RepoMirrors
/
openssh
mirror of git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
openssh/myproposal.h

198 lines
5.4 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

upstream commit turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by default too) ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
2015-07-03 03:47:00 +00:00
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.46 2015/07/03 03:47:00 djm Exp $ */
- niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/2001 [atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1 ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h] $OpenBSD$
2001-01-29 07:39:26 +00:00
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 02:29:08 +00:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 04:17:05 +00:00
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 02:10:02 +00:00
/* conditional algorithm support */
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-09 07:39:25 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
#else
- (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-09 07:39:25 +00:00
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
#endif
#else
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
#endif
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
2013-06-11 01:47:24 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 09:17:21 +00:00
",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
2013-06-11 01:47:24 +00:00
#else
# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
#endif
- (dtucker) Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessary functions, not from the openssl version.
2013-06-05 05:04:00 +00:00
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
- (djm) [myproposal.h] Fix reversed OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER test and bad #define that was causing diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 to be incorrectly disabled
2011-01-13 11:00:20 +00:00
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 02:10:02 +00:00
#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512,"
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 04:17:05 +00:00
#else
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 02:10:02 +00:00
# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
#endif
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
2014-08-19 01:14:36 +00:00
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
2014-06-10 21:37:25 +00:00
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
# else
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
# endif
upstream commit Reorder client proposal to prefer diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
2015-05-27 23:51:10 +00:00
#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
2014-06-10 21:37:25 +00:00
KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
upstream commit Reorder client proposal to prefer diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
2015-05-27 23:51:10 +00:00
KEX_SHA256_METHODS
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs
2015-05-29 08:03:15 +00:00
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
upstream commit Reorder client proposal to prefer diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
2015-05-27 23:51:10 +00:00
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs
2015-05-29 08:03:15 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/07 09:07:40 [kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] Implement the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange method using the SHA256 code in libc (and wrapper to make it into an OpenSSL EVP), interop tested against CVS PuTTY NB. no portability bits committed yet
2006-03-15 01:08:28 +00:00
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
upstream commit turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by default too) ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
2015-07-03 03:47:00 +00:00
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 04:17:05 +00:00
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26 [PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
2010-04-16 05:56:21 +00:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-12-07 00:24:01 +00:00
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-31 12:41:14 +00:00
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 01:39:26 +00:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-12-07 00:24:01 +00:00
"ssh-ed25519," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-31 12:41:14 +00:00
"ssh-rsa," \
"ssh-dss"
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/23 07:58:11 [myproposal.h] prefer CTR modes and revised arcfour (i.e w/ discard) modes to CBC modes; ok markus@
2009-01-28 05:33:31 +00:00
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 02:10:02 +00:00
/* the actual algorithms */
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 09:17:21 +00:00
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/05/23 23:32:46 [cipher.c myproposal.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add support for draft-harris-ssh-arcfour-fixes-02 improved arcfour modes; ok markus@
2005-05-26 02:19:17 +00:00
"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/23 07:58:11 [myproposal.h] prefer CTR modes and revised arcfour (i.e w/ discard) modes to CBC modes; ok markus@
2009-01-28 05:33:31 +00:00
"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 02:10:02 +00:00
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18 [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h] [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data; these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default. feedback and ok djm@
2012-12-11 23:46:31 +00:00
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-16 23:52:07 +00:00
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-16 23:52:07 +00:00
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC "," \
"hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18 [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h] [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data; these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default. feedback and ok djm@
2012-12-11 23:46:31 +00:00
"hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/08/02 01:22:11 [mac.c myproposal.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add new SHA256 and SHA512 based HMAC modes from http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt Patch from mdb AT juniper.net; feedback and ok markus@
2011-08-05 20:17:30 +00:00
"hmac-md5," \
"hmac-ripemd160," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/11 12:59:25 [Makefile.in sshd.8 sshconnect2.c readconf.h readconf.c packet.c sshd.c ssh.c ssh.1 servconf.h servconf.c myproposal.h kex.h kex.c] 1) clean up the MAC support for SSH-2 2) allow you to specify the MAC with 'ssh -m' 3) or the 'MACs' keyword in ssh(d)_config 4) add hmac-{md5,sha1}-96 ok stevesk@, provos@
2001-02-15 03:01:59 +00:00
"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/08/02 01:22:11 [mac.c myproposal.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add new SHA256 and SHA512 based HMAC modes from http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt Patch from mdb AT juniper.net; feedback and ok markus@
2011-08-05 20:17:30 +00:00
"hmac-sha1-96," \
"hmac-md5-96"
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
#else
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519"
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
upstream commit Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. ok deraadt@
2015-04-21 07:01:00 +00:00
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 09:17:21 +00:00
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@
2014-05-15 04:35:03 +00:00
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-16 23:52:07 +00:00
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@
2014-05-15 04:35:03 +00:00
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
"hmac-sha2-256," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-16 23:52:07 +00:00
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-16 23:52:07 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 04:24:09 +00:00
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/07/25 11:59:40 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h packet.c packet.h servconf.c session.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] add a new compression method that delays compression until the user has been authenticated successfully and set compression to 'delayed' for sshd. this breaks older openssh clients (< 3.5) if they insist on compression, so you have to re-enable compression in sshd_config. ok djm@
2005-07-26 11:54:56 +00:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 02:32:37 +00:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_CLIENT \
KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 02:32:37 +00:00
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00
#define KEX_SERVER \
KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 02:32:37 +00:00
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 03:17:20 +00:00