv2 are, well, private */
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv1);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv2);
*priv1_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv1_proof_len);
*priv2_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv2_proof_len);
buffer_free(&m);
}
void
mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
BIGNUM **newpub,
u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
/* monitor already has all bignums except theirpub1, theirpub2 */
buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub1);
buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub2);
/* monitor already knows our id */
buffer_put_string(&m, theirid, theirid_len);
buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len);
buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *newpub);
*newpub_exponent_proof = buffer_get_string(&m,
newpub_exponent_proof_len);
buffer_free(&m);
}
void
mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
BIGNUM **k,
u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
/* monitor already has all bignums except step2_val */
buffer_put_bignum2(&m, step2_val);
/* monitor already knows all the ids */
buffer_put_string(&m, theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
/* 'k' is sensitive and stays in the monitor */
*confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(&m, confirm_hash_len);
buffer_free(&m);
}
int
mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
{
Buffer m;
int success = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
/* k is dummy in slave, ignored */
/* monitor knows all the ids */
buffer_put_string(&m, peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
return success;
}
#endif /* JPAKE */