openssh/kex.c

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/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.155 2019/10/08 22:40:39 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
2019-10-28 04:53:25 +00:00
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
2019-10-28 04:53:25 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
2016-07-15 09:14:48 +00:00
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "ssh.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "version.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 05:34:40 +00:00
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 02:39:39 +00:00
#include "kex.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 05:34:40 +00:00
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
"KEX algorithms",
"host key algorithms",
"ciphers ctos",
"ciphers stoc",
"MACs ctos",
"MACs stoc",
"compression ctos",
"compression stoc",
"languages ctos",
"languages stoc",
};
struct kexalg {
char *name;
u_int type;
int ec_nid;
int hash_alg;
};
static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, 0,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
char *
kex_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Validate KEX method name list */
int
kex_names_valid(const char *names)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
free(s);
return 1;
}
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
return strdup(b);
if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
return strdup(a);
if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
return NULL;
len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
(ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
free(m);
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
}
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
free(ret);
return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
}
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
* configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
* indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
* specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
* at the head.
*/
int
kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
{
char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
list = *listp;
*listp = NULL;
if (*list == '+') {
/* Append names to default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else if (*list == '-') {
/* Remove names from default list */
if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
/* filtering has already been done */
return 0;
} else if (*list == '^') {
/* Place names at head of default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else {
/* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
}
/*
* The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
* the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
* cases we need to do it now.
*/
ret = NULL;
if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
/* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*cp == '!') {
/* negated matches are not supported here */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
free(matching);
if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(ret);
ret = tmp;
}
if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
/* An empty name-list is an error */
/* XXX better error code? */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
/* success */
*listp = ret;
ret = NULL;
r = 0;
fail:
free(matching);
free(opatterns);
free(list);
free(ret);
return r;
}
/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
int
kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
u_int i;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(b);
/*
* add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
* kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
*/
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */
return r;
return 0;
}
/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
int
kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char v;
u_int i;
char **proposal = NULL;
int r;
*propp = NULL;
if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */
error("%s: consume cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* extract kex init proposal strings */
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse proposal %u: %s", __func__,
i, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
}
/* first kex follows / reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */
error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
*first_kex_follows = v;
debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
debug2("reserved %u ", i);
r = 0;
*propp = proposal;
out:
if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
kex_prop_free(proposal);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
void
kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
u_int i;
if (proposal == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
free(proposal[i]);
free(proposal);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static void
kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
}
static int
kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
int
kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
return 0;
}
int
kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_int32_t i, ninfo;
char *name;
u_char *val;
size_t vlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) {
free(name);
return r;
}
if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val);
kex->server_sig_algs = val;
val = NULL;
} else
debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name);
free(name);
free(val);
}
return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
}
static int
kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
free(kex->name);
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
int
kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 05:23:11 +00:00
{
u_char *cookie;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
return 0;
kex->done = 0;
/* generate a random cookie */
if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) {
error("%s: bad kex length: %zu < %d", __func__,
sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 05:23:11 +00:00
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 05:23:11 +00:00
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard proposal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
error("%s: unknown kex type %u", __func__, kex->kex_type);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
struct kex *
kex_new(void)
{
struct kex *kex;
if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL ||
(kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
return NULL;
}
return kex;
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 05:23:11 +00:00
}
void
kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
{
if (newkeys == NULL)
return;
if (newkeys->enc.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
free(newkeys->enc.key);
newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
}
if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
free(newkeys->enc.iv);
newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->enc.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
free(newkeys->comp.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
if (newkeys->mac.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
free(newkeys->mac.key);
newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->mac.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
free(newkeys);
}
void
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
if (kex == NULL)
return;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
int
kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
return 0;
}
int
kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
kex_free(ssh->kex);
ssh->kex = NULL;
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
* code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
*/
int
kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no kex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
error("%s: requested twice", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh->kex->done = 0;
return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
}
static int
choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported cipher %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
enc->key = NULL;
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
return 0;
}
static int
choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
error("%s: unsupported MAC %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
mac->name = name;
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
error("%s: unsupported compression scheme %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
const struct kexalg *kexalg;
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
if (k->name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported KEX method %s", __func__, k->name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
error("%s: unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", __func__,
k->hostkey_alg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
return 0;
}
static int
proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
static int check[] = {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
};
int *idx;
char *p;
for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
return (0);
}
}
debug2("proposals match");
return (1);
}
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
char **cprop, **sprop;
int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
int r, first_kex_follows;
debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
goto out;
if (kex->server) {
cprop=peer;
sprop=my;
} else {
cprop=my;
sprop=peer;
}
/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
char *ext;
ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
free(ext);
}
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
peer[nenc] = NULL;
goto out;
}
authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
if (authlen == 0 &&
(r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
peer[nmac] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
peer[ncomp] = NULL;
goto out;
}
debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
}
need = dh_need = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
}
/* XXX need runden? */
kex->we_need = need;
kex->dh_need = dh_need;
/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer))
ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
r = 0;
out:
kex_prop_free(my);
kex_prop_free(peer);
return r;
}
static int
derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
char c = id;
u_int have;
size_t mdsz;
u_char *digest;
int r;
if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
error("%s: KEX hash failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
/*
* expand key:
* Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
* Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
*/
for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
error("%s: KDF failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
dump_digest("key", digest, need);
#endif
*keyp = digest;
digest = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(digest);
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
return r;
}
#define NKEYS 6
int
kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
int r;
/* save initial hash as session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
if (kex->session_id == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(keys[j]);
return r;
}
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
}
return 0;
}
int
kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
*pubp = NULL;
*prvp = NULL;
if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey loader", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
*pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
*prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
if (*pubp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
return 0;
}
int
kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey verifier", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
(kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void
dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
}
#endif
/*
* Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
* Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
*/
static void
send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg)
{
char *crnl = "\r\n";
if (!ssh->kex->server)
return;
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) ||
atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl))
error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
/*
* Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for
* up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0).
* Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure.
*/
int
kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
const char *version_addendum)
{
int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
size_t len, i, n;
int r, expect_nl;
u_char c;
struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version;
struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version;
char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL;
char *cp, *remote_version = NULL;
/* Prepare and send our banner */
sshbuf_reset(our_version);
if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
version_addendum = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version),
sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) {
error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */
error("%s: sshbuf_consume_end: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version);
if (our_version_string == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string);
/* Read other side's version identification. */
for (n = 0; ; n++) {
if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string "
"received.");
error("%s: No SSH version received in first %u lines "
"from server", __func__, SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(peer_version);
expect_nl = 0;
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (timeout_ms > 0) {
r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&timeout_ms);
if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting "
"for SSH identification string.");
error("Connection timed out during "
"banner exchange");
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
} else if (r == -1) {
error("%s: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&c, 1);
if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) {
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host",
__func__);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
} else if (len != 1) {
error("%s: read: %.100s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (c == '\r') {
expect_nl = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n')
break;
if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) {
error("%s: banner line contains invalid "
"characters", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) {
error("%s: banner line too long", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
}
/* Is this an actual protocol banner? */
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 &&
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
/* If not, then just log the line and continue */
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */
if (ssh->kex->server) {
error("%s: client sent invalid protocol identifier "
"\"%.256s\"", __func__, cp);
free(cp);
goto invalid;
}
debug("%s: banner line %zu: %s", __func__, n, cp);
free(cp);
}
peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version);
if (peer_version_string == NULL)
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
/* XXX must be same size for sscanf */
if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) {
error("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'",
peer_version_string);
invalid:
send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string.");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
mismatch = 0;
switch (remote_major) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remote_minor != 99)
mismatch = 1;
break;
default:
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
if (mismatch) {
error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ.");
r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(our_version_string);
free(peer_version_string);
free(remote_version);
return r;
}